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This dissertation considers several aspects of the distribution of income and income 
inequality. It does so by improving estimates of inequality between demographic 
groups, analyzing factors contributing to US income inequality trends, and estimating 
the impact of income on health outcomes for individuals in the lower tail of the 
income distribution. 
 Most empirical studies of earnings and income inequality across demographic 
groups are based on data from the public use March CPS. However, censoring of high 
incomes in this data prevent researchers from observing the full distribution. The first 
essay uses internal CPS data to illustrate how topcoding results in the understatement 
of income and earnings gaps between men and women, Blacks and Whites, and people 
with and without disabilities. It also demonstrates how a new series of mean incomes 
for topcoded observations can be used in conjunction with public use CPS data to 
closely approximate these internal results. 
The second essay considers the factors accounting for trends in household 
income inequality. Using a shift-share approach, this essay analyzes whether income 
inequality shifts are accounted for by male and female earnings distribution changes or 
by changing household characteristics. It illustrates that the factors contributing to the 
rapid rise in household income inequality in the 1970s and 1980s differ substantially 
from those contributing to slower increases in the 1990s. In contrast to findings for the 
1970s and 1980s, in more recent years increases in male earnings inequality largely 
 account for household income inequality trends while declines in the correlation of 
spouses‘ earnings have mitigated household income inequality growth. 
The final essay shifts from considering income inequality to the impact that 
income has on the health of low income individuals. Health economists have long 
observed a positive relationship between health and income but the reason for this 
relationship is unclear. Using exogenous variation in income from state-level 
differences in the Earned Income Tax Credit, it observes the impact on morbidity of an 
exogenous increase in income for low income individuals. The results find only weak 
evidence that the increases in income result in improvements in self-reported health 
status or the prevalence of functional limitations. 
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 PREFACE 
Economists and policymakers often use trends in inequality as a measure of social 
policy success. But such trend outcomes can be sensitive to both the concept of 
inequality used and the way the concept is implemented. Inequality can be measured 
across segments of the population, such as the labor earnings gap between males and 
females or Blacks and Whites, or on a societal level irrespective of individual 
characteristics. Inequality can also be measured on different types of income, such as 
labor earnings inequality, which capture inequalities in how individuals are 
compensated for their time in the labor market or household income inequality, which 
better captures inequalities in individuals‘ resources available for consumption. 
Alternatively, inequality may exist in aspects of society that are separate from income 
– such as the inequality of the health of individuals. Each essay of this dissertation 
examines the levels and trends in various types of inequality using CPS data that 
corrects for differences in the method used to collect the data over the past 40 years, or 
explores the factors contributing to these inequalities. 
 The first essay considers the measurement of inequality in income and labor 
earnings across demographic segments of the population and demonstrates the 
sensitivity of these results to data reporting procedures used by the Census Bureau. 
Since most empirical studies of trends in income and earnings inequality across 
subgroups of the population are based on data from the public use March Current 
Population Survey (CPS), it is important for this data to accurately reflect the full 
income distribution in the United States. However, censoring of high-incomes in the 
public use March CPS prevents researchers from observing the full income 
distribution.  
Using the internal CPS, this essay reexamines estimates of labor earnings gaps 
between men and women, Blacks and Whites, and individuals with and without 
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disabilities. It illustrates how previous estimates using the public use March CPS data 
will both understate the levels of inequality and misstate the trends because of the 
Census Bureau‘s topcoding procedures. It also shows how population-level estimates 
of inequality and measures of inequality within demographic groups will similarly be 
affected by topcoding in the public use data.  
The problems with the CPS identified in this essay, however, do not mean that 
researchers should abandon the public-use March CPS as a tool for analyzing 
inequality in the United States but rather that it is essential to utilize new tools for 
capturing top incomes when using this topcoded data. This essay describes how a new 
series of mean incomes for censored observations based off of the internal CPS data 
can be used in conjunction with the public use CPS data to allow researchers to closely 
approximate the earnings and income gaps found in the internal CPS data. Thus, by 
using this series of mean incomes researchers can largely mitigate the topcoding 
problems which led to the underestimates of earnings and income gaps described here. 
 Having established that previous estimates of income inequality may be 
understating inequality and misstating the trends, the second essay uses improved 
household income inequality trends based off of the internal March CPS and turns to 
the question of what factors account for these trends. While much of the research 
examining the rise in inequality in the United States since the 1960s has focused on 
labor earnings inequality, there is little evidence regarding how closely these labor 
earnings inequality trends correlate to broader measures of income inequality. This 
essay first compares male and female labor earnings inequality to that of household 
income. It then uses a shift-share analysis to analyze the change in income inequality 
accounted for by changes in male and female earnings distributions and changing 
household characteristics.  
When using the shift-share analysis, it is evident that the factors contributing to 
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the rapid rise in household income inequality in the 1970s and 1980s differ 
substantially from those contributing to the slower increase in the 1990s. In contrast to 
findings for the 1970s and 1980s, in more recent years increases in male earnings 
inequality largely account for the changes in household income inequality.  This is the 
case since changes in the correlation between spouses‘ earnings have mitigated 
household income inequality growth. Hence, researchers focusing only on male labor 
earnings inequality as a factor important to household income inequality will 
understate the rise in income inequality in the United States in the 1980s but overstate 
the growth in income inequality in the 1990s.  Since household income inequality 
more closely captures inequality in the resources available for individuals to consume 
goods and services than do labor earnings, these findings are important for 
understanding the more complete set of mechanisms which may influence inequality 
in access to material goods and services in the United States. 
The final essay of this dissertation shifts from considering inequality in income 
to inequality of health status. Health economists have long observed that individuals 
with low incomes tend to be in worse health than individuals with high incomes. As a 
result, when considering inequality across multiple dimensions this positive 
relationship may suggest a more unequal society given that individuals with more 
income not only have greater financial resources but also have better health. This 
essay first documents the existence of this positive relationship in two large, nationally 
representative samples – the March CPS and the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation. It then demonstrates that the relationship is stronger among individuals 
at the bottom tail of the income distribution.  
However, in order to understand the implications of this relationship it is also 
valuable to explore the mechanisms behind it. It is unclear whether this positive 
relationship exists because increased income allows individuals to purchase more 
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health inputs contributing to their better health, or because healthy individuals are 
more productive and can obtain higher wages in the labor market, or because a third 
factor contributes to increases in both health and income. This essay considers the first 
of these three mechanisms. Using the exogenous variation in income that results from 
state-level differences in the Earned Income Tax Credit, it observes the impact on 
health status of an exogenous increase in income for low income individuals. The 
results find only limited evidence that increases in income reduce morbidity for low 
income individuals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
USING INTERNAL CPS DATA TO REEVALUATE TRENDS IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY AND EARNINGS GAPS 
 
Abstract 
Most empirical studies of trends in earnings inequality across subgroups of the 
population are based on data from the public use March Current Population Survey 
(CPS). However, censoring of high-incomes in the public use March CPS prevents 
researchers from observing the full income distribution. Using the internal CPS, this 
chapter shows that inconsistent topcoding in the public use data will understate labor 
earnings and household income gaps between men and women, Blacks and Whites, 
and between individuals with and without disabilities. It also illustrates how topcoding 
has reduced perceptions of inequality across the entire population, along with 
inequality among individuals with given sets of demographic characteristics. Finally, 
using a new series of mean incomes for censored observations based off of the internal 
CPS data, it demonstrates how researchers with access to only the public use data can 
obtain inequality estimates that more closely approximate the earnings and income 
inequality found in the internal CPS data. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The March Current Population Survey (CPS) public use files are one of the primary 
data sources used to study income inequality trends in the United States. Researchers 
using these data files have extensively considered measures of labor earnings 
inequality and household income inequality across demographic groups, such as the 
female-male or black-white earnings gap; within demographic groups, such as the 
earnings inequality of just working age men; and for the population as a whole. Some 
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key findings of this research include the rapid decline in the male-female labor 
earnings gaps in the 1980s (see, e.g. Blau and Kahn 1997, Blau and Kahn 2000, and 
Card and DiNardo 2002), the lack of decline in the Black-White labor earnings gap 
from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1991, Couch and 
Daly 2002, and Juhn 2003) and the rise in household income inequality over the same 
period (Gottschalk and Danziger 2005, Daly and Valetta 2006, and Burkhauser et al. 
Forthcoming).  
While the Current Population Survey is a valuable resource for such studies 
given its large nationally representative sample of households and its extensive battery 
of income questions, it suffers from an important limitation. To protect the 
confidentiality of its respondents the Census Bureau topcodes the highest values from 
each source of income that it collects when it reports the income in the public use CPS 
data. This procedure greatly limits the information available to researchers about the 
incomes at the upper tail of the income distribution and may distort observed income 
inequality trends. 
With access to more complete data on the full distribution of income in the 
United States, including information on incomes above the public use topcode 
thresholds, this paper reconsiders US inequality trends and explores the impact that 
Census Bureau topcoding procedures have had on previous estimates. It first illustrates 
that level and trends of labor earnings and household income gaps between men and 
women, Blacks and Whites, and people with and without disabilities may be misstated 
as a result of topcoding. It then demonstrates that the level and trends for population-
wide and household income inequality are also sensitive to topcoding. Finally, it 
decomposes population-wide household income inequality measures into within- and 
between-group inequality to determine the extent to which each of these components 
are sensitive to topcoding.  
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1.2Measuring income and inequality 
Measuring Income and Earnings. There are two distinct income concepts studied by 
inequality researchers which must be defined precisely since they will be referred to 
regularly in this paper and their terminology is often confused. The first is labor 
earnings (also referred to as earnings), which includes all money received by an 
individual for his or her labor market activities over the course of a year. The vast 
majority of labor earnings come from wages and salaries, but it also includes self-
employment and farm earnings.
1
  
When evaluating measures of labor earnings inequality, the sample is restricted 
to working age individuals (age 22-62) to limit the influence of schooling and 
retirement decisions on results. Additionally, to further limit the impact of work-
intensity decisions, only individuals working full-time and full-year are included.
2
 
Thus, references to labor earnings inequality in this paper reflects inequality among 
individuals who are participating full time in the labor market rather than among the 
entire population. Counts of the number of people in each population group analyzed, 
and the number of people in each group who are of working age and work full-time 
are provided in Appendix Table 1.1. 
The second income concept is household income which includes all money 
received from any individual in the household and from any income source over the 
course of a year. As it includes both income from outside the labor market and income 
                                                 
1
 Since self-employment earnings reflect the value of an individual‘s labor market activities, their 
inclusion better reflects the difference in how an individual‘s labor market activities are valued. Devine 
(1994) demonstrates that excluding self-employment and farm earnings leads to an understatement of 
the gender labor earnings gap since the gap between male and female earnings is larger among self-
employed workers.  
2
 While this limits the impact of work-intensity decisions on results, it does not completely alleviate the 
problem if there are selection effects on the type of people who chose to work full-time. Including all 
working age individuals or including all individuals working for pay regardless of intensity would 
likely increase the gender earnings gap since women work full-time at lower rates than men. Similar 
results should occur for earnings gaps based on race or disability status. Focusing on hourly or weekly 
wages, rather than annual wages, would have mixed effects depending on how the earnings gap for 
part-time workers compares to that of full-time workers. 
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from other household members, household income is a substantially broader definition 
of income than labor earnings. When considering household income inequality, this 
paper follows the standard procedure in the literature of using the individual as the 
unit of analysis and examining their size-adjusted household income. In examining 
household income at the person level, it is assumed that total household income is 
shared equally among household members regardless of its source.
3
 Since income is 
assumed to be shared equally among all household members, unlike with labor 
earnings the sample is not restricted by age and the results reflect inequality for the 
entire population.
4
  
Measuring Inequality. Two methods are used for measuring inequality in 
earnings and income. The first is the mean income or earnings gap between population 
subgroups, calculated as one minus the ratio of the mean income of the two groups. 
Given the intuitive nature of this metric, income and earnings gaps and the related 
earnings ratios are two of the most common metrics for evaluating inequality between 
population groups. For example, earnings ratios are reported by the Census Bureau as 
an illustration of inequality in labor earnings by gender in their annual report on 
income in the United States (Denavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009).  They also are 
used by researchers interested in inequality in labor earnings by gender (see e.g. Blau 
and Kahn 2000)  
To limit the impact of outliers, the Census Bureau and others often use median 
rather than mean income when reporting the income gaps. However, using median 
                                                 
3
 Following the standard convention in the household income inequality literature, size-adjusted 
household income is calculated as total household income is divided by the square root of the number of 
individuals living in the household. This approach accounts for household size and sharing of resources 
within the household while also accounting for economies of scale in household consumption. See e.g. 
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) and Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2009). 
4
 While individuals of all ages are included, those living in group quarters or in the military are 
excluded. This matches the sample used by Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2009) and Burkhauser et al. 
(Forthcoming). 
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income comes at the cost of focusing only on the midpoint of the distribution. As a 
result, if substantial shifts in the relative distribution of groups occurred at either tail of 
the distribution, a comparison of the median will miss these changes. Additionally, 
since income and earnings distributions are positively skewed in all years, analyses of 
the means give relatively more weight than the median to changes in the upper tail of 
the distribution. So for researchers interested in this portion of the distribution, the 
mean is better able to capture differences between groups and changes over time. 
Since this paper focuses on the upper tail of the distribution where most topcoding 
occurs, it uses mean income and earnings, which better reflects changes throughout 
the entire distribution better captures the impact of topcoding on these gaps. 
 Population-wide inequality and the level of within-group and between-group 
inequality are measured using the GE(1), or Theil index, which is a middle-sensitive 
member of the Generalized Engropy class of inequality indices. Like the Gini 
coefficient, Generalized Entropy inequality indices satisfy the four desirable properties 
of inequality indices: scale invariance, replication invariance, symmetry (or 
anonymity), and satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Jenkins and Van Kerm 
2009). However, unlike the Gini coefficient, Generalized Entropy inequality indices 
are additively decomposable into a within-group component reflecting the income 
inequality among members of a demographic group and a between-group component 
reflecting the income inequality across two or more demographic groups. As a result, 
Generalized Entropy inequality indices such as the Theil are more suitable than the 
Gini for analyzing the extent to which changes in population-wide inequality has been 
attributable to inequality within demographic groups of the population and to what 
extent it is attributable to inequality shifts between demographic groups.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Similar decompositions to that performed for the Theil are provided in Appendix Tables 1.4 and 1.5 
for the other two most common Generalized Entropy indices: GE(0), the Mean Log Deviation, and 
GE(2), half of the squared coefficient of variation.  
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The within-subgroup component, 𝐺𝐸𝑤(𝛼), of each Generalized Entropy 
inequality index is calculated as: 
 𝐺𝐸𝑤(𝛼) =  [(𝑣𝑘)
1−𝛼(𝑠𝑘)
𝛼𝐺𝐸𝑘(𝛼)] 
𝐾
𝑘=1     (1.1) 
where vk is the subgroup‘s share of the total population, (
𝑁𝑘
𝑁
), sk is the subgroup‘s 
share of the total income, (
𝑌𝑘
𝑌
), and 𝐺𝐸𝑘(𝛼) is the Generalized Entropy inequality 
measure for the subgroup treating it as an independent population. For the Theil index, 
where 𝛼 = 1, the subgroup‘s share of the total population drops out and the within-
subgroup component of inequality is: 
 𝐺𝐸𝑤(1) =  [(𝑠𝑘)𝐺𝐸𝑘(1)] 
𝐾
𝑘=1      (1.2) 
To calculate the between-subgroup component, 𝐺𝐸𝐵(𝛼), each member of a 
subgroup is assumed to have identical incomes equal to the mean income of the group. 
The between-group inequality is then the population‘s generalized entropy value if this 
assumption were true. Thus, for the between-group inequality there is no remaining 
inequality of incomes within the groups and all inequality is resulting from differences 
in the between-group mean incomes. The total inequality in the entire population is 
simply the sum of these within- and between-subgroup components: 
 𝐺𝐸(𝛼) = 𝐺𝐸𝑤(𝛼) + 𝐺𝐸𝑤(𝛼)     (1.3) 
For further details on the Generalized Entropy inequality measures and its 
decomposition, see Cowell (2000) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009). 
 
1.3 Topcoding in the March CPS 
The analyses in this paper are based on data from both the public use and internal 
March CPS data files. These are the primary data sources used for analyzing 
inequality in the United States. In the public use CPS, each source of income—11 
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prior to 1987, and 24 since then—has a topcode.6 When the amount of income 
reported for an income source in the internal CPS is below or equal to the topcode 
threshold, the exact amount of income is recorded for that income source in the public 
use CPS. But when the amount is greater than the topcode threshold, the reported 
income from that source is suppressed and is recorded as the value of the threshold.  
Topcoded income sources include not just labor earnings but also non-labor 
income including interest, dividends, supplemental security income, workers‘ 
compensation, and all other income recorded on the March CPS survey. Because 
topcodes on non-labor income can be quite low, topcoding affects not only those with 
very high incomes but also those with relatively modest total income whose income 
from one or more sources exceeds the topcode threshold (See Appendix Tables 1.2 
and 1.3 for a full list of the topcode thresholds over time). In addition to topcoding 
each income source in the March CPS, the Census Bureau topcodes income reported 
in CPS surveys from other months, such as the usual weekly earnings reported in the 
surveys filled out by outgoing rotation groups. This further topcoding prevents 
researchers from obtaining additional income information from other questions in the 
CPS.
7
  
When considering income inequality for the entire population, it is easy to see 
how topcoding reduces observed levels of income inequality. Since topcodes reduce 
                                                 
6
 Each CPS survey captures income from the previous year.  In this paper all references are to the 
income year.  Thus, a reference to 1987, for example, refers to income received in 1987 and recorded in 
the 1988 March Current Population Survey. 
7
 While much of the earlier research on topcoding focuses on CPS data, issues of confidentiality make 
topcoding of income a necessity for most national datasets both in the US and internationally. For 
instance the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) topcodes some of its income sources as 
does the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), and the American Community Survey (ACS). In Great Britain, in order to comply with the 2007 
Statistics and Registration Services Act, the Annual Population Survey and the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey have introduced topcodes on earnings data in their main public release files. In numerous 
countries including Germany, Austria, and the United States, the wage data that are available from 
social insurance or social security administrative registers are censored at the earnings level 
corresponding to the upper limit to social insurance contributions. 
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the level of observed income at the top of the distribution, the dispersion of income in 
the population is artificially compressed. As a result, the presence of topcoding will 
necessarily reduce measures of inequality for the entire population. The more severely 
the income distribution is topcoded, the more the observed level of inequality will be 
reduced. 
Less obvious are the impacts that topcoding has on cross-group measures of 
inequality such as the ratio of mean earnings between men and women. If the income 
distribution of men is identical to that of women then individuals in both groups will 
be topcoded at the same rate. In this case while topcoding will reduce the mean 
earnings of both groups, it is reduced by the same amounts for both men and women 
and thus would have no effect on mean earnings gaps. However, if women are 
topcoded at lower rates than men then topcoding will artificially raise the ratio of their 
mean income relative to men‘s because women‘s observed mean income will be less 
artificially depressed. Thus, topcoding can also influence levels of cross-group 
inequality depending on how topcoding rates differ across the groups. 
In addition to influencing the levels of inequality in a given year for the 
reasons described above, topcoding will also distort trends in inequality because 
topcode thresholds vary inconsistently over time. Rather than increase topcodes with 
inflation or real-earnings growth to keep a constant percent of the population topcoded 
in all years, the Census Bureau keeps the topcode threshold constant in nominal terms 
in most years with periodic substantial increases in the topcode thresholds. This has 
resulted in marked variations in topcoding rates over time. In years where the fraction 
of the population topcoded increases, the distortionary effects of topcoding increase 
and there is an artificial reduction in the observed inequality in the population. 
Conversely, when the threshold increases and the fraction of the population topcoded 
declines and less income is suppressed, there is an artificial increase in observed 
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population-wide inequality measures. See Levy and Murnane (1992) for a more 
formal statement of this problem. 
Recognizing these problems from topcoding, in 1995 the Census Bureau 
offered a partial solution for the underreporting of top incomes at the top of the 
distribution. Prior to this time, the Census Bureau simply replaced the value for each 
source of an individual‘s income that was topcoded with the topcode threshold. Since 
1995, the Census Bureau began replacing topcoded incomes in the Public Use CPS 
with its cell mean value—the mean value of all topcoded values from that source of 
income.
8
 Since cell means were not provided retroactively in years prior to 1995, 
using the public use CPS data without taking this major change in reported income 
values into account results in a sizable increase in 1996 and beyond in their measured 
income due to more accurate reporting of their incomes since then. Hence, while the 
use of cell means after 1995 causes the public use CPS to conform better to the 
internal CPS, not taking this improvement in measurement into account will grossly 
overestimate actual increases in income after 1995 compared to prior years.  
 
1.4 Prevalence of topcoding by gender, race, and disability Status 
Topcoding on labor earnings sources: Table 1.1 shows the percentage of full-time, 
full-year workers in each population group who have labor earnings topcoded in the 
public use CPS in the trough years of each business cycle since 1975.
9
 Although it is 
not a trough year, 1992 is included in Table 1.1 and all subsequent tables describing 
                                                 
8
 For individuals topcoded on one of the sources of labor-earnings, the Census Bureau provided further 
detail on top incomes by providing the mean of topcoded incomes of individuals topcoded on the same 
source of income with the same race, gender, and employment status. See Larrimore et al. (2008) for 
details. 
9
 The starting and ending years of a business cycle are somewhat arbitrary. Rather than define them 
directly by changes in macroeconomic growth, they are defined here using troughs in income which 
will, in general, lag macroeconomic growth. The findings in this paper are not sensitive to reasonable 
changes in business cycle trough years.  
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results for trough years of business cycles. As is discussed in more detail below, 
Census Bureau data collection procedures were redesigned after 1992 which reduced 
data comparability across these two years. So 1992 is the last year of the earlier 
procedures and 1993 represents both the trough year of the 1990s business cycle and 
the first year of the new procedures. Table 1.1 also includes 2007 which is not a 
trough year but is the last year available in the internal CPS data.  
 As can be seen in Table 1.1, while the level of topcoding varies by race and 
gender; its prevalence has increased greatly over the past 35 years for individuals of 
each group. In 1975, topcoding on labor earnings was negligible for female or black 
workers. However, by 2007 close to 1 percent of women (column 1) and Blacks 
(column 4) were topcoded on labor earnings and even higher percentages of men 
(column 2) and Whites (column 5) were topcoded.  
In contrast, the rate of topcoding on labor-earnings for full-time, full-year 
workers with disabilities has actually fallen since the 1982 trough year (column 7).
10
 
                                                 
10
 Disability status is measured in the March CPS data starting in 1980 using the work limitation 
question: ―Does anyone in this household have a health problem or disability which prevents them from 
working or which limits the kind or amount of work they can do‖, with a follow-up question to 
determine the disabled member of the household if the response is affirmative. While this work 
limitation-based measure of disability is not as nuanced as those found in other data sets, it is widely 
used in the economics literature to capture the working age population with disabilities (see, e.g., 
Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001 and Hotchkiss, 2004). Since this question asking about work limitations 
Table 1.1: Percentage of Full-Time and Full-Year Workers of working-age who 
are Topcoded on their Labor Earnings by Gender, Race, and Disability Status  
Income Female Male Ratio   Black White Ratio   Disabled1
 
Not 
Disabled
1 
Ratio 
Year (1) (2) (1)/(2)   (3) (4) (3)/(4)   (7) (8) (7)/(8) 
1975 0.02% 1.22% 0.01  
 
0.00% 0.95% 0.00  
    1982 0.18% 1.96% 0.09  
 
0.34% 1.45% 0.23  
 
1.50% 1.30% 1.15  
1992 0.42% 3.12% 0.14  
 
0.34% 2.31% 0.15  
 
0.90% 2.03% 0.44  
1993 0.66% 3.71% 0.18  
 
0.61% 2.87% 0.21  
 
0.70% 2.51% 0.28  
2004 0.59% 2.15% 0.27  
 
0.49% 1.80% 0.27  
 
1.64% 1.50% 1.09  
2007 0.93% 2.46% 0.38    0.83% 2.20% 0.38    0.77% 1.82% 0.42  
Source: Author‘s calculations using public use March CPS data. 
1
Disability status is not available prior to 1980.  
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However, this is partially due to the selection effects of which individuals with 
disabilities are willing and able to work full-time since labor earnings are evaluated 
here for full-time, full-year workers only. The fraction of all working age individuals 
reporting a disability who work full-time fell from 13.06 percent in 1982 to 8.35 
percent in 2007. As a result of this decline, the types of individuals with disabilities in 
the workforce have likely changed thus impacting the topcoding rates. Additionally, 
since the sample of individuals with disabilities who work full-time is relatively small, 
the observed fluctuations in topcoding rates result from only mild shifts in the number 
of individuals with disabilities reporting incomes above the topcode thresholds.
11
  
In addition to the general increases in labor earnings topcoding rates over time 
for each demographic group, in any given year there are noticeable differences in 
topcoding rates between these groups. This can be seen in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of 
Table 1.1, which illustrates the ratio of topcoding rates across groups. In 2007, women 
were topcoded 33 percent as much as men, up from only 2 percent as much in 1975. In 
2007 Blacks were topcoded 37 percent as much as Whites, compared with 1975 when 
no Blacks were topcoded. Given these large differences in topcoding rates across 
groups, one should expect that topcoding will impact levels of earnings gaps. 
Additionally, the changes in relative topcoding rates over time should factor into the 
trends in inequality with earnings gaps being suppressed to a greater degree in years 
when there is more topcoding overall and in years when there is a greater disparity in 
relative topcoding rates. 
Topcoding on any source of household income: As previously described, labor 
                                                                                                                                            
was not asked prior to 1980 or of individuals under the age of 15, results comparing individuals with 
and without disabilities are not available prior to that time or for children under the age of 15. 
11
 For example, the shift from 2004 to 2007 in the fraction of working age full time workers with a 
disability was a shift from 13 surveyed individuals with topcoded income to 7 individuals. In 
comparison, in 2007 there were 253 women working full time topcoded in the March CPS on any labor 
earnings and 62 Blacks topcoded on any labor earnings. 
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earnings are just one component of the total income available to an individual. Thus, 
while labor earnings inequality is important in understanding how individuals are 
compensated differently for their time, it is important to consider broader measures of 
inequality as well. For this reason, in the income inequality literature it is commonly 
assumed that income is shared equally across members of a household when 
calculating income inequality statistics (see e.g. Karoly and Burtless 1995, Atkinson, 
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995, and Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins 2009). Table 1.2 
therefore considers the prevalence of topcoding on any source of household income 
over time for each of the demographic groups discussed above. Since sharing of 
resources is assumed, Table 1.2 includes all individuals rather than just full-time, full-
year workers of working age.
12
   
There is a noticeable difference between the relative gender topcoding rates on 
household income and those seen for labor earnings. While working females are 
topcoded on their own labor earnings at less than half the rate of working men in all 
years, for household income female topcoding rates are always at least 85 percent of 
                                                 
12
 For comparisons of individuals with and without disabilities, only individuals aged 15 and older are 
included because no information on one‘s disability status is available for individuals under age 15.  
Table 1.2: Percentage of individuals who are Topcoded on any source of 
household income by Gender, Race, and Disability Status 
Income Female Male Ratio   Black White Ratio   Disabled 
Not 
Disabled Ratio 
Year (1) (2) (1)/(2)   (3) (4) (3)/(4)   (7) (8) (7)/(8) 
1975 0.84% 0.97% 0.87  
 
0.01% 1.07% 0.01  
    1982 1.34% 1.52% 0.88  
 
0.28% 1.65% 0.17  
 
0.54% 1.51% 0.35  
1992 2.20% 2.55% 0.86  
 
0.35% 2.86% 0.12  
 
0.54% 2.52% 0.21  
1993 2.73% 3.13% 0.87  
 
0.92% 3.52% 0.26  
 
0.78% 3.05% 0.26  
2004 4.56% 4.90% 0.93  
 
2.10% 5.79% 0.36  
 
3.34% 5.05% 0.66  
2007 5.73% 5.94% 0.97    2.73% 7.37% 0.37    4.24% 6.27% 0.68  
Source: Author‘s calculations using public use March CPS data. 
1
Disability status is not available prior to 1980. Comparisons of household income for 
people with and without a disability excludes individuals age 15 and under, for whom 
disability status is not captured in the March CPS 
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that of men‘s (column 3). In contrast, the difference in topcoding rates across race and 
disability status is similar or larger for household income than for labor earnings of 
working individuals.  
There are several potential reasons that could lead to the relationship between 
labor earnings and household income topcoding rates by gender being different from  
the relationship seen by race or disability status. These explanations include relative  
topcoding rates being affected by the expansion of income sources to include all 
income rather than just labor earnings and the inclusion of individuals of all ages and 
employment statuses rather than just those of working age who work full-time and 
full-year. While both of these factors likely contribute to this result, a further 
explanation is that mixed race and mixed disability status households are substantially 
less common than mixed gender households and thus topcoding patterns are less likely 
to be equalized by expanding the analysis to the household. This can be observed in 
Table 1.3, which illustrates the average characteristics of other household members for 
each demographic group. From Panel A of Table 1.3, men who are topcoded live with 
an average of 0.60 other men and 1.38 women. Thus, the average male topcoded on 
his personal income leads to 1.60 total men topcoded on their household income 
(himself plus 0.60 other men) and 1.38 women topcoded on their household income. 
The income sharing within a household thus equalizes topcode rates when compared 
to considering all individuals separately – where a man topcoded on his own personal 
income would result in exactly 1 man topcoded and no women topcoded. 
This is quite different than the patterns for black and disabled individuals. The 
average white individual who is topcoded results in 2.76 topcoded white individuals 
(himself or herself plus 1.76 housemates) but just 0.01 topcoded black individuals. 
Thus, the income sharing within households will increase, rather than decrease, the 
differential topcoding rates by race on household income compared to that seen for 
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individuals alone. Similarly for individuals with and without disabilities, the average 
topcoded individual without a disability results in 2.20 topcoded individuals without 
disabilities but just 0.05 topcoded individuals with disabilities. Thus, the income 
sharing within households will also increase, rather than decrease, the differential 
topcoding rates by disability status on household income compared to that seen for 
individuals alone.  
 
1.5 Methods to correct for topcoding problems 
Previous researchers have considered a range of solutions to correct for the topcoding 
problem. Three of these previous solutions, along with a proposed alternative solution, 
are discussed here. A first approach, the Unadjusted Public Use series, is to simply 
Table 1.3: Characteristics of other household members by Gender, Race, and 
Disability Status 
Panel 1: Composition of households by gender (1975-2008) 
  All Individuals   
Topcoded 
Individuals 
 
Male Female 
 
Male Female 
Avg. number of additional men 1.02 1.38 
 
0.60 1.02 
Avg. number of additional women  1.49 1.01   1.38 0.50 
      Panel 2: Composition of households by race (1975-2008) 
  All Individuals   
Topcoded 
Individuals 
 
White Black 
 
White Black 
Avg. number of additional white individuals 2.21 0.05 
 
1.76 0.08 
Avg. number of additional black individuals 0.01 2.68   0.01 1.75 
      Panel 3: Composition of households by disability status (1980-2008) 
  All Individuals   
Topcoded 
Individuals 
 
Not 
Disabled Disabled 
 
Not 
Disabled Disabled 
Avg. number of additional non-disabled individuals 1.40 0.85 
 
1.20 0.83 
Avg. number of additional disabled individuals 0.09 0.28   0.05 0.20 
Source: Author‘s calculations using public use March CPS data. 
Note: Since household income inequality calculations include all individuals, 
including children, average number of additional individuals includes children as well.  
Panel 3 excludes children under 15, for whom disability status is not recorded. 
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ignore topcoding issues and use the unadjusted public use CPS data as released by the 
Census Bureau. However, this will confuse real changes in mean income with changes 
in reported income due to topcoding. Additionally, as discussed previously, starting in 
1995 the Census Bureau began providing a cell mean to use for all topcoded values in 
the public use CPS but since cell means were not provided for earlier years this major 
change in the reported income values among topcoded individuals results in a 
significant increase in measured income in 1995 and beyond (see Larrimore et al. 
2008 and Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins, 2009). For instance, the topcode for primary 
earnings income rose from $99,999 to $150,000 thus reducing the share of full-time 
male workers who were topcoded on their own primary labor earnings from 3.93 to 
1.35 percent, but the use of cell means increased the average reported primary labor 
earnings of those men who were still topcoded to $305,989.  
A second approach, the No Cell Mean series, simply ignores the introduction 
of cell means into the public use CPS, and produces an income series where all 
topcoded values are assigned a value at the topcode level even after the introduction of 
cell means in 1995.
13
 This will correct for the large artificial jump in income due to the 
introduction of cell means in 1995. But it does not remedy the basic problems of 
inconsistent topcode threshold changes over time (such as the change in primary labor 
earnings topcoding from $99,999 to $150,000 between 1994 and 1995) or the different 
topcoding rates across subgroups of the population. As a result it will still provide an 
inaccurate picture of income trends. 
A more sophisticated approach discussed for labor earnings by Burkhauser, 
Butler, et al. (2004) and for income by Burkhauser, Couch, et al. (2004) is to create a 
                                                 
13
 A common refinement on the No Cell Mean approach is to assign topcoded individuals income that is 
a fixed multiple of the topcode level—e.g. 1.3 to 1.5. (See, e.g., Blau and Kahn 2000). While this comes 
closer to capturing levels of earnings gaps, the trends are nearly identical to those seen in the No Cell 
Mean series as it does not account for changes in the distribution of incomes above the topcode 
thresholds over time.  
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consistent topcode series (Consistent Topcode series). For each income source, this 
series finds the year where the topcode cuts most deeply into that source‘s income 
distribution and then chooses a topcode threshold that cuts that deeply into that 
source‘s income distribution in all other years. For example, 1.3% of individuals with 
wage earnings were topcoded in the public use CPS data in 2001, which is the highest 
percentage of individuals topcoded for wage earnings in any year. Thus, in all years an 
artificial topcode is imposed such that 1.3% of individuals with wage earnings are 
topcoded. A similar procedure was followed for all 24 sources of income to create the 
Consistent Topcoded Public Use series. The advantage of this approach is that all 
observed changes in cross-group inequality are due to real changes in the income 
distribution since a consistent fraction of the population is topcoded in each year. 
However, this consistency comes at the cost of topcoding a larger fraction of the 
population in all other years.  
The Consistent Topcode Public Use series will consistently capture the bottom 
97 percent of the earnings distribution for full-time workers and the bottom 89 percent 
of the household income distribution for all individuals. But, because more of the 
income of men, Whites, and those without work limitations is missed by consistently 
reducing topcodes, doing so will reduce their mean income by more than that of 
women, Blacks, and those with work limitations. Hence it will consistently 
overestimate mean income and earnings gaps between these groups. Additionally, 
estimates using consistent topcoding are highly dependent on the specific years of 
analysis chosen since the thresholds are always lowered to match the year with the 
most restrictive topcoding for each source. Thus, the inclusion of an additional year of 
data may change the inequality statistics for every year examined. 
Given these limitations, this paper uses a new method for controlling for 
topcoding. Using the internal March CPS data files, Larrimore et al. (2008) closely 
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followed the methodology the Census Bureau used to create cell means after 1995 and 
extend the series back to 1975. By using these cell means in conjunction with the 
public use March CPS, it is now possible to create an extended cell mean series (Cell 
Mean series) which will better match the income distributions found in the internal 
March CPS data for each of the demographic groups discussed in this paper.  
While this approach has substantial advantages over consistent topcoding 
because it allows researchers to better understand changes at the top of the income 
distribution, it will still be impacted by changes in procedures for collecting and 
processing the internal CPS data. In particular, the Census Bureau performs limited 
censoring on internal CPS data records in addition to the more severe topcoding that 
occurs on the public use records. This censoring originated due to limits on the 
number of digits provided for responses on the survey questionnaire and early 
electronic data records. However, after the Census Bureau processing systems were 
upgraded in 1985 to allow for responses with more digits, censoring persisted out of 
concerns about the accuracy of these high values and the impact of such outliers on 
inequality statistics (See Welniak, 2003, Feng et al. 2006, and Burkhauser et al. 
Forthcoming for a fuller discussion of internal censoring and see Larrimore et al. 2008 
for a full list of internal censoring points).  
While internal censoring is a limitation of the cell mean series in measuring the 
―true‖ income trends, the censoring encountered in the internal data files used to 
produce the extended cell mean series is identical to that in the data files used by the 
Census Bureau to produce their official income statistics (Denavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Smith 2009). Thus, this problem is no more severe than that which exists in these 
official government statistics and for researchers limited to using the public use CPS, 
using cell means of topcoded incomes will yield the best estimates of the US income 
distribution that can be made without making out of sample predictions on incomes 
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above the internal censoring points (Burkhauser et al. Forthcoming provides one such 
effort to estimate censored values in the internal CPS data). 
Although its less restrictive censoring and more stable censoring thresholds 
over time make the internal data more consistent than the public use data, there is one 
notable exception. Between 1992 and 1993 the Census Bureau substantially improved 
their data collection and processing techniques, including the implementation of 
computer-assisted data collection and an increase in the internal censoring thresholds 
(see Ryscavage 1995 and Jones and Weinberg 2000 for details on this redesign). 
These changes increased the ability of the Census Bureau to accurately observe 
incomes, particularly near the top of the distribution. While the use of internal data 
exacerbates the observed break in the series, changes such as computer-assisted data 
collection influence the entire distribution and thus may present problems for 
researchers using the public use files as well. Therefore, while the extended cell mean 
series used with the public use CPS allows for consistent trends before and after these 
years that closely match the internal CPS data, researchers should take caution when 
using any CPS based income series, including the cell means series, to compare years 
before 1992 to years after 1993. 
 
1.6 Results 
Impact of topcoding on mean earnings levels by demographic group. Panel A of Table 
1.4 compares the trough-year ratios of mean labor earnings of men and women using 
four topcode correction methods to those observed in the internal March CPS data. A 
ratio of 1.000 indicates the correction method perfectly captures the mean earnings 
observed in the internal data series (Internal). The lower the ratio, the more income is 
missed as a result of topcoding. The four topcode correction procedures are using: the 
extended cell mean series together with the public use CPS data (Cell Mean), the 
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unadjusted public use CPS data (Unadjusted Public Use), the public use CPS data 
without cell means (No Cell Mean), and the public use CPS data consistently topcoded 
(Consistent Topcode). For each series, the first column presents the ratio of mean 
Table 1.4: Ratio of mean labor earnings observed in the public use CPS using 
alternative topcode correction methods to corresponding mean labor earnings 
observed using the internal CPS. 
Panel 1: Mean labor earnings by gender compared to internal data 
Income 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Year Female Male 
 
Female Male 
 
Female Male 
 
Female Male 
1975 1.000 0.986 
 
1.000 0.986 
 
0.998 0.950 
 
1.000 1.000 
1982 0.998 0.988 
 
0.998 0.988 
 
0.993 0.955 
 
1.000 0.999 
1992 0.992 0.959 
 
0.992 0.959 
 
0.988 0.940 
 
1.000 1.000 
1993 0.970 0.914 
 
0.970 0.914 
 
0.966 0.901 
 
0.999 1.000 
2004 0.974 0.934 
 
1.002 1.003 
 
0.966 0.907 
 
1.002 1.003 
2007 0.970 0.936   1.000 1.001   0.960 0.911   1.000 1.001 
            Panel 2: Mean labor earnings by race compared to internal data 
Income 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Year Black White 
 
Black White 
 
Black White 
 
Black White 
1975 1.000 0.988 
 
1.000 0.988 
 
0.998 0.956 
 
1.000 1.000 
1982 0.997 0.990 
 
0.997 0.990 
 
0.988 0.963 
 
1.000 0.999 
1992 0.995 0.966 
 
0.995 0.966 
 
0.992 0.951 
 
1.001 1.000 
1993 0.962 0.927 
 
0.962 0.927 
 
0.959 0.916 
 
0.996 1.000 
2004 0.983 0.943 
 
1.007 1.004 
 
0.976 0.920 
 
1.007 1.004 
2007 0.964 0.944   1.003 1.002   0.956 0.922   1.003 1.002 
            Panel 3: Mean labor earnings by disability status compared to internal data
1 
 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Income 
Year Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
1975 
           1982 
           1992 0.982 0.969 
 
0.982 0.969 
 
0.975 0.955 
 
1.000 1.000 
1993 0.969 0.931 
 
0.969 0.931 
 
0.966 0.921 
 
0.995 0.999 
2004 0.885 0.948 
 
0.949 1.003 
 
0.869 0.927 
 
0.949 1.003 
2007 0.919 0.948   0.949 1.001   0.908 0.929   0.949 1.001 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
1
 Disability status is not available prior to 1980 in the public use March CPS or prior 
to 1987 in the internal March CPS 
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earnings using that series to the mean earnings in the internal data for women and the 
second column presents the same ratio but for men. 
As can be seen when looking at the data for 2007, because of Census Bureau 
provided cell means, the mean income of full-time, full-year male and female workers 
captured in the Unadjusted Public Use data since 1995 is very close to the mean values 
in the Internal series. So for those only interested in years since 1995, the year cell 
means were first provided by the Census Bureau, the Unadjusted Public Use series and 
the Cell Mean series both nicely capture the mean earnings of both men and women in 
the Internal series.  
But for those also interested in years prior to 1995 the Unadjusted Public Use 
series is flawed because it does not provide cell means for persons above the topcoded 
values. Hence its mean values are smaller for both men and women. In contrast, the 
Cell Mean series provides yearly means very close to those from the Internal series for 
both men and women in all years back to 1975, coming within 0.3 percent of the 
internal mean values for both men and women in each of the trough years.  
In contrast to these two series, both the No Cell Mean series and the Consistent 
Topcode series understate the mean earnings of both men and women in all years. 
Additionally, the amount by which earnings are understated using these series has 
grown over time. For example, the Consistent Topcode series understates the mean 
earnings seen in the internal series by 5 percent and 0.2 percent for men and women 
respectively in 1975. By 2007 the understatement between the Consistent Topcode 
and Internal series rises to 8.9 percent for male earnings and 4 percent for female 
earnings.  
As is seen in Panels B and C of Table 1.4, similar patterns emerge for how 
each of the topcode corrections impact the observed mean earnings of black and white 
workers and of workers with and without work limitations. The group mean earnings 
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using the Cell Mean series in all years or the Public Unadjusted series after 1995 
closely match the group mean earnings in the Internal series. The group mean earnings 
using either the Consistent Topcode or No Cell Mean series will not only understates 
group mean earnings compared to the Internal series but will do so more for white that 
for black workers and in most years will also do so more for workers without work 
limitations than for workers with work limitations. However, among workers with 
work limitations, cell means are not consistently as accurate at capturing the internal 
values as they are for men and women or Blacks and Whites. This is particularly true 
in both 2004 and 2007 when even the Cell Mean series understates the earnings of 
workers with work limitations in the internal data by 5.1 percent. 
Table 1.5 replicates the results presented in Table 1.4, but does so for 
household income of all individuals rather than labor earnings of full-time workers. 
When doing so, there are a few differences such as women having their mean 
household income understated in the No Cell Mean and Consistent Topcode series by 
a larger percent than their mean labor earnings were. However, while there are 
differences in the magnitude of how topcoding impacts income rather than earnings, 
the overall picture remains quite similar. Across all groups, for researchers interested 
in household income only after 1995, the Public Unadjusted series closely replicates 
the Internal mean incomes. But for researchers interested in longer term trends, prior 
to 1995 the Public Unadjusted series understates the mean household income in the 
internal data for all groups. And as was the case for labor earnings, both the No Cell 
Mean and Consistent Topcode series understate the mean incomes seen in the internal 
data for all groups in all years. The Cell Mean series, however, closely replicates the 
mean incomes in the internal data for all groups and thus provides a better picture of 
group mean incomes than that achieved using the No Cell Mean or Consistent 
Topcode series. Additionally, in contrast to the labor earnings series, the Cell Mean 
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Series for household income closely replicates the mean values in the internal data for 
workers with disabilities in all years of the series including both 2004 and 2007 when 
Table 1.5: Ratio of mean household income observed in the public use CPS using 
alternative topcode correction methods to corresponding mean household income 
observed using the internal CPS. 
Panel 1: Mean income by gender compared to internal data 
Income 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Year Female Male 
 
Female Male 
 
Female Male 
 
Female Male 
1975 0.991 0.990 
 
0.991 0.990 
 
0.953 0.954 
 
1.000 1.000 
1982 0.993 0.993 
 
0.993 0.993 
 
0.958 0.960 
 
0.999 1.000 
1992 0.978 0.976 
 
0.978 0.976 
 
0.949 0.946 
 
1.000 1.000 
1993 0.946 0.946 
 
0.946 0.946 
 
0.920 0.920 
 
0.997 1.000 
2004 0.942 0.940 
 
1.000 1.001 
 
0.924 0.923 
 
1.000 1.001 
2007 0.939 0.941   0.999 1.003   0.924 0.926   0.999 1.003 
            Panel 2: Mean income by race compared to internal data 
Income 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Year Black White 
 
Black White 
 
Black White 
 
Black White 
1975 1.000 0.989 
 
1.000 0.989 
 
0.988 0.949 
 
1.000 1.000 
1982 0.998 0.992 
 
0.998 0.992 
 
0.990 0.955 
 
1.000 0.999 
1992 0.995 0.974 
 
0.995 0.974 
 
0.987 0.942 
 
1.000 1.000 
1993 0.972 0.942 
 
0.972 0.942 
 
0.962 0.913 
 
1.000 0.998 
2004 0.977 0.938 
 
1.003 1.004 
 
0.971 0.917 
 
1.003 1.004 
2007 0.963 0.936   1.004 1.005   0.958 0.919   1.004 1.005 
            Panel 3: Mean income by disability status compared to internal data 
Income 
No Cell Mean 
Public Use 
 
Unadjusted 
Public Use 
 
Consistent 
Topcode 
Public Use 
 
Cell Mean 
Public Use 
Year 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
 
Disabled 
Not 
Disabled 
1975 
           1982 
           1992 0.996 0.977 
 
0.996 0.977 
 
0.956 0.946 
 
1.001 1.000 
1993 0.991 0.948 
 
0.991 0.948 
 
0.958 0.920 
 
1.002 1.000 
2004 0.955 0.941 
 
0.994 1.000 
 
0.939 0.923 
 
0.994 1.000 
2007 0.956 0.940   0.996 1.001   0.948 0.926   0.996 1.001 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
1
 Disability status is not available prior to 1980 in the public use March CPS or prior 
to 1987 in the internal March CPS. Comparisons of household income for people with 
and without a disability excludes individuals age 15 and under, for whom disability 
status is not captured in the March CPS 
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it is within 0.6 percent of the internal values. 
Impact of topcoding on mean earnings gaps. Having observed that mean 
incomes and earnings of all groups are influenced by topcoding, how do these 
differences in mean income and earnings levels influence mean income and earnings 
gaps? In addressing these questions, this paper focuses on differences in the No Cell 
Mean, Consistent Topcode, Cell Mean and Internal series. The Unadjusted Public Use 
series is excluded from further discussions since it is identical to the No Cell Mean 
series before 1995 and after 1995 it is nearly identical to the Cell Means series. Since 
the Unadjusted Public Use series is a combination of these two series, it cannot 
provide additional information about trends in the earnings gaps, and has a clear 
artificial jump in 1995 that makes it inferior to either of its component series 
individually.  
Because the No Cell Mean and Consistent Topcode series consistently 
understate the labor earnings of both men and women prior to the introduction of cell 
means, the male-female mean earnings gap could in principal be greater or less than 
that in the Cell Mean and Internal series. But as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.4, men are 
more likely than women to have labor earnings topcoded and their amount of 
suppressed earnings from topcoding is greater. Therefore, the relative earnings of 
women will appear to be higher and the earnings gap lower in the No Cell Mean and 
Consistent Topcode series than in the Cell Mean and Internal series.  
This can be seen in Figure 1.1 which compares the gender mean earnings gap 
for full-time workers of working age in each of the four series. In all years, the female-
male earnings gap is smaller using the No Cell Mean series than the Internal series. 
This difference is relatively small in the first year of the sample, but has grown over 
time. In 1975 it was under 1 percentage point—females‘ earned 43.4 percent less than 
male workers‘ using the No Cell Mean Public Use Series and 44.2 percent using the 
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Internal series—but the difference between these series grew to over 2 percentage 
points by 1989 and was 2.7 percent in 2007.  
This understatement is even greater when Consistent Topcoding is used, since 
it further suppresses values at the top of the earnings distribution and captures even 
more male earnings relative to female earnings. Using Consistent Topcoding 
understates the gap between female and male mean earnings by 2.8 percentage points 
in 1975 and this understatement rises to 3.9 percentage points by 2007. The growth in 
the understatement of the gender earnings gap is important for evaluating the trends in 
the relative earnings of women. Since the extent to which both the Consistent Topcode 
series and the No Cell Mean series understate the gender earnings gap has grown over 
time, using either of these series will overstate the relative improvement in female 
earnings in addition to overstating their relative earnings in each year.  
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Figure 1.1: Mean labor earnings gap between men and women using alternative 
topcode correction methods 
 
 
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0.500
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
No Cell Mean
Consistent Topcode
Cell Mean
Internal
 25 
 
In contrast to the Consistent Topcode and No Cell Mean series, the Cell Mean 
series nicely approximates the gender earnings gap found using the Internal CPS data 
in all years. Thus, unlike that seen for the Consistent Topcode and No Cell Mean 
series, it also closely approximates the trend in the female relative earnings since 
1975. Therefore, for researchers limited to the Public Use data, the Cell Mean series is 
better able to replicate internal results from the Internal data than previous topcode 
correction techniques. 
Figure 1.2 provides a similar analysis of the Black-White earnings gap under 
each of the four methods of controlling for topcoding.
14
 As was seen for the female-
male earnings gap, using the No Cell Mean series understates the racial earnings gap 
                                                 
14
 Since earnings and income gaps are only capable of comparing two groups, Hispanics and individuals 
of races other than white or black are excluded in this analysis. These individuals are included, 
however, in the analysis of within-group and between-group inequality later in the paper. 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Figure 1.2: Mean labor earnings gap between blacks and whites using alternative 
topcode correction methods 
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and the extent of this understatement grew over time from 0.8 percentage points in 
1975 to 2.7 percentage points in 2004 before falling back to 1.5 percentage points in 
2007. Similarly, the Consistent Topcode series understates the black-white earnings 
gap by even more, as white workers are more likely to be near the top of the earnings 
distribution and thus have additional earnings suppressed by using this topcode 
correction method. Once again, however, the Cell Means Public Use series closely 
matches the earnings gaps from the Internal CPS data and is the best available method 
of replicating the earnings gap seen in the Internal series.  
For workers with and without disabilities (Figure 1.3), the earnings gap among 
full-time, full-year workers is smaller than that seen across races or genders. This may 
be expected as workers with relatively mild disabilities may be more likely to work 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Note: Disability status is not available prior to 1980 in the public use March CPS or 
prior to 1987 in the internal March CPS 
Figure 1.3: Mean labor earnings gap between people with and without a 
disability using alternative topcode correction methods
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full-time so the selection effect reduces the earnings gap. Additionally, the small 
sample of full-time workers with disabilities and the selection effects into this group 
result in some ambiguity in the magnitude and direction of topcoding‘s effect on the 
disability earnings gap. In general both the Consistent Topcode and No Cell Mean 
series overstate the earnings gaps seen in the internal data, although this is less 
consistent over time than was the case for the gender and racial earnings gaps. Once 
again, however, the Cell Mean series is superior in its ability to replicates the internal 
results when compared to these previous approaches used with the public use data. 
 Impact of topcoding on mean household income gaps. It is apparent above that 
the levels and trends in mean earnings gaps are impacted by the choice of topcode 
correction method. This effect is also apparent in the gaps in household income, which 
includes both non-labor income and the sharing of resources between household 
members. This can be seen in Figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6, which illustrate the mean 
household income gaps by race, gender, and disability status respectively.  
A comparison of the gender income gap to the gender earnings gaps found 
previously reveals that focusing on household income reduces the size of the gap. For 
example, in each of the four series examined, the gender income gap of approximately 
6 percent in 2007 is well smaller than the 23 to 28 percent gender earnings gaps seen 
that year. Additionally, the impact of topcoding on the gender income gap is much 
smaller than that for earnings gaps. The difference between the gender income gaps 
using each of the four topcode correction methods is never more than 0.7 percent and 
is less than 0.2 percent in many years, which is well below the differentials of up to 6 
percent seen for labor earnings gaps.  
While the gender income gap is substantially smaller than the gender earnings 
gap, the same is not true for the income and earnings gaps by race and disability   
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Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Figure 1.4: Mean household income gap between men and women using 
alternative topcode correction methods 
 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data.  
Figure 1.5: Mean household income gap between Blacks and Whites using 
alternative topcode correction methods 
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status. Instead, a comparison of the racial income gap in Figure 1.5 with the racial 
earnings gap in Figure 1.2 reveals that the income gap between Blacks and Whites is 
larger than the earnings gap between full-time black and white workers. Additionally, 
as was seen for the racial earnings gaps, using the No Cell Mean or Consistent 
Topcode series understates the racial income gap seen in the Internal series while the 
Cell Mean series closely approximates these internal results. Similarly, a comparison 
of the disability income gap in Figure 1.6 with the disability earnings gap in Figure 1.3 
reveals that the income gap between individuals with and without a disability is larger 
than the earnings gap between full-time workers with and without disabilities. And 
comparing the income gaps across the 4 topcode series, the income gap between 
disabled and non-disabled workers is understated in the Consistent Topcode and No 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Note: Disability status is not available prior to 1980 in the public use March CPS or 
prior to 1987 in the internal March CPS 
Figure 1.6: Mean household income gap between people with and without a 
disability using alternative topcode correction methods 
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Cell Mean series, mirroring the results found for each of the other income and 
earnings gaps calculated.  
The same explanations discussed previously for how relative topcoding rates 
differ for labor earnings and household income may apply here as well when 
considering the different earnings and income gaps across the three sets of 
demographic groups. The relatively high prevalence of mixed gender households, as 
previously illustrated in Table 1.3, reduces both the gender income gap and the impact 
of topcoding on this gap. Since mixed race and mixed disability status households are 
less common, they should have less of an impact on the race or disability status 
income gaps and may even contribute to the widening of these income gaps compared 
to the corresponding earnings gaps. Additionally, the larger household income gap by 
disability status than that seen for labor earnings may be partially attributable to the 
fact that the income gap incorporates individuals including those who do not work – 
including more severely disabled individuals – whereas the earnings gap is only 
calculated for individuals working full-time. As a result, any selection effects into the 
labor market by severity of disabilities and earnings potential will reduce the disability 
earnings gap but not the disability income gap. The broadened age range, in addition 
to the selection effects into the labor market, may also contribute to this result in a 
similar fashion. Finally, the other differences between household income and labor 
earnings – including different rates of receipt of non-labor earnings by group, the 
prevalence of marriage and large or small households within each group, and 
differences in the correlation of earnings within a household by group – could also 
lead to the observed differences between the household income gaps and those seen 
for labor earnings. 
Decomposing population-wide household income inequality by demographic 
group. Given that the compression of the income distribution from topcoding 
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influenced cross-group inequality as measured by mean income gaps, it should not be 
surprising that it also influences population-wide income inequality statistics. This is 
apparent in Figure 1.7, which displays population-wide household income inequality 
calculated using the Theil inequality index for each topcode correction method (See 
Appendix Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for results using the relatively bottom-sensitive GE(0) 
index and the relatively top-sensitive GE(2) index).
15
 When using the No Cell Mean 
series or the Consistent Topcode series, the observed level of inequality well 
understates the inequality observed in the Internal series using the Theil index. 
Additionally, the No Cell Mean series misstates trends in inequality from changes in 
the topcode threshold. Most recently, this is evident between 2001 and 2002 when 
                                                 
15
 The Generalized Entropy family of inequality indices cannot be computed using zero or negative 
incomes.  Therefore, as is common for discussions of these inequality measures, when computing the 
Theil and other Generalized Entropy indices these incomes are bottomcoded at $1 (see Burkhauser et al. 
Forthcoming and Jenkins et al. Forthcoming for a further discussion of this approach). 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using internal and public use March CPS data. 
Figure 1.7: Theil household income inequality index using alternative topcode 
correction methods 
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inequality in the No Cell Mean series increased as the topcode threshold increased but 
declined slightly in the more accurate Internal and Cell Mean series. Similar effects 
occurred with previous changes to the topcode threshold as well.  
In contrast, the Cell Mean series which accurately captures the level, if not the 
dispersion, of top incomes more closely matches both the level and trends of income 
inequality in the Internal Series. However, while this dispersion of top incomes 
generally did not impact mean income gaps, which were virtually identical using the 
Internal data and the Cell Mean series, the lack of dispersion in the Cell Mean series 
does have a noticeable effect on the Theil index. In order to remove the remaining 
difference between the Cell Mean and Internal data, it is necessary to also include 
information about the dispersion of top incomes in the topcode correction mechanism 
(see Burkhauser, Feng, and Larrimore, Forthcoming, for information on the variance 
of top incomes and one approach for incorporating this data into the topcode 
correction).
16
 Nevertheless, with the exception of the break between 1992 and 1993 
when the Internal data shows a larger jump in inequality than the Cell Mean series, the 
trend in inequality between the Cell Mean and Internal series are quite similar. 
Additionally, while not a perfect fit, the level of population-wide inequality using the 
Cell Mean series is substantially closer to that in the Internal data than in either the No 
Cell Mean or Consistent Topcode series.  
A valuable property of the Theil index, and other Generalized Entropy indices, 
is that unlike the Gini coefficient it is additively decomposable by subgroups. Thus, it 
can be observed whether the higher income inequality in the Internal and Cell Mean 
series comes from within or between the demographic groups described above, as well 
                                                 
16
 As can be seen in Appendix Figures 1.1 and 1.2, for researchers particularly interested in top-
sensitive inequality indices, the gap between the level of inequality in the Cell Mean series and the 
Internal series increases, while for researchers interested in bottom-sensitive inequality indices the 
difference in levels declines.  
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as which subgroups are most important for understanding the higher inequality in 
these series. Unlike mean income gaps which only permit a comparison between two 
groups, the Theil decomposition allows for multiple groups to be considered at once. 
While this is not necessary for naturally binary groups such as gender and disability 
status, it allows more delineation across races than was possible in the black-white 
income gap. Thus, when decomposing the household income inequality by race, four 
racial groups will be considered: white, black, Hispanic, and all other races.  
The three panels of Table 1.6 illustrate the results of decomposing the Theil 
household income inequality index for people of all ages by gender, race, and 
disability status in each of the trough years since 1975 (inequality decompositions for 
the alternative relatively bottom-sensitive and relatively top-sensitive inequality 
measures, GE(0) and GE(2), are available in Appendix Tables 1.4 and 1.5).
17
 When 
decomposing the population-wide inequality by any of these demographic 
characteristics, it is apparent that the vast majority of household income inequality 
exists within these demographic groups rather than between groups. In each trough 
year examined, less than 1 percent of household income inequality using each topcode 
series is between genders (for example, 0.001 of the total within and between 
inequality of 0.336 in 2004 using internal data), less than 5 percent is between 
disability statuses (for example, 0.010 out of the total within and between inequality of 
0.346 in 2004 using the internal data), and less than 8 percent is between races. In the 
sections above it was illustrated that correcting for topcoding using Cell Means or 
Internal series rather than using the No Cell Mean or Consistent Topcode series finds 
greater income gaps between each of these demographic groups. While this is 
reflected in the Theil decomposition through a higher between-group inequality 
                                                 
17
 As was the case above for household income gaps, individuals under age 15 are excluded when 
considering inequality within and between groups of individuals based on disability status since 
disability status is only asked of people over age 15. 
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Table 1.6: Decomposition of Theil household income inequality into within-group and between-group inequality using 
alternative topcode correction methods 
Panel A: Decomposition of Theil household income inequality by gender 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.217 0.201 0.209 0.001 
 
0.195 0.201 0.209 0.001 
 
0.229 0.214 0.221 0.001 
 
0.230 0.215 0.223 0.001 
1982 0.247 0.231 0.239 0.001 
 
0.218 0.231 0.239 0.001 
 
0.254 0.238 0.246 0.001 
 
0.255 0.239 0.247 0.001 
1992 0.266 0.245 0.255 0.001 
 
0.243 0.245 0.255 0.001 
 
0.288 0.269 0.278 0.001 
 
0.292 0.274 0.283 0.001 
1993 0.274 0.251 0.262 0.001 
 
0.253 0.251 0.262 0.001 
 
0.331 0.308 0.319 0.001 
 
0.358 0.333 0.345 0.001 
2004 0.283 0.264 0.273 0.001 
 
0.268 0.264 0.273 0.001 
 
0.344 0.325 0.334 0.001 
 
0.365 0.346 0.355 0.001 
2007 0.276 0.256 0.266 0.001 
 
0.263 0.256 0.266 0.001 
 
0.341 0.319 0.330 0.001 
 
0.355 0.329 0.342 0.000 
 
Panel B: Decomposition of Theil household income inequality by race 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.249 0.191 0.224 0.222 0.197 0.013 
 
0.253 0.167 0.213 0.201 0.175 0.012 
1982 0.292 0.215 0.269 0.243 0.224 0.016 
 
0.284 0.185 0.254 0.222 0.197 0.014 
1992 0.343 0.223 0.292 0.261 0.238 0.018 
 
0.335 0.198 0.278 0.242 0.216 0.017 
1993 0.352 0.227 0.293 0.270 0.243 0.020 
 
0.342 0.205 0.279 0.253 0.223 0.018 
2004 0.324 0.240 0.289 0.284 0.255 0.019 
 
0.317 0.224 0.282 0.269 0.241 0.018 
2007 0.320 0.232 0.279 0.265 0.247 0.020 
 
0.313 0.217 0.270 0.251 0.234 0.019 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.249 0.204 0.231 0.229 0.208 0.014 
 
0.249 0.205 0.231 0.225 0.210 0.014 
1982 0.295 0.222 0.275 0.251 0.231 0.016 
 
0.295 0.223 0.276 0.252 0.232 0.016 
1992 0.350 0.247 0.304 0.285 0.260 0.019 
 
0.351 0.252 0.304 0.294 0.264 0.019 
1993 0.394 0.285 0.333 0.330 0.298 0.022 
 
0.404 0.313 0.343 0.371 0.324 0.022 
2004 0.364 0.303 0.333 0.344 0.313 0.022 
 
0.366 0.328 0.353 0.349 0.335 0.021 
2007 0.381 0.296 0.319 0.325 0.308 0.022 
 
0.387 0.311 0.325 0.343 0.321 0.022 
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Table 1.6 (continued) 
Panel C: Decomposition of Theil household income inequality by disability status
1 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean   Internal 
Income 
Year 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
     
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
1982 0.286 0.221 0.225 0.006 
 
0.247 0.192 0.196 0.006 
 
0.291 0.228 0.232 0.006 
     1992 0.307 0.234 0.239 0.008 
 
0.269 0.211 0.214 0.008 
 
0.315 0.257 0.261 0.008 
 
0.313 0.262 0.265 0.008 
1993 0.297 0.239 0.243 0.010 
 
0.264 0.217 0.220 0.010 
 
0.312 0.295 0.296 0.011 
 
0.312 0.318 0.318 0.011 
2004 0.303 0.253 0.256 0.010 
 
0.287 0.239 0.242 0.010 
 
0.343 0.312 0.314 0.011 
 
0.380 0.334 0.336 0.010 
2007 0.306 0.246 0.249 0.009  0.297 0.232 0.236 0.009  0.353 0.306 0.309 0.010 
 
0.370 0.319 0.322 0.010 
Source: Author’s calculations using Internal and Public Use March CPS data. 
1
Disability status is not available prior to 1980. Comparisons of household income for people with and without a disability excludes 
individuals age 15 and under, for whom disability status is not captured in the March CPS
 36 
 
component, given the small impacts that the inequality between these groups have on 
total inequality, the actual increase in between-group inequality from improving the 
topcode correction method is quite small. When decomposing by race, where the 
between-group inequality is most important to household income inequality, in 2004 
using the Internal series rather than the No Cell Mean series increases the observed 
between-group component of the Theil index by 0.002. Yet, this is just a small 
element of the 0.082 increase in the observed population-level Theil index in 2004 
when the Internal series is used rather than the No Cell Mean series. Using the Internal 
series has an even smaller effect on the between-group component of inequality when 
decomposing by gender or disability status – in 2004 less than 0.0001 of the 0.082 
increase in the population‘s Theil index switching from the No Cell Mean series to the 
Internal series came from the between-gender component of inequality.  
Given that much of the household income inequality comes from within 
groups, it is valuable to also observe which groups have the highest levels of within-
group income inequality. Perhaps surprisingly, in almost all years the household 
income inequality is greater among women than it is among men; among Blacks, 
Hispanics, and other minority races that it is among Whites; and among individuals 
with a disability than it is among individuals without a disability. However, the 
magnitude of these differences in within-group inequality varies based on the topcode 
correction technique used. 
Since the Consistent Topcode and No Cell Mean series suppress incomes for 
individuals at the top of the distribution in all groups, using either of these series 
reduces the within-group inequality in each of the demographic groups. However, the 
amount by which it reduces within-group inequality varies by group. For each gender, 
the extent to which within-group income inequality is suppressed by the Consistent 
Topcode or No Cell Mean series is similar in any given year. For example, in 2004, 
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which is the last trough year in the data, using the No Cell Mean Series rather than the 
Cell Mean series reduces within-group Theil index for male inequality by 0.061 (0.264 
versus 0.325) and reduces within-group female inequality by the same amount (0.283 
versus 0.344). The same is true when comparing the No Cell Mean series to the 
Internal series, as the within-group Theil index for both male and female inequality is 
0.082 lower in the No Cell Mean series than in the Internal one. Thus, while censoring 
impacts the levels and trends in within-group inequality for both men and women it 
does not alter the relative within-group inequality for the genders. 
This relationship is not true for comparisons of inequality within different 
racial groups or within groups of different disability statuses. Household income 
inequality is always the highest among black individuals. But since less Blacks are 
subject to topcoding than Whites, using the No Cell Mean or Consistent Topcode 
series understates the inequality among Blacks by less than it does Whites. Thus, when 
using the more accurate Cell Mean or Internal series the difference in within-group 
inequality for black and white individuals declines. In 2004 using the Consistent 
Topcode series finds that the Theil index among Blacks is 0.092 higher than among 
Whites and using the No Cell Mean series it is 0.084 higher. But when using the Cell 
Mean series this difference in Theil indices shrinks to 0.061 and when using the 
internal series it shrinks even further to 0.038. A similar relationship exists when 
comparing the within-group inequality of other races as well. While inequality among 
Hispanics is always greater than inequality among Whites, the magnitude of this 
difference shrinks once correcting for topcoding using the Cell Mean Series rather 
than the No Cell Mean or Consistent Topcode series.  
As was the case for racial groups, the difference between within-group 
inequality for individuals with disabilities and that for individuals without disabilities 
declines somewhat from better capturing high incomes. Household income inequality 
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is always the highest among individuals with disabilities. But since less of these 
individuals are subject to topcoding than individuals without disabilities, using the No 
Cell Mean or Consistent Topcode series understates the inequality among individuals 
with disabilities less than it does those without. Thus, when using the more accurate 
Cell Mean series or Internal series the difference in within-group inequality for 
individuals with and without disabilities declines.  
 
1.7 Conclusions 
 Topcoding is a well-documented problem for the Current Population Survey, 
but until recently, the only available strategy for mitigating the problem has been to 
place further restrictions on the data, either by using consistent topcoding or by 
discarding the cell means provided by the Census Bureau from 1995 onward. Each of 
these previous topcode correction methods relied on gaining consistency by reducing 
the usable information about top incomes.  
Through access to internal March CPS data, the constraints of topcoding have 
largely been lifted which allows for a more accurate view of inequality in the United 
States for the complete income distribution. Unlike previous topcode correction 
methods, the cell mean series created based off of this internal data, and made 
available to the public in Larrimore et al. (2008), gains consistency by increasing the 
usable information about top incomes. This paper demonstrated that within 
demographic group, between demographic groups, and population-wide inequality 
statistics are all impacted by the topcode correction method.  In each case the results 
using cell means more closely mirror results based on the more complete internal 
March CPS data.  
When using the internal March CPS data or public use data with cell means, 
earnings and income inequality within-group and between-group are higher than that 
 39 
 
seen using previously available topcode correction methods. Measuring between-
group earnings inequality first using mean earnings gaps, the mean earnings gap 
between men and women, Blacks and Whites, and people with and without disabilities 
are higher than that seen using the public use data without cell means. The same is true 
for household income gaps across race and disability status. For gender, however, 
there is only a small household income gap across genders and similarly only a small 
effect from topcoding. 
In addition to understating between-group income inequality, previous topcode 
corrections have also led to an understatement of population-wide household income 
inequality. Thus, once correcting for topcoding using internal data or cell means, it is 
apparent that the level of inequality for the population is higher than that observed in 
the public use data and has been higher for the past 40 years. While the greater 
between-group income inequality slightly contributed to this finding, the primary 
reason for the higher population-wide inequality using cell means or the internal data 
comes through a rise in within-group inequality. The vast majority of population-wide 
household income inequality is within, rather than between, gender, racial, and 
disability status demographic groups. Once using cell means to correct for topcoding, 
the within-group inequality increases substantially which results in the greater 
population-wide income inequality.  
Finally, topcoding also impacts which demographic groups have higher within-
group inequality. In particular, while Blacks and Hispanics have greater within-group 
inequality than Whites in the no cell mean series the magnitude by which inequality is 
greater among Blacks than Whites declines when using cell means and, in recent 
years, inequality is greater among Whites than Hispanics when using cell means. This 
observation that topcoding impacts each demographic group differently emphasizes 
the need to carefully consider the treatment of top incomes when calculating 
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inequality statistics. While one may expect that previous topcode correction 
techniques reduce inequality and impact its trends as topcoding thresholds vary, the 
intricacies of who is topcoded in any given year makes the choice of topcode 
correction at least as important for such comparisons of inequality within and between 
demographic groups as well.  
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APPENDIX 
  
 
Appendix Table 1.1: Number of individuals by demographic group in the March 
Current Population Survey 
  Panel A: All Individuals 
Income 
Year Male Female White Black 
Not  
Disabled Disabled 
1975 64,149 68,989 105,203 13,725 
  1976 76,166 81,484 124,487 15,540 
  1977 73,815 79,192 120,199 15,098 
  1978 73,110 78,874 118,474 15,080 
  1979 86,156 92,186 139,259 16,973 
  1980 86,083 92,313 138,606 17,033 122,690 13,125 
1981 77,169 82,849 123,485 15,592 109,755 12,417 
1982 77,093 82,797 123,288 15,634 110,706 11,811 
1983 76,145 82,307 121,946 15,312 109,221 12,238 
1984 76,108 82,642 121,560 15,789 109,621 12,479 
1985 74,514 80,370 118,848 15,306 107,778 11,744 
1986 73,457 79,517 116,817 15,538 106,825 11,261 
1987 73,809 79,558 116,961 15,151 107,573 10,849 
1988 68,608 73,700 109,838 13,796 99,835 10,142 
1989 74,838 80,678 116,121 15,301 108,647 10,992 
1990 75,008 80,811 114,982 14,997 108,498 10,995 
1991 73,951 79,519 112,326 15,109 107,087 10,895 
1992 73,555 79,499 111,673 15,000 106,009 11,295 
1993 71,253 77,501 108,251 14,708 101,383 12,150 
1994 70,655 76,816 105,919 14,526 100,934 12,021 
1995 61,569 67,240 91,264 12,702 88,050 10,504 
1996 62,533 67,586 91,522 12,860 89,536 10,534 
1997 62,733 67,353 90,997 12,524 90,192 9,821 
1998 63,128 67,726 90,954 12,711 91,030 9,707 
1999 63,989 68,207 89,976 12,735 92,254 9,930 
2000 61,874 65,506 85,791 12,318 89,288 9,553 
2001 103,935 110,588 147,439 24,676 145,398 14,271 
2002 103,967 109,817 143,403 24,707 145,512 14,027 
2003 101,920 108,544 139,809 23,934 143,486 14,294 
2004 100,805 107,120 137,323 23,429 141,743 14,222 
2005 99,826 106,018 133,199 23,353 140,838 14,466 
2006 99,289 104,884 131,377 23,617 140,875 13,410 
2007 98,655 105,117 129,957 23,896 141,464 13,375 
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Appendix Table 1.1 (Continued) 
  Panel B: Working age, full time workers 
Income 
Year Male Female White Black 
Not  
Disabled Disabled 
1975 21,235 9,876 25,993 2,471 
  1976 25,614 11,860 31,247 2,933 
  1977 25,483 12,331 31,330 3,002 
  1978 25,954 13,072 32,132 3,062 
  1979 30,906 15,954 38,634 3,543 
  1980 30,276 16,279 38,119 3,499 45,606 949 
1981 26,893 14,880 33,879 3,226 40,903 870 
1982 25,735 15,166 33,332 3,099 40,111 790 
1983 26,210 15,809 34,017 3,289 41,164 855 
1984 27,535 16,679 35,597 3,553 43,328 886 
1985 27,289 16,699 35,318 3,690 43,093 895 
1986 27,148 17,056 35,351 3,723 43,331 873 
1987 27,648 17,776 36,278 3,706 44,671 753 
1988 26,058 16,966 34,703 3,456 42,312 712 
1989 28,491 18,418 36,659 3,896 46,092 817 
1990 27,826 18,491 35,886 3,713 45,530 787 
1991 26,757 18,645 35,086 3,685 44,606 796 
1992 26,510 18,790 34,990 3,638 44,513 787 
1993 26,012 18,196 34,002 3,593 43,437 771 
1994 26,480 18,399 34,149 3,732 44,113 766 
1995 23,367 16,390 29,843 3,333 39,051 706 
1996 23,859 16,686 30,085 3,410 39,855 690 
1997 24,323 17,119 30,391 3,509 40,813 629 
1998 25,103 17,567 31,049 3,639 42,040 630 
1999 25,539 18,176 31,027 3,852 43,019 696 
2000 24,855 17,854 29,907 3,846 42,078 631 
2001 40,109 29,212 49,174 7,332 68,355 966 
2002 39,475 28,636 47,631 7,097 67,252 859 
2003 38,602 28,148 46,237 6,834 65,911 839 
2004 38,412 27,941 45,502 6,746 65,525 828 
2005 38,577 28,000 44,843 6,744 65,736 841 
2006 38,714 28,207 44,527 7,127 66,204 717 
2007 38,268 28,651 44,328 7,224 66,227 692 
Source: Author‘s calculations using public use March CPS data. 
Note: Disability status is not available prior to 1980 in the public use March CPS or 
prior to 1987 in the internal March CPS 
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Appendix Table 1.2: Public use CPS censoring points for each income source in dollars (1975-1986) 
 Wages 
Self 
Employment Farm 
Social 
Security 
 
Supplemental 
Security 
Public 
Assistance Interest 
Dividends 
Rentals 
Veterans/ 
Workers 
Comp Retirement Other 
(I51A) (I51B) (I51C) (I52A) (I52B) (I53A) (I53B) (I53C) (I53D) (I53E) (I53F) 
1975-1980 50,000 50,000 50,000 9,999 5,999 19,999 50,000 50,000 29,999 50,000 50,000 
1981-1983 75,000 75,000 75,000 19,999 5,999 19,999 75,000 75,000 29,999 75,000 75,000 
1984-1986 99,999 99,999 99,999 19,999 9,999 19,999 99,999 99,999 29,999 99,999 99,999 
Source: Current Population Survey Annual Demographic File Technical Documentation 
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Appendix Table 1.3: Public Use CPS Censoring Points for each Income Source in Dollars (1987–2007) 
Year 
Primary 
Earnings 
(ERN_VAL) 
Wages 
(WS_VAL) 
Self 
Employment 
(SE_VAL) 
Farm 
(FRM_VAL) 
Social 
Security 
(SS_VAL) 
Supplemental 
Security 
(SSI_VAL) 
Public 
Assistance 
(PAW_VAL) 
Interest 
(INT_VAL) 
1987-1992 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 29,999 9,999 19,999 99,999 
1993-1994 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 29,999 9,999 19,999 99,999 
1995-1997 150,000 25,000 40,000 25,000 49,999 25,000 24,999 99,999 
1998-2001 150,000 25,000 40,000 25,000 49,999 25,000 24,999 35,000 
2002-2007 200,000 35,000 50,000 25,000 49,999 25,000 24,999 25,000 
 
Year 
Dividends 
(DIV_VAL) 
Rental 
(RNT_VAL) 
Alimony 
(ALM_VAL) 
Child 
Support 
(CSP_VAL) 
Unemployment 
(UC_VAL) 
Workers 
Comp 
(WC_VAL) 
Veterans 
(VET_VAL) 
Retirement 
1st source 
(RET_VAL1) 
1987-1992 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 29,999 99,999 
1993-1994 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 
1995-1997 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 
1998-2001 15,000 25,000 50,000 15,000 99,999 99,999 99,999 45,000 
2002-2007 15,000 40,000 45,000 15,000 99,999 99,999 99,999 45,000 
 
Year 
Retirement 
2nd Source 
(RET_VAL2) 
Survivors 
1st Source 
(SUR_VAL1) 
Survivors 
2nd Source 
(SUR_VAL2) 
Disability 
1st Source 
(DIS_VAL1) 
Disability 
2nd Source 
(DIS_VAL2) 
Education 
Assistance 
(ED_VAL) 
Financial 
Assistance 
(FIN_VAL) 
Other 
(OI_VAL) 
1987-1992 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 
1993-1994 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 
1995-1997 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 99,999 
1998-2001 45,000 50,000 50,000 35,000 35,000 20,000 30,000 25,000 
2002-2007 45,000 50,000 50,000 35,000 35,000 20,000 30,000 25,000 
Source: Current Population Survey Annual Demographic File Technical Documentation (1988-2002), Current Population 
Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement Technical Documentation (2003-2008) 
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Appendix Table 1.4: Decomposition of GE(0) household income inequality into within-group and between-group 
inequality using alternative topcode correction methods. 
Panel 1: Decomposition of GE(0) household income inequality by gender 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.290 0.265 0.278 0.001 
 
0.267 0.265 0.278 0.001 
 
0.297 0.273 0.285 0.001 
 
0.298 0.273 0.286 0.001 
1982 0.348 0.330 0.339 0.001 
 
0.305 0.330 0.339 0.001 
 
0.353 0.335 0.344 0.001 
 
0.353 0.336 0.345 0.001 
1992 0.356 0.324 0.340 0.001 
 
0.330 0.324 0.340 0.001 
 
0.372 0.341 0.357 0.001 
 
0.373 0.342 0.358 0.001 
1993 0.376 0.340 0.358 0.001 
 
0.349 0.340 0.358 0.001 
 
0.414 0.380 0.397 0.001 
 
0.420 0.384 0.403 0.001 
2004 0.418 0.386 0.402 0.001 
 
0.399 0.386 0.402 0.001 
 
0.457 0.426 0.442 0.001 
 
0.467 0.445 0.456 0.001 
2007 0.419 0.376 0.398 0.001   0.406 0.376 0.398 0.001   0.462 0.419 0.441 0.001   0.465 0.420 0.443 0.000 
 
Panel 2: Decomposition of GE(0) household income inequality by race 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.317 0.254 0.289 0.306 0.264 0.015 
 
0.327 0.222 0.277 0.312 0.238 0.013 
1982 0.410 0.303 0.373 0.378 0.322 0.018 
 
0.403 0.252 0.357 0.353 0.279 0.016 
1992 0.483 0.283 0.374 0.411 0.321 0.020 
 
0.477 0.255 0.363 0.384 0.297 0.019 
1993 0.509 0.298 0.371 0.445 0.337 0.022 
 
0.500 0.269 0.359 0.416 0.312 0.020 
2004 0.562 0.335 0.407 0.472 0.382 0.021 
 
0.555 0.315 0.401 0.455 0.365 0.020 
2007 0.569 0.326 0.416 0.427 0.377 0.021   0.565 0.312 0.409 0.409 0.365 0.020 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.317 0.262 0.292 0.310 0.271 0.015 
 
0.317 0.263 0.292 0.307 0.271 0.015 
1982 0.411 0.308 0.377 0.384 0.327 0.018 
 
0.411 0.309 0.377 0.384 0.327 0.018 
1992 0.487 0.301 0.381 0.429 0.336 0.022 
 
0.487 0.302 0.381 0.434 0.337 0.022 
1993 0.532 0.339 0.392 0.487 0.374 0.024 
 
0.534 0.345 0.393 0.500 0.379 0.025 
2004 0.584 0.377 0.432 0.512 0.419 0.024 
 
0.621 0.391 0.457 0.477 0.433 0.023 
2007 0.602 0.371 0.438 0.468 0.417 0.025   0.607 0.375 0.438 0.479 0.419 0.024 
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Appendix Table 1.4 (continued) 
Panel 3: Decomposition of GE(0) household income inequality by disability status
1 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean   Internal 
Income 
Year 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
     
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
     
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
1982 0.359 0.311 0.316 0.007 
 
0.316 0.266 0.271 0.007 
 
0.362 0.316 0.320 0.007 
     1992 0.379 0.307 0.314 0.009 
 
0.341 0.280 0.286 0.009 
 
0.383 0.323 0.329 0.009 
 
0.382 0.324 0.330 0.009 
1993 0.397 0.323 0.331 0.011 
 
0.362 0.295 0.302 0.011 
 
0.405 0.361 0.366 0.013 
 
0.404 0.365 0.369 0.013 
2004 0.445 0.371 0.378 0.011 
 
0.429 0.352 0.360 0.011 
 
0.469 0.409 0.415 0.012 
 
0.483 0.423 0.429 0.011 
2007 0.476 0.362 0.373 0.011   0.468 0.350 0.361 0.010   0.505 0.404 0.413 0.011 
 
0.510 0.406 0.416 0.011 
Source: Author’s calculations using Internal and Public Use March CPS data. 
1
Disability status is not available prior to 1980. Comparisons of household income for people with and without a disability 
excludes individuals age 15 and under, for whom disability status is not captured in the March CPS 
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Appendix Table 1.5: Decomposition of GE(2) household income inequality into within-group and between-group inequality 
using alternative topcode correction methods. 
Panel 1: Decomposition of GE(2) household income inequality by gender 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Female 
Within 
Male 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.246 0.230 0.238 0.001 
 
0.202 0.230 0.238 0.001 
 
0.276 0.260 0.268 0.001 
 
0.286 0.268 0.277 0.001 
1982 0.281 0.261 0.271 0.001 
 
0.227 0.261 0.271 0.001 
 
0.297 0.277 0.287 0.001 
 
0.301 0.279 0.290 0.001 
1992 0.303 0.279 0.291 0.001 
 
0.259 0.279 0.291 0.001 
 
0.352 0.328 0.340 0.001 
 
0.371 0.349 0.360 0.001 
1993 0.314 0.285 0.299 0.001 
 
0.272 0.285 0.299 0.001 
 
0.446 0.412 0.429 0.001 
 
0.648 0.592 0.619 0.001 
2004 0.329 0.304 0.316 0.001 
 
0.300 0.304 0.316 0.001 
 
0.493 0.457 0.475 0.001 
 
0.647 0.598 0.622 0.001 
2007 0.313 0.289 0.301 0.001   0.286 0.289 0.301 0.001   0.473 0.440 0.456 0.001   0.578 0.524 0.550 0.000 
 
Panel 2: Decomposition of GE(2) household income inequality by race 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
 Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.274 0.217 0.262 0.267 0.227 0.012 
 
0.274 0.173 0.229 0.200 0.183 0.011 
1982 0.334 0.244 0.319 0.265 0.258 0.014 
 
0.312 0.193 0.283 0.224 0.207 0.013 
1992 0.397 0.254 0.359 0.283 0.275 0.016 
 
0.373 0.211 0.321 0.250 0.232 0.015 
1993 0.411 0.259 0.364 0.288 0.282 0.018 
 
0.388 0.219 0.328 0.257 0.242 0.017 
2004 0.376 0.275 0.352 0.320 0.299 0.018 
 
0.357 0.247 0.337 0.290 0.271 0.017 
2007 0.359 0.259 0.334 0.292 0.283 0.018   0.343 0.234 0.313 0.267 0.257 0.017 
 
Cell Mean 
 
Internal 
Income 
Year 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
Within 
Black 
Within 
White 
Within 
Hispanic 
Within 
Other 
Total 
Within 
Total 
Between 
1975 0.274 0.248 0.284 0.282 0.257 0.012 
 
0.275 0.258 0.286 0.273 0.266 0.012 
1982 0.342 0.259 0.334 0.283 0.273 0.014 
 
0.344 0.262 0.336 0.287 0.276 0.014 
1992 0.417 0.302 0.392 0.331 0.323 0.018 
 
0.422 0.323 0.392 0.354 0.343 0.018 
1993 0.554 0.380 0.485 0.427 0.410 0.020 
 
0.650 0.568 0.634 0.654 0.600 0.020 
2004 0.524 0.426 0.485 0.475 0.455 0.020 
 
0.562 0.577 0.661 0.555 0.603 0.019 
2007 0.594 0.401 0.461 0.432 0.436 0.021   0.658 0.496 0.537 0.531 0.531 0.020 
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Appendix Table 1.5 (continued) 
Panel 3: Decomposition of GE(0) household income inequality by disability status
1
 
 
No Cell Mean 
 
Consistent Topcode 
 
Cell Mean   Internal 
Income 
Year 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
     
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
    
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
     
Within 
Disabled 
Within 
Not 
Disabled 
    
Total 
Within 
       
Total 
Between 
1982 0.365 0.250 0.258 0.005 
 
0.283 0.199 0.205 0.005 
 
0.378 0.265 0.273 0.005 
     1992 0.399 0.267 0.276 0.007 
 
0.312 0.223 0.230 0.007 
 
0.424 0.313 0.322 0.007 
 
0.420 0.333 0.341 0.007 
1993 0.387 0.271 0.280 0.008 
 
0.308 0.230 0.237 0.008 
 
0.435 0.396 0.405 0.010 
 
0.454 0.565 0.571 0.010 
2004 0.380 0.291 0.299 0.008 
 
0.343 0.264 0.271 0.008 
 
0.513 0.440 0.451 0.009 
 
0.763 0.576 0.593 0.009 
2007 0.374 0.276 0.284 0.008   0.353 0.251 0.259 0.008   0.513 0.419 0.429 0.008 
 
0.654 0.508 0.522 0.008 
Source: Author‘s calculations using Internal and Public Use March CPS data 
1
Disability status is not available prior to 1980. Comparisons of household income for people with and without a disability 
excludes individuals age 15 and under, for whom disability status is not captured in the March CPS 
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Source: Author’s calculations using Internal and Public Use March CPS data 
Appendix Figure 1.1: GE(0) household income inequality index using alternative 
topcode correction methods 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Internal and Public Use March CPS data 
Appendix Figure 1.2: GE(2) household income inequality index using alternative 
topcode correction methods 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE IMPACT OF CHANGING EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS AND 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS ON US INCOME INEQUALITY TRENDS 
SINCE 1967 
 
Abstract 
While much of the research on the rise in inequality in the United States since the 
1960s has focused on labor earnings inequality, there is little evidence regarding how 
closely these labor earnings inequality trends correlate to the broader measure of 
household income inequality. This paper first compares male and female labor 
earnings inequality to that of household income. It then uses a shift-share analysis to 
analyze the change in income inequality accounted for by changes in male and female 
labor earnings distributions and changing household characteristics. In doing so, it is 
evident that the factors contributing to the rapid rise in household income inequality in 
the 1970s and 1980s differ substantially from those contributing to the slower increase 
in the 1990s. In contrast to findings for the 1970s and 1980s, in more recent years 
increases in male earnings inequality largely account for the changes in household 
income inequality while declines in the correlation between spouses‘ earnings have 
mitigated household income inequality growth. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since researchers first observed a dramatic rise in labor earnings and income 
inequality in the early 1980s, there has been a strong interest in understanding these 
trends. Much of this research has focused on labor earnings inequality among full-time 
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workers and has been motivated by concerns regarding how labor is compensated in 
the labor market. Among other factors, researchers have explored how the relative 
wages of high and low skill workers changed due to increasing returns to post-
secondary education (Lemieux 2006a), skill-biased technological change (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce 1993, Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994, Autor, Katz and 
Kearney 2008), the decline in the real minimum wage (Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
1996, Lee 1999, Card and Dinardo 2002, Lemieux 2006b), and the decline in 
unionization (Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996). 
 A smaller literature has considered the related question of how these changes 
in labor earnings inequality relate to changes in household income inequality.
18
 The 
most naïve researchers believe that household income inequality and labor earnings 
inequality are equivalent. This would be true if all households contained only one 
worker, that worker worked full-time, and there were no non-labor earnings or 
government transfers. However, as illustrated by Stigler‘s (1946) research on 
minimum wage legislation, when there is more than one worker per household, when 
workers work different hours, or when there are other sources of income in a 
household, then all these factors must be considered in evaluating the impact of 
changes in earnings inequality on trends in income inequality.  
Using a shift-share analysis, this paper explores this relationship and the extent 
to which changes in male and female labor earnings inequality have translated into 
changes in household income inequality. Additionally, it attempts to better estimate 
how shifts in employment rates, hours worked, marriage rates, and the correlation 
between spouses‘ earnings, have influence household income inequality trends since 
1967. 
                                                 
18
 The terms earnings and labor earnings are used interchangeably in this paper to refer to earnings from 
wages and salaries, self-employment, or farm-employment. The terms income and household income 
are used interchangeably to refer to all income within a household from any income source. 
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There is a small literature that has previously explored elements of this 
relationship between U.S. labor earnings inequality and household income inequality. 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Karoly and Burtless (1995), Cancian and Reed (1998), 
and Bayez and Couch (2008) decompose the Gini coefficient for family income into 
the contributions from component income sources using Fei, Ranis, and Kuo‘s (1978) 
Gini decomposition. Burtless (1999) and Daly and Valetta (2006) use a shift-share 
analysis, comparing family income inequality across two years and observing how 
inequality changes would have differed had only certain income components changed 
over that time. In addition to the literature considering these questions in the United 
States, there is a somewhat more expansive literature using similar decomposition and 
shift-share methods considering the relationships between labor earnings inequality 
and household income inequality in an international context (see, for example, 
Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982, Jenkins 1995, and Jenkins 1996 for the UK, 
Fournier 2001 for Taiwan, Del Boca and Pasqua 2003 for Italy, and Pasqua 2008 for 
Europe). 
Such studies report mixed findings on the strength of the relationship between 
male earnings inequality and household income inequality. For example, Karoly and 
Burtless (1995) suggest that rising correlations between spouses‘ earnings is as 
important as rising male earnings inequality in explaining rising family income 
inequality. Burtless (1999) also finds that a minority of the rise in income inequality in 
the 1980s was due to male earnings inequality, with changes in marriage patterns and 
an increase in single-headed families contributing substantially to the increase in 
income inequality. In a later paper, Burtless (2009) notes that marriage patterns 
continue to be important although he also observes that they cannot explain periods of 
rapid inequality growth because changes in marriage patterns occur slowly over time. 
Daly and Valetta (2006), on the other hand, place a higher importance on male 
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earnings inequality changes, suggesting that they explain the majority of the rise in 
income inequality since 1979.  
In contrast to the work by Daly and Valetta (2006), Burtless (1999), and 
Burtless and Karoly (1995) which evaluate inequality trends by looking at a single 
year per business cycle, Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) compare annual male 
earnings inequality trends to those for income inequality. Using P90/P10 ratios, 
Gottschalk and Danziger observe that while the overall rise in male earnings 
inequality since 1975 is similar to the overall rise in income inequality, the timing of 
these increases are different. They therefore suggest that other factors are likely 
contributing to the observed income inequality increases. Their findings illustrate the 
importance of considering complete trends in inequality, rather than concentrating 
only on single years. Had Gottschalk and Danziger only considered the beginning and 
ending years of their sample period, the rise in income inequality and male earnings 
inequality would have seemed quite similar. By comparing the complete trends they 
reached a different conclusion. 
One limitation of the work by Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) and other 
inequality researchers, however, is that they do not have access to the complete 
income distribution because the Census Bureau censors top incomes in the March CPS 
data. This topcoding makes it difficult to consistently observe changes at the top of the 
distribution. A common approach used by Gottschalk and Danziger to limit the 
influence of topcoding on inequality results is to measure inequality using the P90/P10 
ratio. Since the P90/P10 ratio is unaffected by changes to the distribution above the 
90
th
 percentile, the distortionary effects of topcoding on P90/P10 ratios are limited 
when compared to most other inequality measures.
19
 
                                                 
19
 Although the P90/P10 ratio does reduce the impact of topcoding, Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins 
(2009) show that P90/P10 ratios do not completely overcome the problem because CPS topcoding is 
performed on each sources of income separately. Nevertheless, the effects of topcoding are smaller than 
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However, the features of the P90/P10 ratio that make it beneficial for limiting 
the distortionary effects of topcoding also make it an imperfect measure of inequality 
when compared to other inequality indices. As described by Jenkins and Van Kerm 
(2009), there are four key properties that are desirable in an inequality index: scale 
invariance, replication invariance, symmetry (or anonymity), and satisfying the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle.
20
 While the P90/P10 ratio satisfies the first of these three 
principles, it does not satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle since a transfer of 
income will only impact the P90/P10 ratio if the transfer impacts the income of the 
individual at the 90
th
 or 10
th
 percentile. This is in contrast to other commonly used 
measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient, the Generalized Entropy family of 
inequality indices including the Thiel index, and the Atkinson indices. Each of these 
inequality measures satisfy all four desirable properties for measuring inequality. 
This distinction would be relatively innocuous if it did not influence inequality 
trends. However, this is not the case. Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009) illustrate that 
cross-country rankings of income inequality are affected by the choice between a 
P90/P10 ratio and a Gini index. Furthermore, Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2009) 
show that even after correcting for topcoding the inequality trends using P90/P10 
ratios are quite different from those found using the Gini coefficient – and this 
difference varies for labor earnings and household income. Therefore, using the 
P90/P10 ratio to analyze the contribution of male earnings inequality to household 
income inequality may lead to different results than those found using Gini 
                                                                                                                                            
for Gini coefficients or other measures of inequality that incorporate dispersion through the entire 
distribution. 
20
 Scale invariance states that the index is insensitive to a rescaling of the unit of income measurement, 
such as shifting from measuring income in dollars to measuring it in cents. Replication invariance states 
that the index is insensitive to a replication of all individuals and their incomes, thus making the index 
comparable for populations of different sizes. The symmetry axiom states that only the income of 
individuals, and not personal characteristics, impact the measure of inequality. Finally, the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle states that a small transfer of income from an arbitrarily chosen person to a 
person lower in the distribution, while keeping the transferor richer overall, reduces income inequality. 
For a further discussion of these properties see Jenkins and Van Kerm (2009). 
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coefficients. 
With access to the internal CPS data, I am able to lift these topcoding 
constraints and observe incomes in the distribution above those in the public use CPS. 
As a result, this paper examines the relationship between labor earnings and income 
inequality across the entire distribution using broad-based inequality metrics that 
satisfy all four desirable properties of inequality indices. Since it is one of the most 
commonly used measures of income inequality, this paper focuses on the Gini 
coefficient when analyzing trends in income inequality.
21
  
Additionally, to further understand the relationship between changes in male 
earnings inequality and changes in household income inequality, the analysis in this 
paper goes beyond the comparison of trends performed by Gottschalk and Danziger 
and examines the extent to which increases in household income inequality are 
attributable to changes in each income source and changes in household 
characteristics. This additional analysis is performed using a shift-share procedure 
similar to that used by Burtless (1999) and Daly and Valetta (2005).  
This paper further adds to the analysis by considering annual trends in 
inequality rather than just one year per business cycle, examining the entire income 
distribution rather than just the portion under the topcoding threshold, separately 
evaluating different types of changes occurring within income sources, and expanding 
the studied time-frame. Using this analysis, the results reconcile the varied results on 
the importance of each income component on household income found in the 
literature. They also show that different factors account for household income 
inequality changes in the 1990s than in earlier decades, indicating that the relationship 
between earnings inequality and household income inequality has evolved over time. 
                                                 
21
 Similar results can be obtained using the GE(1) Generalized Entropy measure (the Theil Index) 
which, like the Gini coefficient, is relatively sensitive to changes at the middle of the income 
distribution. Results based upon the GE(1) inequality index are available in the Appendix. 
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The results in this paper provide new information on the factors accountable 
for rises in income inequality, although this accounting should not be viewed in a 
causal sense due to the complex behavioral interactions occurring across the factors 
considered. For example, if increases in female wage rates empowered more women 
to live independently this could lead to a decline in marriage rates. Thus, from a causal 
perspective inequality changes accounted for by changing marriage rates may actually 
be caused by changes in female employment possibilities. Similarly, if increases in 
public transfers induce individuals to leave the labor market, then the public transfers 
– which in this strict accounting sense reduce inequality – could have behavioral 
implications that increase inequality through other channels. Nevertheless, given the 
relatively little research exploring factors contributing to household income inequality 
changes, it is valuable to first consider such an accounting approach to changes in 
income inequality which can then direct future research into the impact of these 
factors in a causal sense. 
 
2.2 Data 
Topcoding in the March CPS data. This analysis derives from access to internal CPS 
data, which is identical to the data used by the Census Bureau for producing their 
official income statistics (Denavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009). These data 
measure top incomes much better than the data released in public use CPS files. To 
protect the confidentiality of its respondents, the Census Bureau censors (―topcodes‖) 
each of the income sources received by individuals in the public use data and the 
extent of topcoding varies over time. As a result, the public use CPS data traditionally 
allowed researchers to at-best consistently measures inequality for the 95 percent of 
the income distribution below the topcode thresholds and at-worst provide inconsistent 
estimates of inequality due to variations in topcoding (See Feng, Burkhauser, and 
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Butler 2006 and Larrimore et al. 2008 for comparisons of inequality results using 
various topcode correction procedures).  
The internal CPS data does not have the same topcode constraints. While some 
censoring occurs in the internal CPS data, this censoring is much less extensive than 
that seen in the public use CPS data. Less than 1 percent of the population has their 
household income censored in the internal data in any given year, while several recent 
years have upwards of 5 percent of individuals with household income topcoded in the 
public use data. The limited internal censoring exists mainly to minimize the impact of 
recording errors and prevent volatility in annual statistics (Semega and Welniak, 
2007). Furthermore, since the internal data is the same as that used by the Census 
Bureau for their official income statistics, this censoring is no more restrictive than 
that which is incorporated into the government‘s official inequality statistics.  
One limitation when calculating long-term trends that cannot be corrected by 
using internal data is the potential for survey design changes to influence the results. 
While the March CPS data is largely consistent over time, there were substantial 
changes between 1992 and 1993 when the Census Bureau implemented computerized 
data collection along with several other data collection procedure changes (See 
Ryscavage, 1995 and Jones and Weinberg, 2000 for further discussion of these 
changes). These changes improved the Census Bureau‘s accuracy in recording 
incomes, particularly at the top of the distribution. However, this also led to a large 
artificial increase in inequality so the Census Bureau recommends against making 
comparisons over these years. Thus, 1992-1993 are separated in the results due to 
these data comparability problems. 
Defining Income. The results in this paper focus on the size-adjusted household 
income of persons, including both labor and non-labor earnings. This income measure 
is commonly used in US and cross-national studies of income inequality (see, for 
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example, Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding 1995, Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, 
Atkinson and Brandolini 2001, and Burkhauser et al. Forthcoming). It assumes that 
income is shared equally among all household members, so each individual in the 
household receives the same income. To account for economies of scale in household 
consumption, household income is divided by the square root of household size to 
obtain size-adjusted household income.
22
 This aggregation and size adjustment is 
performed at the level of the income source. For example, all individuals in a 
household are assigned the same male-head labor earnings, which is equal to the 
earnings received by the male household head divided by the square root of household 
size.
23
 Such a procedure is necessary to ensure that all income is accounted for when 
considering the impact of earnings source changes on income inequality.  
As is common in the income inequality literature, individuals in group quarters 
or in a household containing a member of the military are excluded. Additionally, 
unlike in labor earnings analyses where the sample population is often restricted to 
working age individuals, analyses of household income inequality generally include 
all individuals regardless of age. When analyzing household income inequality, this 
paper will do the same.  
 
2.3 Comparing Gini coefficient trends for labor earnings and household income 
There are several ways to examine the relationship between earnings inequality and 
                                                 
22
 Dividing by the square-root of the household size is the most commonly used case of the economies 
of scale size-adjustments proposed by Buhmann et al. (1988) where size-adjusted HH income = (total 
HH income) / (HH size)
α, with α=1 implying no economies of scale and α=0 implying infinite 
economies of scale. Setting α=0.5 closely matches the adjustments for household size implied by the 
Census Bureau poverty thresholds (Ruggles 1990). 
23
 The household head refers to the Census householder in years since 1980 and the Census household 
head prior to that time. The definition of the household head is the person (or people) in whose name 
the housing unit is owned or rented. In cases where there is no such person, it may refer to any adult 
member of the household excluding boarders (US Census Bureau, 2008). In cases of married 
individuals, while the Census arbitrarily considers one person to be the householder, this paper refers to 
both as being household heads. 
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household income inequality. One way is to simply compare the inequality levels and 
trends for household income to those for labor earnings. This is the procedure used by 
Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) to explore inequality trends using P90/P10 ratios and 
similar comparisons are made here using Gini coefficients.  
The comparison used here starts with a definition of labor earnings commonly 
used in the earnings inequality literature – personal, non-size-adjusted labor earnings 
among working age individuals who have positive earnings (Card and DiNardo 2002 
and Gottschalk and Danziger 2005 use a similar definition, although restricting 
earnings to wage earnings rather than the more inclusive labor earnings definition). 
Working age individuals are defined in this paper as those aged 22-62. This sample is 
divided by gender, reflecting the fact that the labor earnings distributions differ for 
men and women. The Gini coefficients using this income definition by gender are 
provided in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.1 for the trough years of each business cycle 
since 1967.
24
 While there are valuable insights to be gained from more carefully 
analyzing the annual trends in inequality, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
sections below, such a comparison across trough years allows for a snapshot of 
inequality trends devoid of cyclical business-cycle variations. 
Both male and female earnings inequality among working individuals has risen 
since 1975, although it increased more rapidly for men. However, while these series 
are informative for understanding inequality in labor market compensation, they do 
not necessarily reflect inequality in society as a whole. For example, both series 
exclude people with zero earnings. Including these individuals, but still analyzing 
                                                 
24
 Trough years of business cycles are defined here based on troughs in income which generally lag 
macroeconomic growth. While not trough years, 1967 and 2007 are included in Table 1, and all tables 
of business cycle trough years, because they are the first and last years of data available. 1993 is also 
included along with the actual trough year of the 1990s business cycle, 1992, due to the Census 
redesign in 1993 that limits data comparability from 1992-1993. Thus, the inclusion of 1993 in the 
tables separates out any inequality changes due to the survey methods from actual changes in inequality 
that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s business cycles. 
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personal, non-size-adjusted labor earnings among working age individuals (Columns 2 
and 4 of Table 2.1) leads to higher levels of inequality for both sexes. Additionally, 
the choice to include or exclude individuals with no earnings impacts not just the 
levels of inequality but also their trends. This is most evident when comparing trends 
between the two female labor earnings series. Among working age women who work, 
labor earnings inequality increased slightly since 1975, while labor earnings inequality 
among all working age women declined dramatically as a result of increases in female 
employment rates.  
Including individuals with no labor earnings is just one way that household 
income inequality trends could differ from those for labor earnings. Household income 
includes not just own-labor earnings, but also non-labor income such as public 
transfers, interest, dividend, and rental income. The inclusion of these additional 
income sources and assuming sharing of income across members of the household will 
further change levels and trends of inequality. This can be seen in Column 5 of Table 
Table 2.1: Gini coefficients for male and female labor earnings and size-adjusted 
household income in business-cycle trough years since 1967. 
  Male Labor Earnings   Female Labor Earnings   
Size-Adjusted 
Household Income 
 
Working-age 
with earnings 
All 
Working-age 
 
Working-age 
with earnings 
All 
Working-age 
 
All 
Working-age All ages 
1967 0.328 0.358 
 
0.433 0.690 
 
0.343 0.363 
1975 0.352 0.408 
 
0.416 0.652 
 
0.338 0.359 
1983 0.385 0.454 
 
0.416 0.604 
 
0.366 0.386 
1992 0.414 0.478 
 
0.418 0.567 
 
0.383 0.404 
1993 0.444 0.510 
 
0.437 0.579 
 
0.408 0.427 
2004 0.447 0.520 
 
0.427 0.574 
 
0.417 0.434 
2007 0.439 0.511   0.425 0.568   0.412 0.431 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: While not trough years, 1967 and 2007 are included in tables of trough years 
because they are the first and last years of data available. 1993 is also included to 
separate the large artificial increase in inequality that occurred between 1992-1993 due 
to changes in the March CPS data collection procedures from actual changes occurring 
before and after that time. 
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2.1 which considers inequality of size-adjusted household income of individuals but 
still restricts the sample only those of working age. Including these additional factors 
generates lower levels of inequality than that seen for either male or female labor 
earnings. Additionally, the growth in household income inequality for working age 
individuals is moderately slower over the 40 year period than that seen for labor 
earnings inequality among working age men alone.  
A final distinction in understanding the differences between household income 
and labor earnings inequality is the age-range of analysis. Researchers interested in 
household income inequality are interested in inequality across all age ranges 
including children and the aged, rather than just among working age adults. Since 
children typically live with their parents and therefore are assumed to share the parents 
income for consumption, the inclusion of children mainly impact inequality only by 
increasing the importance of large households in the analysis. The income 
composition of the aged, however, is quite different from that of working age 
individuals. As can be seen by comparing Column 5 of Table 2.1, which considered 
size-adjusted household income for working age individuals, to Column 6 of Table 
2.1, which expands the sample to include individuals of all ages, including the aged 
and children increases the levels of household income inequality when compared to 
that of working age individuals.  
A casual observer may compare column 1 – the labor-earnings inequality for 
working age men who work – to Column 6 of Table 2.1 – the size-adjusted household 
income inequality for the entire US population and observe that since the levels are 
similar they must be measuring approximately the same things. However, as should be 
apparent through the discussion above, the underlying factors that can influence 
household income inequality extend well beyond just male labor earnings. Thus, the 
observation that levels of inequality are so similar for these two series is therefore 
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largely coincidental.  
Of course, while it is not a one-to-one relationship the changes in male labor 
earnings inequality can, and do, influence levels and trends in household income. To 
the extent that male earnings are an important component of household income, an 
increase in male earnings inequality may increase household income inequality. 
However, a basic comparison of inequality trends across series is limited in its ability 
to explain the extent to which a single income source accounts for the rise in 
household income inequality. This is because there are three ways that changes to an 
income source can influence household income inequality. The first is through 
changes to the level of inequality of the source. The second is through changes to the 
share of income coming from the source. And the third is through changes in the 
correlation between income from that source and income from other sources. 
Comparing the trends in source-level inequality to the trend in household income 
inequality only considers the first of these three contribution paths. Understanding the 
full impact of how male or female earnings changes account for household income 
inequality changes requires analyzing the other two pathways as well. 
Additionally, comparing inequality trends cannot provide information about 
contributions to rising income inequality that are not due to changes in source-level 
income distributions but are instead due to changes in how individuals form 
households. Given these limitations, an alternate shift-share approach is used to further 
examine the income sources and household demographic shifts responsible for the 
increase in income inequality over the past 40 years. 
 
2.4 Method of decomposing the increase in household income inequality 
To decompose the change in household income inequality into that attributable to 
male earnings changes and to other income and demographic changes, the shift-share 
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analysis starts with the March CPS sample from 1975.
25
 Changes that could impact 
inequality are then added one at a time and the resulting increase in income inequality 
is compared to the increase that would have occurred had the specified factor 
remained unchanged. This yields the inequality changes that can be accounted for by 
each factor. In this procedure, potential causes are divided into three categories: 
changes to the prevalence of population groups, changes to the distribution of incomes 
from a given source, and changes to the correlations of income across income sources. 
Each of these categories requires slightly different methods for capturing their 
relationships with household income inequality changes. 
Changes in the prevalence of population groups. The portion of household 
income inequality changes attributable to changes in population group size is 
determined using a shift-share approach commonly used to separate changes into their 
factor components (Atkinson 1998, Burtless 1999). This procedure starts with the 
population in time t where the income distribution is described by the income 
frequency density function, 𝜑𝑡(𝑦). The population in time t can be divided into K 
mutually exclusive subgroups where 𝑁𝑘
𝑡 the fraction of the population belonging to 
group k in time t is 𝜈𝑘
𝑡 . Each subgroup‘s income distribution is described by the 
income frequency density function 𝜑𝑘
𝑡 (𝑦).  
As noted by Jenkins (1996), the population income frequency, 𝜑𝑡(𝑦), equals 
the weighted sum of the subgroup frequencies, 𝜑𝑘
𝑡 (𝑦), with the weight equal to the 
population share of the subgroups, 𝜈𝑘
𝑡 . As a result, changes to group size can impact 
the population income distribution and the inequality metrics calculated based off of it 
even if the subgroup income distributions remain unchanged. This is because if one 
                                                 
25
 1975 was chosen as a base-year both because it is commonly used as the initial year in studies of 
long-term income inequality trends (see, for example, Gottschalk and Danzinger, 2005) and because a 
comparison of household-income and labor-earnings trends indicates that 1975 is the beginning of an 
era where the relationship between male-earnings inequality and household income inequality changed. 
Alternate base-years were tested and did not substantially impact the findings in this paper. 
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subgroup‘s population share increases over time then the population income 
distribution will increasingly approximate the growing group‘s income distribution as 
its weight increases in the population. 
 For this reason, changes in population group sizes have the potential to impact 
income inequality without changing the underlying income distributions of those 
groups. For example, if a subgroup with relatively high inequality increases in size 
then, holding the subgroup income inequalities constant, then its larger subgroup size 
it will increase overall income inequality.  
The importance of the relative size of these population groups can be analyzed 
by considering how income inequality trends would have differed if the income 
distributions of individuals within each group remained constant and only the size of 
the groups had changed. Thus, suppose that 𝜈𝑘
𝑡  percent of the population is in 
subgroup k in year t and 𝜈𝑘
𝑡′ percent of the population is in the same subgroup in year 
t’. Then the impact of the change in the group size can be captured by reweighting 
observations from time t such that the fraction of the population in group k is 𝜈𝑘
𝑡′. This 
is accomplished by replacing the observation weight for each individual i in group k in 
year t, 𝑊𝑖 ,𝑘
𝑡 , with: 
 𝑊 𝑖 ,𝑘
𝑡′ = 𝑊𝑖 ,𝑘
𝑡 (
𝜈𝑘
𝑡 ′
𝜈𝑘
𝑡 )       (2.1) 
This increases the weight of individuals in groups that are more prevalent in year t‘ 
than in year t and reduces the weight of individuals in groups that are less prevalent in 
year t‘ than in year t. 
Changes in source-level income distributions within population groups. In 
addition to changes in the prevalence of each population group, there have also been 
changes to the distribution of incomes of individuals within each subgroup. These 
changes can come from any one of the income sources received from individuals, 
including male labor earnings, female labor earnings, public transfers, or non-labor 
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income. This is the second factor considered: changes to the source-level distribution 
of incomes. 
The portion of household income inequality changes attributable to changes in 
population group size is determined using a rank-preserving income exchange. The 
procedure used is similar to that used by Burtless (1999) and Daly and Valetta (2005), 
although there are several important differences. First, the income exchange is a 
conditional on full-time or part-time employment status. This is in contrast to earlier 
work that either performed an unconditional income exchange, or only conditioned on 
having any employment rather than on intensity of employment. This conditioning 
allows me to separate the impact of changes to work-intensity from changes in 
earnings inequality among individuals working full-time, part-time, or not working. 
Additionally, in this paper the exchange is performed in two steps – first allowing the 
inequality of source-level incomes to vary while holding the conditional mean 
earnings levels constant and then allowing both the source-level inequality and real 
earnings level to vary. This two-step process differentiates the impact of these two 
ways that source-level income distribution changes can influence income inequality.  
In order to perform the conditional rank-preserving income exchange, 
individuals are ordered in each subgroup k from low to high based on their income 
from source f and assign them a source-level income rank, 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑓
𝑡 , based on this ordering. 
Rank 1 represents the individual with the lowest income from source f among group k 
and rank 𝑁𝑘
𝑡  being the individual with the highest income from source f among group 
k. Note that an individual‘s rank will generally not be the same across two sources of 
income, so each individual has a separate rank for all income sources analyzed. The 
source-level income of the individual at any given rank in time t can therefore be 
denoted as 𝑦𝑘𝑓𝑟
𝑡  where 𝑦𝑘𝑓𝑟1
𝑡 ≥ 𝑦𝑘𝑓𝑟2
𝑡  for 𝑟1 > 𝑟2.  
To understand how changes in the source-level distribution of incomes among 
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individuals in group k relate to household income inequality, rank-correlations across 
income sources are assumed to remain unchanged. To observe the impact of changing 
the distribution of earnings from each source, starting with the income distribution of 
year t, each individual is assigned the income from source f of the individual in year t’ 
with the same rank in the source-level distribution. Income from all other sources 
remains unchanged. This procedure preserves the conditional earnings rank of each 
individual but captures the change in the source-level income distribution among 
individuals of the group.  
If there were the same number individuals in each group in all years, this 
process would be quite straightforward using a simple one-to-one replacement. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. In general, 𝑁𝑘
𝑡 ≠ 𝑁𝑘
𝑡′, which means that individuals 
with the same numerical ranks are at different points in the income distribution in each 
year. Thus, an exact rank replacement would truncate the top of the distribution when 
subgroup membership expands. Therefore, to avoid this problem ranks in year t are 
rescaled to match the number of observations in year t’:  
 𝑟 𝑖𝑘𝑓
𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑓
𝑡 (
𝑁𝑘
𝑡 ′
𝑁𝑘
𝑡 )       (2.2) 
Since these new ranks are not restricted to integer values as necessary for replacement, 
they are rounded up or down randomly in proportion to the decimal value of the 
estimated rank. So, for example, if the rescaled rank of an individual is 100.2, he will 
be assigned a rank of 100 with probability of 0.8 and a rank of 101 with probability 
0.2. Once the rescaled ranks from year t are determined, individuals are assigned the 
income from year t’ corresponding to the rescaled rank, 𝑦𝑘𝑓𝑟 
𝑡′ . This income is then 
added to the individual‘s income from all other sources in year t to determine how 
income inequality would have changed had only income from source f changed and 
income from all other sources remained constant. 
 To separate the impact of changes to the source-level inequality from real 
 71 
 
earnings growth of the source, the rank-preserving income exchange described above 
is divided into two components: changes to the mean-preserving source-level income 
distribution and changes to the inflation-adjusted source mean incomes. First, the 
analysis is performed keeping the source-level mean incomes constant over time. This 
captures the impact of the change in dispersion of source-level income without 
capturing the change in real earnings levels. Second, the real earnings growth is 
included as well, capturing the additional impact on inequality of income from specific 
sources growing faster or slower than the rate of inflation over time. 
Changes in income-source rank correlations within population groups. The 
previous two methods each assume that the rank correlation of income sources is 
unchanged over time. Thus, if the man at rank n in the conditional male earnings 
distribution is married to the woman at rank m in the conditional female earnings 
distribution in year t, then the procedure described above assumed that the man at rank 
n in the male earnings distribution in all future years is also married to the woman at 
rank m in the female earnings distribution. The third area of analysis removes this 
assumption and considers how changes to the rank correlation of earnings sources 
impact household income inequality. 
The procedure for incorporating changes to the rank correlation is as follows, 
using similar procedures to those used by Burtless (1999) and Fournier (2001). Taking 
the rescaled income source ranks described above, 𝑟 𝑖𝑘𝑓
𝑡 , each individual‘s ranks are 
observed to establish rank pairings across the income sources. The relationship 
between changes to rank correlations and changes to household income inequality can 
be captured by replacing the rank pairings from year t with the rank pairings from year 
t’ - and rearranging the source incomes to correspond to the new rank pairings. This 
revised source-level income is then added to the income from all other income sources 
to calculate the estimated Gini coefficient and observe the change in income inequality 
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attributable to the correlation change.  
Robustness of results to changes in the order of analysis. A known limitation 
of this type of shift-share analysis is that the results are sensitive to the order in which 
the component factors are analyzed (Jenkins 1995, Fournier 2001, Daly and Valetta 
2006). One approach for analyzing the factors is to add in the changes to factor 
components sequentially (Daly and Valetta 2006). Thus, for example, one would first 
observe how household income inequality changes since year t if nothing changes 
except for marriage rates. Then, one would observe how household income inequality 
changes since year t if nothing changes except for marriage rates and the male 
earnings distribution. The portion of the total household income inequality change 
accounted for by each factor is therefore the additional change in inequality observed 
from the additional component – beyond the change accounted for in the previously 
analyzed factors. The advantage of this method is that it ensures that exactly 100 
percent of the actual change in household income inequality is captured by the 
component factors. However, the disadvantage is that altering the order in which 
factors are analyzed has the potential to change the results.  
An alternate method of performing the shift-share analysis is to always start 
with the income distribution in year t and only change a single factor (Burtless 1999). 
For example, using this approach one would observe how household income 
inequality differs from that seen in year t if nothing changes except for marriage rates. 
Then, one would observe how household income inequality differs from that seen in 
year t if nothing changes except for the male earnings distribution. The portion of the 
total household income inequality change accounted for by each factor is thus done in 
isolation with the same starting conditions. However, using this approach, the sum of 
the changes in household income inequality accounted for by all factors may overstate 
or understate the true change in inequality since that time.  
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While this paper uses the former approach, adding changes from factor 
components sequentially, the main results are consistent with those found using the 
approach of analyzing each factor in isolation. The choice between these methods 
alters the magnitude of some results but they both present a similar picture of the 
factors accounting for the rise in income inequality. The results in the following 
section focus exclusively on the primary sequential analysis, but the results using the 
alternate approach are provided in Appendix Table 2.1. 
Robustness of results to changes in inequality index. While the Gini coefficient 
is the primary focus of this paper, a similar decomposition can be performed for other 
inequality measures. This including the three Generalized Entropy indices which, 
similar to the Gini, satisfy each of the desirable properties of inequality indices 
described previously. When performing the decomposition on these alternate 
inequality measures, the results are largely consistent with those found for the Gini 
coefficient.  Results for the GE(0), the Mean Log Deviation; GE(1), the Theil index; 
and GE(2), half of the squared coefficient of variation, are provided in Appendix 
Tables 2.2 through 2.4. 
 
2.5 Decomposition Results 
In order to explain factors accounting for trends in household income inequality, it is 
necessary to first observe the trends being explained. The first row of Table 2.2 does 
just that – providing the average annual percentage change in Gini coefficients for 
each business cycle since 1967. From Row 1 of Table 2.2, it is apparent that inequality 
fell slightly in the late 1960s business cycle (1967-1975), before rising dramatically in 
the late 1970s business cycle (1975-1983). It continued to rise, although at a somewhat 
moderated pace, in the late 1980s business cycle (1983-1992). The year from 1992-
  
7
4
 
  
Table 2.2: Estimated average annual percentage change in the size-adjusted household income Gini coefficient attributable to 
factor components by business cycle 
  1967-75 1975-83 1983-92 1992-93 1993-04 2004-07   1967-07 
(1) Actual Gini Avg. Annual Pct. Change -0.16 0.90 0.51 5.69 0.13 -0.23 
 
0.42 
         Avg. Annual Pct. Change accounted for by: 
       (2) Marriage Rates 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.08 
 
0.13 
         (3) Male Employment Rates 0.22 0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 
 
0.04 
(4) Male Earnings Inequality -0.05 0.32 0.31 4.10 0.09 -0.30 
 
0.23 
(5) Male Real Earnings Level 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.78 0.13 0.01 
 
0.12 
         (6) Female Employment Rates -0.04 -0.15 -0.19 -0.93 -0.08 0.00 
 
-0.13 
(7) Female Earnings Inequality -0.20 0.05 0.08 0.81 0.02 0.12 
 
0.03 
(8) Female Real Earnings Level 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.04 
 
0.02 
         (9) Spouses‘ Earnings Correlation 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.04 
 
0.06 
         (10) Public Transfers Inequality -0.23 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 
 
-0.01 
(11) Real Level of Public Transfers -0.23 0.06 -0.08 -0.16 0.00 -0.02 
 
-0.05 
         (12) Other Factors -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.91 -0.03 -0.18   -0.02 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Note: 1992-1993 is separated from the 1992-2004 business cycle to separate the large artificial increase in inequality that occurred 
between 1992-1993 due to changes in the March CPS data collection procedures from actual changes occurring before and after that 
time.
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1993 showed a substantial 5.69 percent increase in the Gini coefficient due to data 
collection changes in that year. A comparison of this increase to preceding and 
subsequent years highlights the impact of these changes and the importance of 
separating this year from other periods in the analysis.
26
 In the remainder of the 1990s 
business cycle (1993-2004), the increase in inequality slowed even further compared 
to the periods of rapid growth in the early 1980s. Most recently, the beginning of the 
current business cycle (2004-2007) has then seen a fall in inequality – although the 
conclusions regarding the current business cycle are limited given that the complete 
business cycle cannot yet be observed. 
 The annual trends in income inequality can be observed in Figure 2.1 (with 
inequality in the base-year of 1975 normalized to 1). In this figure, it is apparent that 
income inequality trends are generally not steady over time. For example, the rapid 
rise in inequality from 1980-1983 was followed by a year of declining income 
inequality in 1984 before inequality continued to increase. The factors accounting for 
income inequality trends should explain not just the long-term trends but also these 
year-over-year fluctuations. Thus, it is valuable to consider both the long-term 
inequality changes, which will be done across trough years of the business cycles, 
along with these annual fluctuations in income inequality. Having observed the trends 
in inequality to be accounted for, it is now possible to explore the factors underlying 
these trends. 
Changes to the marriage rates. The first factor considered is the change in the 
fraction of households headed by married couples. Marriage rates have changed
                                                 
26
 Further evidence that this one-year increase is artificial can be obtained by comparing March CPS 
results to other datasets. Burkhauser, et al. (2009) do so by showing that trends in top income shares for 
pre-tax, pre-transfer tax-unit income in the March CPS closely match Piketty and Saez‘s (2003) results 
using IRS tax records in most years. One year in which this comparison across datasets does not 
provide similar results is 1992-1993, where the top 1% income share increases substantially in the 
March CPS data due to the new Census Bureau procedures but are relatively constant in the IRS tax 
records.  
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rapidly over the past 40 years, as can be seen in Table 2.3 which provides the fraction 
of people living in households headed by a married couple in the trough year of each 
business cycle. In 1967, 82 percent of people lived in a household headed by a married 
couple. This percentage declined to just 63 percent in 2007.  
 This change could, in theory, increase or decrease income inequality 
depending on where unmarried individuals fall in the distribution. If unmarried 
individuals are concentrated near the middle of the distribution, the decline in 
marriage rates would decrease inequality. On the other hand, if they are more 
commonly found near either tail of the distribution, the reduction in marriage rates 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: Dashed vertical lines represent trough-years of each business cycle.  Each 
series is dashed from1992-1993 due to the March CPS redesign of collection 
procedures that limits data comparability between 1992 and 1993.  As a result of the 
redesign, comparisons of levels should not be made across years that span this period. 
Figure 2.1: Estimated increase in Gini coefficient for household income when 
only marriage rates change and the income distribution is held constant (1967-
2007), 1975 normalized to 1 
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would increase inequality. In general, single individuals are more likely to be living in 
poverty than their married counterparts. As a result, one would expect the decline in 
marriage rates to increase income inequality as it expands the population in the lower 
tail. 
Starting with the March CPS sample from 1975, by using the reweighting 
technique described above it is possible to determine how much of the change in 
household income inequality can be accounted for by this decline in marriage rates. In 
doing so, note that the estimated effect focuses exclusively on changes to how many 
people marry, rather than who marries since it assumes the income distribution of 
married and single individuals remain unchanged. If, for example, there is an increase 
in assortative mating with high-income individuals increasingly marrying other high-
income individuals, then the impact of such changes are not included here. Instead 
these changes will be observed in the analysis of changing correlations between male 
and female earnings. Thus, the impact of changing marriage rates measures 
exclusively the impact of the change in marriage rates across the population.  
Row 2 of Table 2.2 shows the average-annual percentage change in household 
income inequality that is accounted for by marriage pattern changes in each business 
Table 2.3: Percent of individuals living in a household with married, single-male, 
and single-female householders by year 
  Married 
Single 
Male 
Single 
Female 
1967 82.5 4.1 13.4 
1975 77.4 5.8 16.8 
1983 72.6 7.9 19.5 
1992 67.5 10.3 22.2 
1993 66.9 10.3 22.8 
2004 63.6 13.1 23.4 
2007 62.6 13.6 23.9 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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cycle. This can be compared to the actual changes in inequality observed for each 
business cycle presented in Row 1 of Table 2.2. In the late 1960s business cycle, when 
household income inequality fell by an average rate of -0.16 percent-per-year, the 
decline in marriage rates holding incomes for married and single individuals constant 
accounted for inequality increases of 0.20 percent per year. This suggests that had 
marriage patterns been unchanged during this period, the decline in income inequality 
would have been even greater.  
During each subsequent business cycle through 2007 there continued to be a 
fall in marriage rates. In the late 1970s business cycles (1975-1983), declines in 
marriage rates accounted for approximately 23 percent of the total rise in inequality, as 
marriage rate declines accounted for a rise in inequality of 0.20 percent point per year 
compared to the actual increase of 0.90 percent per year. An identical 23 percent of the 
total increase in inequality can be explained by declines in marriage rates in the late 
1980s (1983-1992) (0.12 percent per year increase due to marriage rates out of the 
total increase of 0.51 percent per year). During the 1990s (1993-2004) the decline in 
marriage rates slowed, thus reducing the rise in income inequality accounted for by 
marriage changes. But since income inequality growth slowed even more the marriage 
rate changes accounted for 40 percent of the 0.13 average annual percentage change in 
income inequality over the business cycle. 
Figure 2.1 provides a comparison of the annual income inequality changes 
accounted for by the marriage rate changes and compares them to the actual income 
inequality changes seen during that time. When considered on an annual basis, rather 
than by business cycle, it is clear that changes to income inequality due to marriage 
rates are extremely steady compared to the actual changes in income inequality. There 
are wide fluctuations in the year-over-year changes in household income inequality, 
with inequality increasing or decreasing by as much as 3 percent in some years. In 
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contrast, the inequality changes attributable to marriage rate changes are never more 
than 0.4 percent in any given year. This supports the view that while declines in 
marriage rates are contributing to the increase in income inequality, they generally 
cannot explain rapid shifts in inequality trends since they are a slow-moving factor.  
Changes to the male employment rate. The second factor that may explain 
changes in household income inequality is the change in male employment rates. 
Previous studies that have considered the impact of changing employment rates on 
income inequality have only considered whether the individual is employed or not-
employed (see, for example, Daly and Valetta 2006). However, not considering 
whether individuals work full time or part time will potentially miss important 
changes to work intensity over time. As such, this paper considers three potential 
employment statuses: working full time, working part time, and not-employed (both 
unemployed and not in the labor force).
27
 It follows the previous literature, however, 
in focusing on the employment status and earnings of just the household head and his 
or her spouse rather than the employment of all individuals in the household. Thus all 
subsequent references to male earnings refer to the size-adjusted labor earnings of the 
male household head and references to female earnings refer to the size-adjusted labor 
earnings of the female household head.  
 It is likely that employment decisions of the household head are made 
conditional on marital status, since married individuals with other available sources of 
income likely have higher reservation wages and thus will enter the labor market at 
lower rates than single individuals. Therefore, to avoid confusing changes in income 
inequality resulting from changes in employment rates versus those resulting from 
changing marriage patterns, this analysis is performed conditional on marital status.  
                                                 
27
 Full time work is considered working at least an average of 35 hours per week for 50 weeks or more 
during the year. Part time work is considered working at least 1 hour for one or more weeks during the 
year, but working less than 35 hours per week or less than 50 weeks during the year. 
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As was the case with the marital status of the head, employment rates of 
household heads have changed substantially over the past 30 years. The full-time and 
part-time employment rates for male household heads are provided in Table 2.4.  
Among married male household heads, the full-time employment rates fell 
substantially from 1967 through 1983 before recovering somewhat since then. 
Additionally, over the entire period there was an increase in non-working males as 
men shifted out of paid employment. Illustrating the importance of conditioning on 
marital status, the pattern for single males is quite different. The fraction of single-men 
not working in 2007 was very close to that seen in 1967. Among these men, most of 
the fluctuations in employment are in the form of shifts between full-time and part-
time work.  
 The procedure for testing the impact of these changes in the employment rates 
is the same as that for evaluating the impact of changing marriage patterns, except that 
now a conditional rather than an unconditional reweighting procedure is used. Once 
again, the income of all individuals remains unchanged conditional on marital status 
Table 2.4: Percent of individuals living in a household with a male householder 
working full-time, part-time, and not-working, given the marital status of the 
householder 
  
Percent living in a 
household with a married 
male householders working   
Percent living in a 
household with a single 
male householders working 
 
Full time Part-time None 
 
Full time Part-time None 
1967 76.2 17.0 6.9 
 
52.0 24.8 23.2 
1975 68.2 20.7 11.1 
 
45.8 30.5 23.7 
1983 64.0 21.4 14.6 
 
50.6 28.4 21.0 
1992 66.1 17.4 16.5 
 
52.6 26.0 21.4 
1993 66.9 16.3 16.8 
 
54.3 25.0 20.8 
2004 70.2 13.3 16.5 
 
55.2 21.6 23.1 
2007 70.8 12.3 16.9   56.8 21.2 22.0 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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and employment status. 
 In Row 3 of Table 2.2, the additional impact of male employment rate changes 
are presented for each business cycle. Although male employment changes 
substantially increased inequality in the late 1960s and were still important over the 
late 1970s business cycles, these changes have had very little impact on inequality 
since that time.  
This is further evidenced by comparing Series (b) of Figure 2.2, which presents 
inequality trends when both marriage rates and male employment rates change, to 
Series (a) of Figure 2.2 when only marriage rates changed. With the exception of the 
period from 1967 to 1975, where the male employment changes clearly led to a further 
increase in inequality, the inequality trends in these two series are quite similar. Thus, 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note for Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.2: Estimated increase in the household income Gini coefficient resulting 
from male employment status and labor earnings changes (1967-2007), 1975 
normalized to 1 
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male employment rate changes offer relatively little additional information regarding 
the changes in inequality seen since 1975. To the extent that changes in male earnings 
impacted household income inequality, it is evident that these changes have generally 
occurred among workers with a given employment status rather than due to shifts in 
intensity of employment. 
Changes to the male labor earnings distribution.
28
  Given that the changes in 
male employment rates generally had little impact household income inequality, to 
what extent did changes to the male earnings distribution impact household income 
inequality? Since male earnings inequality rose substantially in the past 40 years, one 
would expect that male earnings changes had a large effect on household income 
inequality trends. Using the rank-preserving income exchange procedure previously 
described for testing the impact of changes to the income distribution, this section 
explores the extent to which this is the case. This is first done holding the conditional 
mean labor earnings constant at 1975 levels, concentrating only on changes to male 
earnings inequality and excluding the impact of the real wage growth.  
In Row 4 of Table 2.2, it can be seen that male earnings inequality explains 
only a small fraction of the decline in income inequality between 1967 and 1975. 
These changes in male earnings inequality explain a 0.05 average annual percent 
decrease in inequality over this business cycle, which is less than one-fourth of the 
0.22 average annual percent increase in inequality seen from male employment 
changes over the same period. Thus, male earnings and employment changes alone 
cannot account for the small decline in household income inequality before 1975. 
The importance of changes in male earnings inequality is very different after 
1975, however. In the late 1970s business cycle male earnings inequality changes 
                                                 
28
 References to the male and female earnings distribution refer to the combination of changes to male 
labor earnings inequality and to changes in the real level of male earnings. 
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account for a 0.32 average annual percentage increase in inequality, 35 percent of the 
0.90 actual average annual percentage increase. In both the late 1980s and 1990s 
business cycles it accounts for over 60 percent of the observed increases in inequality.  
When the real male earnings growth is included along with the male earnings 
inequality changes, it is evident that complete shifts in the male earnings distribution 
are even more important for explaining household income inequality trends.
29
 In the 
late 1980s and late 1990s business cycles, the inclusion of real male earnings growth 
explains an additional 0.14 and 0.13 percent per year of the inequality growth 
respectively (Row 5 of Table 2.2). 
Additionally, when considering the annual trends in income inequality 
explained by including male earnings inequality (Series (c) of Figure 2.2) and male 
real earnings growth (Series (d) of Figure 2.2) in addition to the marriage rate and 
male employment changes, one can observe that many of the year-over-year 
fluctuations in inequality can largely be explained by the inclusion of these factors. 
While the magnitudes of inequality changes do not always match those actually 
observed, the years in which inequality increase and decrease attributable to male 
earnings, employment, and real income changes are generally consistent with the 
actual income inequality series.  
The combination of male employment rate changes, male earnings inequality 
changes, and male real earnings growth are clearly extremely important for 
understanding the long-term changes in income inequality that have occurred over the 
past 40 years. However, it is also notable that the relationship between these male-
earnings factors and household income inequality trends has changed over time. In the 
                                                 
29
 Real earnings are inflation adjusted using the CPI-U-RS series. This series is used by the Census 
Bureau for their historical income series (Denavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2009) and incorporates 
recent improvements in the CPI to provide a more consistent inflation series than that provided by the 
unadjusted CPI. For more details on the CPI-U-RS series, see Stewart and Reed (1999). 
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late 1970s business cycle, the sum of the contributions of these three factors explains a 
0.43 average annual percentage increase in income inequality (Rows 3 through 5 of 
Table 2.2), or about one-half of the net increase in income inequality during this 
period. In the late 1980s business cycle, they combined to explain a 0.45 average 
annual percentage increase in income inequality, which is 88 percent of the actual 
income inequality growth observed in this business cycle.  
By the 1990s business cycle, while the combined contribution of these factors 
slowed to explain a 0.19 average annual percentage increase, this slowdown is less 
substantial than the actual slowdown in income inequality that occurred. As a result, in 
the 1990s business cycle the male earnings and employment changes accounted for 
143 percent of the actual increase in inequality. This suggests that had it not been for 
other factors mitigating the inequality growth from male employment and earnings 
changes, household income inequality growth would not have slowed to the extent that 
it did in the 1990s.  
More broadly, since Figure 2.2 illustrates that male employment and earnings 
alone understate the inequality increases in the 1970s and 1980s and overstates the 
increase in the 1990s, had other changes beyond male employment and earnings 
changes not been occurring, household income inequality growth would have been 
slower in the late 1970s and 1980s business cycles but faster in the 1990s. Therefore, 
to reconcile the differences in the timing of the inequality increases, it is necessary to 
also consider the changes to the earnings distributions of other income sources and 
changes to the correlation between male and female earnings.  
 Changes to female employment rates and the female earnings distribution. It 
has been well documented that female employment rose dramatically over the past 40 
years. Unlike the observation for male employment where married men exited the 
work force while single men increased their employment rates, females in 2007 are 
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both more likely to be employed and more likely to work full-time than they were in 
1967 regardless of their marital status. This is illustrated in Table 2.5, which shows a 
23 percentage point increase in full-time employment among married women and a 13 
percentage point increase in full-time employment among single women. 
Using the same reweighting procedure as above for evaluating the impact of 
changing male employment rates on household income inequality, Row 6 of Table 2.2 
illustrates that the rise in female employment slowed the rise in income inequality over 
the past 40 years. During the late 1970s and 1980s business cycles this reduction in 
inequality growth was more substantial given the rapid growth in female employment 
during that period. If females entering the labor market had the same earnings profiles 
of women in 1975, increases in female employment would have reduced inequality 
growth by -0.15 and -0.19 percent per year in the 1970s and 1980s business cycles 
respectively. This is quite different from the trivial impact of the male employment 
rate changes on household income inequality over this period.  
This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2.3. Series (a) of Figure 2.3 reproduces 
Table 2.5: Percent of individuals living in a household with a female-householder 
working full-time, part-time, and not-working, given the marital status of the 
householder 
  
Percent living in a household 
with a married female 
householders working   
Percent living in a household 
with a single female 
householders working 
 
Full time Part-time None 
 
Full time Part-time None 
1967 18.3 30.9 50.8 
 
30.1 27.9 42.1 
1975 20.2 32.0 47.8 
 
28.6 26.0 45.4 
1983 26.0 32.8 41.2 
 
32.7 23.2 44.1 
1992 35.4 30.5 34.2 
 
36.9 22.5 40.6 
1993 34.9 31.3 33.7 
 
36.3 23.4 40.2 
2004 38.9 26.2 35.0 
 
42.7 23.1 34.2 
2007 41.3 24.4 34.3   43.3 22.5 34.2 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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Series (d) of Figure 2.2 – the change in inequality that would have occurred if only 
marriage rates and the male employment rate and earnings distribution changed. Series 
(b) of Figure 2.3 then shows the change in inequality if marriage rates, the male 
employment rate and earnings distribution, and female employment rates changed. 
Considering the difference between Series (b) and Series (a), the marginal effect of 
female employment changes did considerably reduce the increases in inequality – as 
expected from the business cycle results described above. However, like changes in 
marriage rates, this change was mainly important for long-term trends and hence its 
inclusion did not have much effect on the years in which inequality increased and the 
years in which it decreased.  
More importantly, just as the distribution of earnings among male workers was 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note for Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.3: Estimated increase in the household income Gini coefficient resulting 
from female employment status and labor earnings changes (1967-2007), 1975 
normalized to 1 
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changing, the conditional female earnings distribution changed as well. Series (b) of 
Figure 2.3 does not incorporate these changes to the female earnings distribution. To 
examine how changes to the female earnings distribution of working women 
contributed to household income inequality changes, the conditional rank-preserving 
income exchange procedure is used once again.  
As can be seen in Row 7 of Table 2.2, including the changes to female 
earnings inequality, but holding the conditional mean female incomes constant offsets 
the household income inequality declines since 1975 that resulted from the increase in 
female employment. However, the net increase in income inequality since 1975 is still 
smaller than it would have been had both female employment and female earnings 
inequality been unchanged at the 1975 levels. Prior to 1975, the contribution of 
changing female earnings inequality was different. During the late 1960s business 
cycle, the decline in female earnings inequality reinforced the slower inequality 
growth from women entering the labor market and these two factors account for a 
decline in income inequality during this period. However, the combination of factors 
considered thus far still suggest an increase in inequality from 1967-1975 rather than 
the slight decrease that actually occurred.  
Unlike the case for men, Row 8 of Table 2.2 shows the increase in inequality 
from including the real female earnings growth in addition to the female earnings 
inequality changes. In each business cycle since 1975, the average annual percentage 
increase in inequality attributable to real earnings growth of female earnings was less 
than 0.05 percent per year. Thus the combined effect of female employment and 
earnings distribution changes (Rows 6 through 8 of Table 2.2) reduced inequality in 
each business cycle through the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s business cycles, these 
combined factors reduced inequality growth by approximately 10 percent of the actual 
increase, and in the 1990s it reduced inequality growth by approximately 40 percent of 
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the now slower actual increase.  
 The year-over-year changes in inequality including these factors (Series (c) 
and Series (d) of Figure 2.3) present a similar picture to that described above when 
female employment rates changed but the conditional female earnings distributions 
were held constant. The increase in inequality is slower than that seen when both 
female employment and earnings distributions were held constant but the year-over-
year patterns in inequality are only slightly effected.  
Changes to spouses’ earnings correlations. Thus far the analysis has assumed 
that the rank correlation across income sources remains unchanged. However, this has 
not been the case. The correlation between male and female labor earnings has risen 
substantially over the past 30 years, which could occur for several reasons.  These 
include an increase in assortative mating or from high-skill women who were married 
to high-earning men and thus chose not to work in the 1970s have entered the labor 
market at a disproportionately high rate and now have positive labor earnings.  This 
increase in the correlation of earnings between male and female household heads has 
the potential to greatly increase household income inequality by concentrating wealth 
into a smaller number of households. Since correlation changes can result both from 
shifts in the correlation of spouses‘ employment decisions and from shifts in the 
correlation of earnings when both spouses are employed, the analysis of correlation 
changes only conditions on the household heads‘ marital status and not their 
employment status. 
Previously, it was observed that almost all of the total increase in household 
income inequality could be explained by the combination of changes to the marital 
status of the household head and the employment status and earnings distributions of 
male household heads. However, as was seen in Figure 2.2 these factors alone led to 
an understatement of the household income inequality increase in the late 1970s and 
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1980s business cycles and an overstatement of the increase in the 1990s. This was 
particularly noticeable during the late 1970s business cycle where income inequality 
was rising quite rapidly but male employment and earnings distribution changes could 
explain less than half of this increase. 
 As is evident in Row 9 of Table 2.2, these timing differences can largely be 
explained by the change in earnings correlation. In the late 1970s and 1980s business 
cycles, the change in earnings correlations were positively associated with household 
income inequality changes. The increase in correlation accounted for a 0.24 percent-
per-year increase in household income inequality in the late 1970s business cycle and 
a 0.10 percent-per-year increase in the 1980s business cycle. As a result, the rise in 
household income inequality over these two business cycles outpaced the rise 
attributable to only male employment and earnings distribution changes.  
This reversed in the 1990s business cycle. Starting in the 1990s, the effect of 
changes in spouses‗ rank correlation of labor earnings reversed. Rather than 
accounting for an increase in household income inequality, as occurred in the 1970s 
and 1980s, changes in spouses‘ earnings rank correlations mitigated the increase in 
household income inequality in the 1990s. Had earnings rank correlations been 
unchanged, the rise in household income inequality in the 1990s would have been 0.06 
percent-per-year higher, a 39 percent increase over the observed inequality increase. 
Thus, as a result of changing earnings correlations and the reduction in household 
income inequality attributable to female employment rate changes, the actual rise in 
household income inequality in the 1990s was slower than that attributable to only 
male earnings distribution and employment rate changes. In the beginning of the 
current business cycle, from 2004-2007, however, correlation between male and 
female earnings began growing slightly again so reductions in their correlations should 
not necessarily be expected to continue holding down inequality increases in the 
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future.  
The impact of these correlation changes can also be seen in Series (b) of Figure 
2.4. When spouses‘ earnings correlations are changed along with marriage rates, male 
and female employment rates, and male and female earnings distributions, the 
explained inequality trend very closely matches the actual change in inequality since 
1975. Thus, while there are other factors that could also influence household income 
inequality, such as changes in public transfers, non-labor income, or labor earnings for 
non-household heads, these other factors play only a small role in explaining 
inequality changes from 1975-2007.  
However, it is also apparent in Figure 2.4 that the previously discussed factors 
are less successful at explaining inequality changes prior to 1975. Changing only these 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note for Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.4: Estimated increase in the household income Gini coefficient resulting 
from spouses' earnings rank-correlation changes (1967-2007), 1975 normalized  
to 1 
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factors suggests that household income inequality would have increased by 3.1 percent 
over this 8 year period, when in fact, household income inequality declined by 1.3 
percent. Therefore, there must be another factor that accounts for why household 
income inequality was not increasing. This factor is public transfers. Between 1967 
and 1975 there were sizeable increases in public transfers for those near the bottom of 
the income distribution. As a result, excluding these changes to public assistance 
programs ignores a source of growing income for individuals at the bottom of the 
income distribution during the late 1960s business cycle.  
It is possible that these increases in public transfers also induced individuals to 
reduce their levels of employment and contributed somewhat to the rise in inequality 
in the late 1960s observed when only changes to employment, labor earnings, and 
marriage rates were considered. However, even if that is the case, focusing only on 
labor earnings changes and ignoring changes in public transfers income will lead to a 
misstatement of shifts in the well-being of individuals at lower-tail of the distribution 
and of changes in household income inequality. 
Public Transfers. The impact of changes to the distribution of public transfers 
can be added by using a rank-preserving income exchange as was done for both male 
and female earnings. The changes in the inequality of public transfers distributions 
that occurred in the 1960s business cycle accounted for a -0.23 average annual 
percentage change in the Gini coefficient during this period (Row 10 of Table 2.2). 
Furthermore, the increase in mean public transfers over this period accounted for an 
additional -0.23 average annual percentage change in the Gini coefficient (Row 11 of 
Table 2.2). As a result, public transfers changes explain why the earlier analysis 
expected an increase in income inequality in the late 1960s business cycle while 
inequality actually decreased slightly.  
The influence of including public transfers can be seen more clearly by 
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comparing Series (b) of Figure 2.5, which includes these public transfers changes 
along with all previously discussed factors, to Series (a) of Figure 2.5 which excludes 
the public transfers changes. While changes to public transfers had very little 
additional impact on inequality after 1975, their inclusion largely reconciles the 
unexplained changes in income inequality prior to 1975. 
 
2.7 Understanding the trend in the correlation of spouses’ earnings 
Given the importance that the correlation between spouses‘ earnings had on the trends 
in household income inequality, it is worth considering what led to the rise in 
correlation in the 1970s and 1980s and the decline in correlation in the 1990s. The 
changes in correlation can come either from shifts in the correlation of earnings among 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note for Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.5: Estimated increase in the household income Gini Coefficient resulting 
from public transfers changes (1967-2007), 1975 normalized to 1. 
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couples where both individuals work or from shifts in the frequency of two-earner 
couples at different points in the income distribution. While not eliminating the 
possibility of the former explanation, there is evidence that changing employment 
patters are a key element of the correlation trends. 
 Figure 2.6 illustrates the change in female employment rates among married 
working age women in each full business cycle since 1975 based on the decile of their 
husband‘s labor earnings.  When considering employment trends in this way, it is 
apparent that in the 1975-1983 business cycle, the most rapid rise in female 
employment occurred among women married to high earning men.  Among working-
age women married to men in the top decile of the male earnings distribution, 
employment increased by over 15 percentage points.  However, among working-age 
women married to non-working men employment only increased by 2 percentage 
Source: Authors calculations using Public Use March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Figure 2.6: Percentage change in female employment among married, working 
age women by decile of their husband's labor earnings 
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points.  This difference is important in understanding the increase in correlations since 
the increases in female employment among high earning men must increase the 
spouses‘ earnings correlation as two uncorrolated observations (a high earning man 
married to a woman with no earnings) now become more correlated (a high earning 
man married to a woman with some positive earnings). 
 Looking at the 1993-2004 business cycle when correlations declined, the 
pattern is quite different.  During this period, women married to non-working men 
increased their employment by almost 10 percent while women married to working 
men in any decile saw a decline in employment rates. This would therefore lead to a 
decline in correlations as correlated earnings (two non-earners) become less correlated 
with the woman entering the labor market. 
 Figure 2.7 provides a similar analysis of the change in male employment rates 
 
Source: Authors calculations using Public Use March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Figure 2.7: Percentage change in male employment among married, working age 
women by decile of their wife’s labor earnings 
 
 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
not 
working
bottom
decile
2nd
decile
3rd
decile
4th
decile
5th
decile
6th
decile
7th
decile
8th
decile
9th
decile
top
decile
1975-1983
1983-1992
1993-2004
 95 
 
among married working age men based on the decile of their wife‘s labor earnings.  
This analysis finds similar results to that of female employment trends.  In the 1975-
1983 business cycle the slowest decline in male employment is among men who are 
married to high-earning women.  But in the 1993-2004 business cycle the trend is 
reversed with only men married to non-working or low-earning women entering the 
labor market at a positive rate. 
 To gain even more insight into why there is a decline in couples with two non-
workers in the 1990s requires further dividing the population into individuals in 
households with exactly two people and those in households with more than two 
people – which generally indicates children in the household.  When doing so in Table 
2.6, it is apparent that the increase in employment among working age women married 
to non-working men in the 1990s came entirely among women in households with 
three or more individuals.  The same occurred among working age men married to 
non-working women, where the gains in employment were entirely among men in 
households with three or more individuals. 
 Although this analysis cannot provide information on precisely why the 1990s 
saw a decline in non-earning couples with children, one possible explanation is that it 
was in response to changes in public policies during that time. Significant expansions 
of the Earned Income Tax Credit that occurred between 1993 and 1996 provided 
strong incentives for low income households with children to have at least one 
individual working in the labor market.  Additionally, declines in the welfare program 
made it more difficult for households with children to survive on government benefits 
alone.  Thus, employment patterns may reflect responses to public policies and the 
influence of these policies on income inequality trends go beyond that seen for labor 
earnings through their impact on the correlation of spouses‘ earnings. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
Numerous studies have documented the rapid rise in male earnings inequality 
and household income inequality that occurred during the 1980s, and the slower 
growth in inequality for each of these series in the 1990s. Despite the relative 
similarities in the overall increases in inequality using these two income definitions, 
the relationship between these series is not one-to-one and there are numerous other 
factors that should also be considered to understand trends in household income 
inequality. 
When disaggregating the increase in household income inequality into its 
component sources, results for the 1970s and 1980s are consistent with those found in 
earlier studies by Burtless (1999) and Burtless and Karoly (1995). Male earnings and 
employment changes account for just 47 percent of the rise in household income 
inequality in the late 1970s business cycle – which also includes the early years of the 
1980s. While male earnings inequality growth has slowed since that time, it has not 
slowed as markedly as household income inequality growth. As a result, the 
importance of male employment and earnings distribution changes have grown in 
Table 2.6: Correlation coefficient between size-adjusted male and female 
household head labor earnings  
  
Percent living in a household 
with a married female 
householders working   
Percent living in a household 
with a single female 
householders working 
 
Full time Part-time None 
 
Full time Part-time None 
1967 18.3 30.9 50.8 
 
30.1 27.9 42.1 
1975 20.2 32.0 47.8 
 
28.6 26.0 45.4 
1983 26.0 32.8 41.2 
 
32.7 23.2 44.1 
1992 35.4 30.5 34.2 
 
36.9 22.5 40.6 
1993 34.9 31.3 33.7 
 
36.3 23.4 40.2 
2004 38.9 26.2 35.0 
 
42.7 23.1 34.2 
2007 41.3 24.4 34.3   43.3 22.5 34.2 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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importance for explaining household income inequality trends and accounted for 143 
percent of the increase in household income inequality in the 1990s. This indicates 
that had it not been for other factors mitigating the increase in inequality from male 
earnings then household income inequality growth would not have slowed as 
substantially in the 1990s. The additional reduction in household income inequality 
growth in the 1990s was in large part due to changes in spouses‘ earnings correlations 
which reduced household income inequality growth during the decade by 39 percent. 
This is in marked contrast to the earlier business cycles when increasing correlations 
between male and female earnings accelerated the growth in income inequality.  
However, it also appears to be coming from a different area of the income distribution 
– with the earlier rise in correlations coming from an increase in two-earner couples 
while the decline in the 1990s appears to be coming from a decline in no-earner 
couples. 
An additional factor that changed dramatically over the past 40 years that 
influences income inequality is the rate of female employment. Consistent with the 
findings by Daly and Valetta (2006), the increase in female employment led to a 
reduction in household income inequality. However, this reduction was mitigated by 
increases in female earnings inequality among working women. Nevertheless, the 
combined impact of female employment rate changes and female earnings distribution 
changes did slow the increase in household income inequality by 10 percent in the 
1970s and 1980s business cycles and by 40 percent in the 1990s. 
Income sources other than labor earnings also have influenced income 
inequality at times during the past 40 years. During the business cycle spanning the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, increases in public transfer income at the bottom of the 
income distribution were offsetting the rises in inequality accounted for by other 
factors. While changes in public transfers have had little influence on trends in income 
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inequality since that time, their large effect during this early business cycle highlights 
the importance of considering income beyond just labor earnings when evaluating 
levels and trends of income inequality.  
The remaining contributor to changing household income explored was the 
decline in marriage rates over the past 40 years. Other than changes to male earnings 
inequality, this decline was the most important factor contributing to the rise in 
household income inequality since 1975 and accounts for a steady increase in income 
inequality since that time. Thus, it is evident that demographic shifts play an important 
role alongside changes in labor-market compensation in explaining the long-term 
trends in income inequality in the United States.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 2.1: Estimated Gini increase attributable to factor components using alternate method of analysis rather 
than sequential  analysis 
  1967-75 1975-83 1983-92 1992-93 1993-04 2004-07   1967-07 
(1) Actual Gini Avg. Annual Pct. Change -0.16 0.90 0.51 5.69 0.13 -0.23 
 
0.42 
         Avg. Annual Pct. Change accounted for by: 
       (2) Marriage Rates 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.08
 
0.13
         (3) Male Employment Rates 0.25 0.13 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
 
0.07
(4) Male Earnings Inequality -0.04 0.36 0.37 4.94 0.11 -0.24 
 
0.28 
(5) Male Real Earnings Level 0.21 0.03 0.13 0.49 0.05 -0.03 
 
0.10 
         (6) Female Employment Rates -0.06 -0.20 -0.17 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08
 
-0.10
(7) Female Earnings Inequality -0.20 0.05 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.10 
 
0.01 
(8) Female Real Earnings Level 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.08 0.06 
 
0.05 
         (9) Spouses‘ Earnings Correlation 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.06
 
0.06
         (10) Public Transfers Inequality -0.23 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.02
 
-0.01
(11) Real Level of Public Transfers -0.38 0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 
 
-0.10 
         (12) Other Factors 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.64 -0.09 -0.13  -0.07
1
Since other factors are the residual change, they are not separated from the overestimation of inequality that results from 
applying the shift-share analysis on 1975 data for all factors rather than applying the analysis sequentially through each factor. 
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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Appendix Table 2.2: Estimated average annual percentage change in the size-adjusted household income GE(0) coefficient 
attributable to factor components by business cycle 
  1967-75 1975-83 1983-92 1992-93 1993-04 2004-07   1967-07 
(1) Actual Gini Avg. Annual Pct. Change -0.33 2.07 0.48 11.79 1.06 -1.03 
 
0.96 
         Avg. Annual Pct. Change accounted for by: 
       (2) Marriage Rates 0.48 0.46 0.25 0.41 0.10 0.14
 
0.27
         (3) Male Employment Rates 0.35 0.12 0.00 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04
 
0.06
(4) Male Earnings Inequality 0.06 0.71 0.11 7.15 0.03 -1.36 
 
0.23 
(5) Male Real Earnings Level 0.36 0.04 0.28 1.62 0.24 -0.01 
 
0.24 
         (6) Female Employment Rates 0.00 -0.26 -0.30 -1.70 -0.20 0.08
 
-0.21
(7) Female Earnings Inequality -0.38 0.03 0.06 1.10 -0.01 0.30 
 
0.01 
(8) Female Real Earnings Level 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.10 
 
0.05 
         (9) Spouses‘ Earnings Correlation -0.07 1.08 0.21 1.21 -0.12 -0.43
 
0.17
         (10) Public Transfers Inequality -0.91 0.81 0.14 0.52 1.34 0.04
 
0.47
(11) Real Level of Public Transfers -0.56 0.15 -0.17 -0.28 0.01 -0.06 
 
-0.11 
         (12) Other Factors 0.26 -1.10 -0.20 1.80 -0.33 0.20  -0.28
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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Appendix Table 2.3: Estimated average annual percentage change in the size-adjusted household income GE(1) coefficient 
attributable to factor components by business cycle 
  1967-75 1975-83 1983-92 1992-93 1993-04 2004-07   1967-07 
(1) Actual Gini Avg. Annual Pct. Change -0.69 1.53 1.28 19.89 0.26 -1.26 
 
0.92 
         Avg. Annual Pct. Change accounted for by: 
       (2) Marriage Rates 0.37 0.38 0.20 0.30 0.08 0.12
 
0.21
         (3) Male Employment Rates 0.38 0.16 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03
 
0.07
(4) Male Earnings Inequality -0.23 0.39 0.92 16.86 0.16 -1.18 
 
0.62 
(5) Male Real Earnings Level 0.33 0.04 0.28 2.70 0.28 -0.06 
 
0.28 
         (6) Female Employment Rates -0.11 -0.34 -0.47 -4.23 -0.14 0.16
 
-0.32
(7) Female Earnings Inequality -0.41 0.11 0.18 2.92 0.02 0.22 
 
0.10 
(8) Female Real Earnings Level 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.31 -0.05 0.17 
 
0.00 
         (9) Spouses‘ Earnings Correlation 0.03 0.56 0.25 0.57 -0.11 0.20
 
0.15
         (10) Public Transfers Inequality -0.50 0.17 0.05 -0.17 0.12 0.01
 
-0.01
(11) Real Level of Public Transfers -0.44 0.13 -0.16 -0.32 0.01 -0.03 
 
-0.09 
         (12) Other Factors -0.17 -0.06 -0.01 1.69 -0.08 -0.84  -0.12
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
  
1
0
2
 
 
Appendix Table 2.4: Estimated average annual percentage change in the household income GE(2) coefficient attributable 
to factor components by business cycle 
  1967-75 1975-83 1983-92 1992-93 1993-04 2004-07   1967-07 
(1) Actual Gini Avg. Annual Pct. Change -1.70 0.77 2.21 52.84 0.03 -4.06 
 
1.34 
         Avg. Annual Pct. Change accounted for by: 
       (2) Marriage Rates 0.33 0.38 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.09
 
0.17
         (3) Male Employment Rates 0.38 0.19 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03
 
0.06
(4) Male Earnings Inequality -0.80 -0.19 2.05 50.71 0.05 -3.64 
 
1.30 
(5) Male Real Earnings Level 0.36 0.03 0.32 8.04 0.31 -0.54 
 
0.40 
         (6) Female Employment Rates -0.24 -0.51 -0.82 -12.92 -0.09 0.98
 
-0.54
(7) Female Earnings Inequality -0.53 0.15 0.30 7.47 -0.03 0.04 
 
0.20 
(8) Female Real Earnings Level -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 -1.83 -0.23 0.51 
 
-0.12 
         (9) Spouses‘ Earnings Correlation 0.01 0.71 0.53 5.15 -0.22 0.71
 
0.32
         (10) Public Transfers Inequality -0.54 0.07 0.03 -1.44 0.11 0.01
 
-0.05
(11) Real Level of Public Transfers -0.36 0.13 -0.15 -0.49 0.00 -0.01 
 
-0.07 
         (12) Other Factors -0.27 -0.14 -0.11 -1.98 0.07 -2.18  -0.44
Source: Authors calculations using Internal March CPS data (1967-2007) 
Notes: See Note to Table 2.1 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ARE THERE POSITIVE HEALTH EFFECTS FROM HIGHER INCOME?  
USING THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT TO EXPLORE THE INCOME-
HEALTH GRADIENT  
 
Abstract 
Although the existence of a positive relationship between income and morbidity has 
been well-documented in the literature, it is unclear whether the positive relationship 
exists because increased income allows individuals to purchase more health inputs 
contributing to their better health, because healthy individuals are more productive and 
can obtain higher wages in the labor market, or because a third factor contributes to 
increases in both health and income. This paper uses exogenous variation in income 
resulting from 17 years of changes in the generosity of state and federal Earned 
Income Tax Credit benefits to consider whether increases in income result in health 
improvements among the low income population. It finds only limited support for the 
theory that the relationship between income and morbidity is derived from shifts in 
income. In Survey of Income and Program Participation data, there is no evidence that 
increases in income improve self-reported health statuses and using March Current 
Population Survey data such evidence is only found when employment controls are 
excluded from the model. Additionally, while increases in income appear to reduce the 
prevalence of hearing and vision limitations when using corrective measures, it has no 
significant effect on other functional limitations considered.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is extensive evidence that a positive correlation exists between individuals‘ 
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socioeconomic statuses and their health outcomes, with high income individuals 
tending to be in better health than those with low incomes. This relationship has been 
observed for a wide range of health measures including mortality (Backlund, Sorlie 
and Johnson, 1996; McDonough et al., 1997; Deaton and Paxson, 1998), chronic 
conditions (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002), obesity (Schmeiser, 2009), functional 
limitations (Zimmer and House, 2003), and self-reported health status (Deaton and 
Paxson, 1998). However, while it is generally accepted that this positive correlation 
exists, there is no clear consensus on the direction or the pathway of the relationship. 
For example, Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002) and Lindahl (2005) suggest that 
increased income improves health outcomes. Bound (1989), Haveman et al. (1995), 
and Smith (1999, 2004), on the other hand, suggest that lower incomes are due to the 
productivity declines that result from poor health and disabilities rather than the 
reverse. Still others, including Fuchs (1982), suggest that an outside factor, such as a 
high discount rate, could lead to both poor health and low incomes and create the 
observed correlation. 
Distinguishing which pathway or pathways drive this relationship is extremely 
valuable for understanding the costs and benefits of public health policies and of 
public transfer programs. It has been suggested, for example, that increasing income 
transfer programs may be warranted if increases in income is demonstrated to have 
positive health effects (Deaton 2002, Lindahl 2005, and Herd, Schoeni and House 
2008). But because there are multiple pathways which could lead to a correlation 
between health and income, it has proved difficult for researchers to determine the 
relationship‘s causal direction.  
One approach for examining the impact of income on health has been to focus 
on how family income impacts child health (Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002). This 
relies on the assumption that children are not part of the labor force so their health 
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does not impact family earnings. However, child health could still affect family 
income if the parents must take time and energy that could be devoted to labor market 
activities caring for the sick child. It is also possible that the impacts of income on 
health differ across the age distribution making it important to consider the impacts of 
income on adult health. 
To further explore the direction of the income-health relationship requires 
using an exogenous variation in either health or income and evaluating the resulting 
impact of this variation on the other. Smith (1999, 2004) accomplishes this by using 
exogenous variation in health from the unanticipated onset of a chronic condition. He 
determines that health status has a causal impact on income and wealth among 
working age adults. However, the existence of a causal link in one direction does not 
preclude the existence of a link in the other direction as well.  
The existing research using exogenous income variations to exploring the 
opposite direction of how individuals‘ incomes impact their health has had mixed 
findings. Comparing the health of mid-size lottery winners in Sweden to non-winners, 
Lindahl (2005) finds evidence that an individual‘s health status improves as a result of 
a positive income shock. However, in a comparison of mortality rates for individuals 
who higher Social Security benefits due to the Social Security notch, Snyder and 
Evans (2006) observed that individuals with higher benefits actually had higher 
mortality rates. Additionally, Schmeiser (2009) uses variation in income from EITC 
benefit changes to find that higher incomes appear to increase obesity rates among 
women.  Supporters of the hypothesis that income influences health have criticized 
Snyder and Evans‘ findings, however, stating that much of the expected relationship 
occurs near the lower tail of the income distribution but that the Social Security Notch 
had a minimal impact on these low income individuals (Herd, Schoeni and House, 
2008). While not directly measuring the effect of income on health, in related work 
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Ruhm (2000) considers how health statuses vary during business cycles and observes 
an improvement in health during economic downturns. Ruhm also notes that the 
theoretical expectations for the impact of increased income on health are not 
necessarily positive. This is because not all normal goods are positive health inputs. 
Thus, the higher income may also be used to purchase goods that are detrimental to 
health, such as alcohol or tobacco. 
This paper adds to the literature exploring the effects of a variation in income 
on individuals‘ morbidity status. It does so by considering how an exogenous increase 
in income from a change in state-level Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) benefits 
influences the health of individuals who are eligible for these benefits. Over the course 
of the 1990s, state and federal guidelines for EITC benefits changed dramatically and 
these changes in benefits led to substantial shifts in the incomes of low income 
families. These variations provide a natural experiment for exploring how changes in 
income influence the health of low income individuals.  
There are three main benefits of using variation in EITC benefits for 
addressing the direction of the income-health gradient. First, previous research has 
suggested that the income-health gradient is strongest among the low income 
population (Backlund, Sorlie, and Johnson 1996, McDonough et al. 1997, Norris et al. 
2003, Herd, Schoeni and House 2008). Since the EITC is targeted at the low income 
population, it can be used to analyze this group of particular relevance to the gradient. 
Second, because the EITC eligible population consists of working age adults, the 
impact of an exogenous shift in income can be observed for a younger population than 
previous studies that looked at changing benefits for retirees. Third, by examining 
morbidity among working age individuals, this paper can benefit from the large 
sample sizes of the March Current Population Survey (March CPS) data and the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). By using these two large, 
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nationally representative datasets the power of estimates of observed effects can be 
improved over those found using smaller samples. Thus, this paper can obtain more 
precise estimates of the impact of income on morbidity for the working age population 
than has previously been possible in the literature. 
 
3.2 Background on the Earned Income Tax Credit 
The EITC program was first enacted in 1975 as a relatively small credit capped at 
$400 per family to offset payroll tax payments by families with children (Ventry 
2001). Since then, Congress has enacted several expansions to the EITC program – 
with one of the most notable expansions occurring from 1993-1996 when the 
government introduced benefits for individuals without children and increased in the 
scope and generosity of the program for those with children. The expansions of the 
program from its initial size broadened the population claiming the EITC from 6.2 
million families in 1975 to 24.6 million families in 2007. Similarly, the total value of 
annual benefits paid through the EITC program increased from 4.4 billion (2007 
dollars) in 1975 to 48.5 billion dollars in 2007. (Tax Policy Center, 2009a).  
A family‘s eligibility for federal EITC benefits is primarily dependent on the 
number of children in the family and the total labor earnings of all family members. In 
2008, a single individual with two children and no labor earnings income receives no 
EITC benefits. Benefits are then phased in at a rate of 40 percent of labor earnings 
income for the first $12,060 of earnings – providing a maximum possible credit of 
$4,829. This maximum benefit is maintained until the family reaches $15,740 in labor 
earnings. For each dollar of labor earnings beyond $15,740 the EITC benefits are 
phased out at a rate of 21.06 percent of labor earnings. Once the family reaches 
$37,783 in labor earnings the benefits are completely phased out and the family is no 
longer eligible for any EITC benefits. The EITC benefits system is similar for families 
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with no children or one child but with lower maximum benefits and different 
thresholds for the phasing-in and phasing-out of benefits.
30
 The structure of the EITC 
benefits is similar in earlier years as that for 2008, except that the benefits thresholds 
and rates of phasing in and out benefits vary by year. Table 3.1 illustrates the 
maximum benefits and thresholds for obtaining these benefits in each year since 1992.   
In addition to the federal EITC benefits, a number of states supplement federal 
benefits with additional state-level EITC benefits. The first state to offer state-level 
supplemental EITC benefits was Rhode Island in 1986 and over the course of the 
1990s and 2000s, supplemental state EITC programs expanded to a geographically 
                                                 
30
 Starting in 2009, the EITC program began offering benefits for families with three or more children 
above that provided for families with two children. Under the new policy, families with 3 or more 
children earned 45 percent of their first $12,590 in labor earnings in credits, an increase from the 40 
percent of the first $12,590 in labor earnings provided to families with two children. Prior to this, all 
families with two or more children were treated identically regarding their EITC benefit eligibility.  
Table 3.1: Maximum Federal EITC benefits and thresholds by year and number 
of children (in 2008 dollars) 
  No children   One child   Two or more children 
 
Earnings range 
for maximum 
benefits 
Maximum 
federal 
benefits 
 
Earnings range  
for maximum 
benefits 
Maximum 
federal 
benefits 
 
Earnings range  
for maximum 
benefits 
Maximum 
federal 
benefits 
1992 
     
11,307 - 17,802 1,991 
 
11,307 - 17,802 2,081 
1993 
     
11,371 - 17,901 2,104 
 
11,371 - 17,901 2,217 
1994 5,746 - 7,183 440 
 
11,134 - 15,803 2,928 
 
12,104 - 15,803 3,632 
1995 5,752 - 7,197 440 
 
8,641 - 15,838 2,938 
 
12,121 - 15,838 4,363 
1996 5,766 - 7,215 441 
 
8,650 - 15,865 2,941 
 
12,148 - 15,865 4,859 
1997 5,805 - 7,263 444 
 
8,694 - 15,957 2,956 
 
12,225 - 15,957 4,890 
1998 5,883 - 7,348 450 
 
8,812 - 16,173 2,996 
 
12,387 - 16,173 4,955 
1999 5,854 - 7,327 448 
 
8,787 - 16,101 2,988 
 
12,328 - 16,101 4,931 
2000 5,764 - 7,214 441 
 
8,652 - 15,866 2,942 
 
12,153 - 15,866 4,861 
2001 5,789 - 7,236 443 
 
8,683 - 15,919 2,953 
 
12,186 - 15,919 4,874 
2002 5,876 - 7,360 450 
 
8,821 - 16,181 2,999 
 
12,387 - 16,181 4,955 
2003 5,842 - 7,305 447 
 
8,768 - 16,073 2,982 
 
12,304 - 16,073 4,922 
2004 5,813 - 7,284 445 
 
8,731 - 16,004 2,968 
 
12,254 - 16,004 4,901 
2005 5,757 - 7,202 440 
 
8,636 - 15,849 2,936 
 
12,132 - 15,849 4,853 
2006 5,745 - 7,198 440 
 
8,628 - 15,815 2,934 
 
12,110 - 15,815 4,844 
2007 5,805 - 7,269 444 
 
8,712 - 15,981 2,962 
 
12,243 - 15,981 4,897 
2008 5,720 - 7,160 438  8,580 - 15,740 2,917  12,060 - 15,740 4,824 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on Tax Policy Center (2009b) 
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and politically diverse set of states. In 1992, the first year of this study, 5 states offered 
supplemental benefits and by 2008 23 states plus the District of Columbia had enacted 
state-level supplements to the federal EITC benefits (see Figure 3.1 for a map of states 
with state-level supplemental benefits). While there are differences in the refundability 
of state-level supplemental EITC benefits, these state-level benefits are typically 
calculated as a fixed percentage of a family‘s federal benefits. 31 In 2008, among states 
offering supplemental EITC benefits, the generosity varied widely from of 3.5 percent 
of federal benefits in Louisiana to 40 percent in the District of Columbia. For low 
income families this combination of state and federal benefits can be quite sizeable, 
representing between 7.65 percent and 56 percent of labor earnings for families with 
labor earnings below the disregard threshold.  
 
3.3 Data 
The primary data used in this paper comes from seven panels of SIPP data spanning 
the 14 years from 1992 through 2005.
32
 The SIPP dataset is a nationally representative 
survey conducted by the Census Bureau. It follows at least 44,000 individuals for two 
to four year panels (starting in 1996 the SIPP expanded to approximately 110,000 
individuals in each panel). Respondents are interviewed every three months on their 
income over the previous quarter and approximately once per year they are provided a 
topical question module asking about their health status and functional limitations.  In 
addition to the SIPP data from 1992 through 2005, estimates are also calculated using 
data from the March CPS from 1996 through 2009. The March CPS interviews at least
                                                 
31
 In addition to varying on the percentage of federal EITC benefits paid to recipients, states also differ 
on whether the credit is refundable. Given that many individuals eligible for the EITC pay little or no 
state income tax, refundable credits have the potential to be much more valuable to the target 
population. 
32
 The SIPP does not ask about health status in questionnaires collected in 2006, 2007, or 2008, thus 
limiting the analysis to years prior to 2006. Additionally, no health questions were asked in 1995, which 
was the final year of the 1993 panel so no observations are recorded for this year.  
  
1
1
5
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s compilation from Leigh (1994), Feenberg (2007), and Tax Policy Center (2009c) 
Figure 3.1: State level supplemental EITC benefits (1992-2008) 
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130,000 individuals each year (at least 200,000 each year since 2002), asking about 
their income over the previous calendar year and their current health status. However, 
unlike the SIPP, the March CPS does not include questions on functional limitations 
and it can only be used to consider the relationship between income and morbidity 
after 1996 when health status questions were added to the survey.
33
  
Measuring Morbidity. In the summer or fall of each year respondents in the 
SIPP are asked ―Would you say your health in general is excellent, very good, good, 
fair, or poor?‖ to obtain a measure of self-reported health status. The same question 
wording is also used in the March CPS to ask about health status. This question 
wording is the same or very similar to that used in numerous other surveys with self-
reported health components, including the Health and Retirement Study and the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Self-reported health status has widely 
been used in the income-health gradient literature (see, e.g., Case, Lubotsky and 
Paxson, 2002; Ettner, 1996; and Lindahl, 2005) and has been shown to be a good 
predictor of functional limitations (Idler and Kasl 1995; Idler, Russell, and Davis 
2000), health care utilization (DeSalvo, et al. 2005) and future mortality 
(Wannamethee and Shaper, 1991, Idler and Kasl 1991; Idler, Russell, and Davis 2000, 
DeSalvo, et al. 2005).  
Although self-reported health status is widely used to measure morbidity, it is a 
subjective measure of health which may vary based on the respondent‘s personal 
assessment of the scale. It is possible that two individuals with identical health could 
report different health ratings simply because of differences in their perceptions of 
good health. Therefore, to test the sensitivity of results to this measure of health status, 
                                                 
33
 One health-related variable that is available in the March CPS prior to 1996 is whether the respondent 
reports having a work-limiting disability. This question was asked in the March CPS beginning in 1980 
and may be a valuable alternative measure to use in future research on the relationship between income 
and morbidity. 
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results are also calculated measuring health based on eight functional limitations 
which are asked in several years of the SIPP panel. These functional limitations are 
having difficulty seeing and reading newspaper print even with glasses or contact 
lenses, hearing normal conversation even when wearing a hearing aid, lifting and 
carrying 10 pounds, walking a quarter-mile, climbing a flight of 10 stairs, getting in 
and out of bed or a chair, doing light housework, and using an ordinary telephone. 
Each functional limitation is asked as part of a series of questions in the SIPP survey 
inquiring as to whether the respondent has any difficulty with the activity. They are 
both evaluated separately and using a single binomial scale where individuals are 
considered to have a functional limitation if they answer affirmatively to having one or 
more of the eight limitations.  
Although the analysis of functional limitations is a valuable check of the 
results in this study, functional limitations are included only in the SIPP data and are 
not part of the CPS questionnaire. Therefore, for analyses of self-reported health status 
both the CPS and SIPP data are used, while analyses of functional limitations are 
limited to the SIPP dataset. 
Measuring Income. Both the SIPP and March CPS contain extensive income 
questionnaires that are intended to capture most sources of cash income in the family. 
The batteries of income questions inquire about wages and salaries as well as income 
from interest, dividends, public transfers, and other sources of non-labor income. 
Similar to most income datasets, both the SIPP and the March CPS capture pre-tax 
income and do not ask about tax liabilities. Given that the majority of research on the 
income-health gradient focuses on this pre-tax income, this paper initially does the 
same. However, since the relationship between health and income is more likely to 
depend on income available to individuals for consumption which is more closely 
captured by post-tax income, it is also valuable to consider the relationship between 
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post-tax income and morbidity. In order to explore post-tax income, taxes are imputed 
using NBER TAXSIM v9 based off of the income information provided by SIPP and 
CPS respondents. These imputed taxes are then added to each family‘s income to 
determine post-tax income for use in this analysis.
34
  
Additionally, the resources available to any individual in a family depend both 
on the family‘s income and on the number of individuals in the family who share that 
income. Thus, throughout this paper income is adjusted for family-size by dividing by 
the square root of the number of individuals in the family.
35
 To focus on low income 
individuals who will be affected by EITC benefit changes, the sample is restricted to 
individuals with pre-tax size-adjusted family income less than twice the federal 
poverty line for a single individual. This threshold roughly coincides with the 
maximum earnings families with 1 or 2 children can receive before EITC benefits are 
completely phased out. Thus, only individuals with pre-tax size-adjusted family 
income below $21,994 (2008 dollars) are included.  
One limitation of using SIPP data in conjunction with EITC and tax 
information is that the interviews for each SIPP panel are staggered across months. 
This means that health questions are asked at different times in the calendar year for 
each respondent. Taxes and EITC benefits, however, are based off of calendar year 
incomes. To ensure that the income for each individual is considered for the same 
time-span prior to being asked their health status, taxes and EITC benefits are 
calculated using calendar years and are assumed to be paid or received equally across 
                                                 
34
 Since the EITC is based on the tax unit, which is generally more restrictive than a family as defined 
by the Census, a family is defined throughout this paper as the Census subfamily. While the traditional 
Census family includes all related individuals in the household, the subfamily separates each nuclear 
family into a separate subfamily which is closer to the expected tax-units.  
35
 Dividing by the square-root of the family size is the most commonly used case of the economies of 
scale size-adjustments proposed by Buhmann et al. (1988) where Size-adjusted Family income = (total 
Family income) / (Family size)
α, with α=1 implying no economies of scale and α=0 implying infinite 
economies of scale. Setting α=0.5 closely matches the adjustments for family size implied by the 
Census Bureau poverty thresholds (Ruggles 1990). 
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months in the year.
36
 So, if individuals are asked about their health status in the 
beginning of October, the tax liabilities incorporated into their post-tax income will be 
9/12 of the current year taxes (January through September) and 3/12 of the previous 
year taxes (October through December). This procedure allows for income to be 
analyzed over consistent 12-month periods prior to health questions being asked, 
regardless of whether that 12-month period aligns with a calendar year. The CPS data, 
in contrast, asks about current health and income for the previous calendar year each 
March. Thus the observation period for income in the CPS accurately aligns with a 
calendar tax year for both the calculation of EITC benefits and annual tax liabilities.  
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
To confirm that a positive relationship between income and health exists in the 
March CPS and SIPP data, the standard Ordered Logit regression: 
 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡     (3.1) 
can be used, where Hist is the individual‘s self-reported health status; Yist is the size-
adjusted family income over the previous 12 months (previous calendar year in the 
CPS); Xit is a vector of demographic variables including age, race, ethnicity, gender, 
education, marital status, number of children in the family, residence in a MSA, and 
health-insurance status; and Zs is a vector of state dummy variables to account for 
time-invariant differences between states that influence the health of its residents. The 
regression is performed as an Ordered Logit regression to reflect the ordinal rather 
than cardinal relationship between health statuses. 
                                                 
36
 While Individuals qualifying for EITC benefits may opt to receive them throughout the year as they 
pay payroll taxes rather than waiting until filing taxes in April of the following year, the take-up rate on 
this option is only around 0-2 percent over the past two decades (Holt , 2008). To the extent that 
individuals anticipate the refund but do not apply for the advance EITC benefits, however, this income 
change may be reflected in their spending decisions. Nevertheless, the delay in collecting EITC benefits 
may lead to an overstatement of the immediate increase in post-tax income that results from an increase 
in EITC benefit generosity. 
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While the existence of a relationship between income and morbidity can be 
observed using a standard Ordered Logitt regression, given the multiple pathways that 
can impact this relationship it would be misleading to interpret the effect as causal 
based on these results. Exploring causality instead requires finding an exogenous 
variation in income or health to separate the contributing effects. The changes in state 
and federal EITC benefits that have occurred since 1992 provide a natural experiment 
to explore the impacts of such an exogenous variation in income. Schmeiser (2009) 
exploited these variations to consider how an exogenous increase in income impacts 
obesity rates among low income individuals and this paper uses a similar strategy to 
consider the impact on morbidity of these individuals. 
In order to identify the causal influence of changes in income on morbidity, 
each individual‘s family income is instrumented for using the maximum combined 
state and federal EITC benefits that the family could potentially receive. This 
maximum benefit level is a state level variable reflecting the credits a family in the 
state could receive if their labor earnings were such to maximize their benefits. It 
depends only on the state of residence and number of children in the family and not on 
the labor earnings of family members. Data on state and federal benefits were 
compiled based on Leigh (2004), Feenberg (2007), and the Tax Policy Center (2009b, 
2009c). 
The validity of using the maximum combined state and federal EITC benefits 
as an instrument requires that these benefits are correlated with family income but 
uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of morbidity status. Since the health of 
low income individuals has not traditionally been a factor in setting EITC benefits, it 
is unlikely that the unobserved determinants of an individual‘s health will be 
correlated with the state-level EITC benefits in a given year. However, this 
assumption could be violated if other state spending that influences health outcomes 
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vary along with EITC benefits.  One of the most notable possibilities is if health 
insurance status is unobserved and Medicaid changes occurred in conjunction with 
shifts in EITC benefits. But this problem is mitigated since individuals are asked about 
their health insurance status. Health insurance status is therefore included in all 
regressions, making health insurance an observable rather than unobservable 
determinant of morbidity.  Nevertheless, since it cannot be tested whether the 
exclusion restriction is satisfied, it remains possible that concurrent changes in other 
public spending programs could influence the results. 
Although the maximum EITC benefits are unlikely to be correlated with the 
unobserved determinants of morbidity, these benefits should be correlated with the 
income of low income families. In addition to the large direct supplement to income 
from the increase in benefits, increases in the EITC benefits also have been found to 
increase labor force participation and subsequent labor earnings (Meyer, 2002).
37
 As 
will be demonstrated below, given both the higher marginal income for hours worked 
and the labor supply effects from increasing EITC benefits, the generosity of state 
level benefits are a powerful predictor of family income for low income families.  
While the EITC benefits available in a state are predictive of income for the 
low income population, this is not the case for high-income individuals who are not 
eligible for the benefits. Therefore, to focus on individuals influenced by EITC 
policies, only individuals with size-adjusted pre-tax income below twice the federal 
poverty line for a single individual are included in this study. Additionally, the sample 
is limited to working age individuals aged 22 through 62, who are most likely to be 
induced to enter or remain part of the labor market given an increase in their take-
                                                 
37
 Snyder and Evans (2006) suggest that employment itself may have positive health benefits which 
could lead to an overestimate of the positive effects on health of higher income if not controlled for. 
Thus, regressions were analyzed both with and without hours worked as a control variable, as is 
discussed in more detail in the results. 
 122 
 
home pay from the EITC benefits.
38
 Even though these limitations prevent the 
generalization of results to the entire population, since the income health relationship 
is believed to be strongest at low incomes it is particularly valuable to understand the 
direction of the relationship among these individuals. 
To estimate how an increase in income influences the health of low income 
individuals, the family‘s size-adjusted income is first estimated using the first stage 
equation: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛿1𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑍𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖𝑠𝑡     (3.2) 
where Yist is the size-adjusted family income over the previous 12 months (previous 
calendar year in the CPS); EITCist is the maximum EITC benefits for which the 
individual could be eligible based on their number of children, state of residence, and 
year of observation; Xit and Zs are the same vectors of demographic characteristics and 
state dummy variables described in Equation (3.1).  
 As discussed above, since the SIPP data is structured as a monthly dataset 
where individuals enter the sample in different months, the period of analysis does not 
generally represent calendar years. Potential EITC benefits, however, are based on 
calendar year income. This problem can be overcome using the same procedure used 
for distributing estimated taxes paid across months. Just as it was assumed that taxes 
paid are distributed evenly throughout the year it can be assumed that individuals 
eligible for the maximum credits would collect them evenly throughout the year. In 
the first stage equation, EITC benefits are weighted based on the number of months of 
each calendar year for which income is observed. Thus, if income is observed for 
October 1991 through September 1992, EITCist will equal 3/12 of the maximum 
possible EITC benefits in 1991 plus 9/12 of the maximum EITC benefits in 1992. In 
                                                 
38
 Individuals age 22 through 24 are only eligible for EITC benefits if they have children, while 
individuals age 25 through 62 are eligible for some benefits even without any children in their families. 
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the annual March CPS survey, the maximum EITC benefits are considered for the 
previous calendar year which matches the period of observation for the individual‘s 
income.  
Using the estimated income from the first stage, measures of individuals‘ 
health are then estimated using the second stage equation:  
 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑌 𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡     (3.3) 
where the individual‘s health, Hist, is measured as self-reported health or the presence 
of functional limitations and 𝑌 𝑖𝑠𝑡  is the estimated income from the first stage equation. 
As was the case when estimating equation (3.1), when the dependent variable is self-
reported health an Ordered Logit regression is used to reflect the ordinal rather than 
cardinal relationship between health statuses. When the dependent variable is the 
presence of functional limitations, a Logit regression is used to reflect the binary 
nature of functional limitations. If increases in income for low income individuals 
receiving EITC benefits improve health outcomes, then this will be reflected by a 
positive coefficient β1. Similar to equations (3.1) and (3.2), vectors of demographic 
variables, Xit, and a vector of state dummy variables, Zs, are included as control 
variables in the second stage regressions.  
 
3.5 Results 
The positive relationship between pre-tax income and self-reported health that has 
been well documented in the literature can be easily observed in both the SIPP and 
CPS data. Table 3.2 illustrates this relationship by providing the fraction of the 
working age population reporting each health status by decile of their pre-tax size-
adjusted family income. In both datasets individuals in the bottom decile of income 
report being in poor health at over three times the rate of the total population. 
Similarly, the fraction of individuals in the bottom decile reporting being in excellent 
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health is less than 2/3 of that of the total population in both the SIPP and CPS data. 
When using the standard Ordered Logit regression from equation (3.1) to 
regress self-reported health on pre-tax income for the entire working age population, 
including controls for demographic characteristics such as age, race, education, and 
marital status, this significant positive relationship is still observed (Columns 1 and 2 
Table 3.2: Frequency of self-reported health statuses by decile of pre-tax size-
adjusted family income 
Panel A: Survey of Income and Program Participation 
 
  Self-reported Health Status 
Income 
Decile Poor Fair Good 
Very 
Good Excellent 
1 9.13 17.91 30.41 25.58 16.97 
2 5.75 13.26 29.85 30.32 20.82 
3 3.56 10.04 28.62 33.30 24.48 
4 2.71 7.93 28.08 35.39 25.90 
5 2.12 6.73 26.22 36.31 28.62 
6 1.74 5.97 24.69 37.40 30.19 
7 1.52 5.24 23.15 38.35 31.73 
8 1.16 4.61 21.90 38.69 33.64 
9 0.84 3.85 20.65 38.79 35.86 
10 0.59 2.94 17.48 37.17 41.82 
All 2.89 7.80 25.06 35.17 29.08 
 
Panel B: March Current Population Survey 
 
  Self-reported Health Status 
Income 
Decile Poor Fair Good 
Very  
Good Excellent 
1 10.25 16.51 29.29 24.76 19.20 
2 6.97 13.03 29.28 28.82 21.89 
3 4.08 9.71 28.33 32.78 25.10 
4 2.89 7.79 26.94 34.41 27.97 
5 2.23 6.54 25.43 35.61 30.19 
6 1.73 5.72 24.27 36.26 32.02 
7 1.41 4.99 22.66 37.07 33.87 
8 1.15 4.44 21.93 36.76 35.71 
9 1.00 3.82 19.65 36.86 38.67 
10 0.77 3.23 16.66 35.22 44.11 
All 3.25 7.58 24.44 33.85 30.87 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on SIPP and March CPS data files 
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of Panel A of Table 3.3). Additionally, the relationship between pre-tax income and  
self-reported health is even stronger when restricting the sample to low income 
working age individuals making less than twice the federal poverty line (Columns 3 
and 4 of Panel A of Table 3.3).  
If income is influencing health through its ability to allow for greater 
consumption activities, one should expect that the relationship is stronger when using 
post-tax income.
 39
 As can be seen in Panel B of Table 3.3, this is generally the case.  
Using the SIPP data for both all individuals and low income individuals, the 
                                                 
39
 Assuming income is influencing health through consumption, a valuable exercise would be to 
observe the changes in consumption occurring after an income shock and categorize their potential 
health effects.  Previous research has used the Consumer Expenditure Survey to establish that 
consumption increases in response to tax cuts (Souleles 2002) and tax refunds (Souleles 1999), but to 
my knowledge no research has attempted to analyze the health effects of consumption shifts in response 
to tax policy changes. 
Table 3.3: Ordered Logit results regressing self-reported health on size-adjusted 
family income and demographic controls for working age individuals 
  
 
(1) 
SIPP 
All working age
1 
(2) 
CPS 
All working age
1 
(3) 
SIPP 
Low income
2 
(4) 
CPS 
Low income
2 
Pre-tax income ($1000s) 0.0087*** 0.0052*** 0.0160*** 0.0138*** 
 
(0.00013) (0.00004) (0.00124) (0.00052) 
     Observations 307585 1325960 85397 356432 
 
 
  
 
(1) 
SIPP 
All working age
1 
(2) 
CPS 
All working age
1 
(3) 
SIPP 
Low income
2 
(4) 
CPS 
Low income
2 
Post-tax income ($1000s) 0.0154*** 0.00876*** 0.0191*** 0.0091*** 
 
(0.00022) (0.00008) (0.00140) (0.00064) 
     Observations 307585 1325960 85397 356432 
*significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on SIPP and March CPS data 
Note: Additional covariates in all regressions include gender, age, age-squared, race, 
ethnicity, education, year, state of residence, residence in an MSA, number of children 
in the family, marital status, and health insurance status. 
1
Working age population includes all individuals age 22-62 
2
Low income population includes all individuals of working age with size-adjusted 
pre-tax family income less than twice the federal poverty level for a single individual  
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coefficient for the relationship between income and health is greater using post-tax 
income than it was using pre-tax income.  For the CPS data, this is true for all working 
age individuals, although not when the sample is restricted to only those with low 
incomes.  
Additionally, similar to that seen using pre-tax income, the income-health 
relationship is stronger among low income individuals than it is for the population as a 
whole. Therefore, given the strength of the relationship at the lower tail of the income 
distribution, it is apparent that the low income population will be the primary focus 
going forward is particularly relevant to understanding the income-health gradient. 
IV Regression: Pre-tax income and self-reported health. While there is a 
significant positive relationship between pre-tax income and self-reported health for 
low income individuals in the Ordered Logit regression, this does not provide insight 
into on the direction of causation for the reasons described above. To consider the 
extent to which health status is influenced by changes in pre-tax income, the 
generosity of state and federal Earned Income Tax Credit Benefits is used to 
instrument for income. As can be seen from the first-stage F-statistics in Table 3.3, the 
generosity of state and federal Earned Income Tax Credit Benefits meet the 
requirement of an F-statistic greater than 10 signifying a strong instrument. However, 
when using the IV approach, the significant positive relationship observed in the 
Ordered Logit regression largely disappears.  
As can be seen in Column 1 of Table 3.4, when using the generosity of state 
and federal EITC benefits as an instrument for income in the SIPP data, higher pre-tax 
income has no significant effect on individuals‘ self-reported health status. The point 
estimates for the effect of income on morbidity are larger than those in the initial 
Ordered Logit regression, but because of the increase in standard errors from the IV 
approach the estimated effect is not significantly different from zero.  
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Given that a portion of the higher income from the EITC is due to an increase 
in hours worked, it is possible that the health effects of employment may be 
contributing to these results, since the regression in Column 1 of Table 3.4 does not 
control for  employment status. However, previous research suggests that employment 
tends to improve individual‘s self-reported health and mortality outcomes (Gallo et al., 
2000 and Snyder and Evans 2006). Thus, if changes in the EITC produce employment 
effects along with income effects, not controlling for the employment effects would 
likely overstate rather than understate the impact of higher income on health status.  
 When adding controls for whether the individual does not work, works part 
time, or works full time, the point estimate for the effect of income on health is lower 
than when these controls are excluded (Column 2 of Table 3.4). Thus, even with the 
controls for employment status, the observed effect of income on self-reported health 
is still not significantly different from zero and it does not appear that changes in 
individuals‘ employment statuses are a major factor for this result.   
To validate the results from the SIPP data finding no evidence that changes in 
pre-tax income for low income individuals have an effect on morbidity, the previous 
Table 3.4: Instrumental Variable results regressing self-reported health on pre-
tax size-adjusted family income and demographic controls for low income 
working age individuals 
  
(1) 
SIPP 
(2) 
SIPP 
(3) 
CPS 
(4) 
CPS 
Pre-tax income ($1000s) 0.0592 0.0394 0.0757* 0.0519 
 
(0.0671) (0.0723) (0.0442) (0.0750) 
     Employment Status No Yes No Yes 
     Observations 85397 85397 356432 356432 
First stage F-statistic 28.42 26.66 49.12 19.68 
*significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on SIPP and March CPS data 
Note: Additional covariates in all regressions include gender, age, age-squared, race, 
ethnicity, education, year, state of residence, residence in an MSA, number of children 
in the family, marital status, and health insurance status. 
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IV regression was replicated using the March CPS (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4). 
When doing so, there was some support for a positive health effect of higher incomes, 
although these findings were relatively weak. The point estimates for the effect of 
changes in income on morbidity are greater than those found in the SIPP both with and 
without employment controls and when no employment control is included, the higher 
estimated effect of pre-tax income observed in the March CPS data is significantly 
positive at the 10% level. However, once including controls for the individual‘s 
employment status the estimated effect of pre-tax income on self-reported health 
declines and is no longer statistically significant. Therefore, while there is some 
evidence that pre-tax income positively influences self-reported health, the evidence 
supporting this theory is weak given the lack of any significant effects in the SIPP data 
and a positive effect only for one of the model specifications in the March CPS.  
IV Regression: Post-tax income and self-reported health. Given that post-tax 
income more closely approximates the disposable income available to individuals for 
health-related consumption, would focusing on post-tax rather than pre-tax income 
influence the results? Although the first stage regression using the maximum potential 
EITC benefits to predict pre-tax income satisfied the standard requirement of an F-
statistic greater than 10, the strength of the first stage relationship increases 
dramatically when using post-tax income instead. This is because the actual EITC 
benefits received are only observed when using post-tax income. This is in contrast to 
pre-tax income, which only captures the additional income from shifts in behavior 
after a change in EITC benefits and not the direct income from the benefits 
themselves. However, while focusing on post-tax income makes the maximum 
potential EITC benefits a stronger predictor of income, the results for how income 
impacts self-reported health are largely unchanged.  
The results of the IV regression estimating the effect of changes in post-tax 
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income on self-reported health are provided in Table 3.5. When using post-tax income, 
there is no change to the direction and significance of the key results although the 
point-estimates for the effect of income on self-reported health declines in both the 
SIPP and CPS data.   
Similar to the findings using pre-tax income, the estimates derived from the 
SIPP data find that income changes resulting from shifts in the generosity of EITC 
benefits has no significant impact on health status. Using the March CPS data, the 
point estimates for the effect are once again larger than those in the SIPP and when no 
employment control is included the effect of post-tax income on self-reported health is 
positive and significant at the 10 percent level. But when adding the employment 
controls the estimated effect declines and is no longer significant. Therefore, mirroring 
the results using pre-tax income, while there is some evidence that post-tax income 
positively influences self-reported health, the evidence supporting a positive income 
effect on health is weak given the lack of any significant effects in the SIPP data and a 
positive effect only for one of the model specifications in the CPS.  
 IV Regression: measuring morbidity using functional limitations. While self-
Table 3.5: Instrumental Variable results regressing self-reported health on post-
tax size-adjusted family income and demographic controls for low income 
working age individuals 
  
(1) 
SIPP 
(2) 
SIPP 
(3) 
CPS 
(4) 
CPS 
Post-tax income  ($1000s) 0.0154 0.0097 0.0282* 0.0128 
 
(0.0174) (0.0179) (0.0164) (0.0185) 
     Employment Status No Yes No Yes 
     Observations 85397 85397 356432 356432 
First-stage F-statistic 540.42 571.43 521.58 459.40 
*significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on SIPP and March CPS data 
Note: Additional covariates in all regressions include gender, age, age-squared, race, 
ethnicity, education, year, state of residence, residence in an MSA, number of children 
in the family, marital status, and health insurance status. 
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reported health status is commonly used to measure morbidity in survey data, an 
alternative and somewhat less subjective approach is to measure morbidity using self-
reported functional limitations. Eight functional limitations which were included in 
each SIPP panel from 1992 through 2005 are considered in this paper. As was the case 
for self-reported health, when examining the prevalence of functional limitations 
among working age individuals by decile of the pre-tax size-adjusted family income 
distribution, each of the limitations are most prevalent among individuals in the 
bottom income decile (Table 3.6). The probability that a working age individual in the 
lowest decile of the income distribution reports at least one of these limitations is 2.2 
times that of the general working age population.  
 Table 3.7 uses a Logit regression to estimate the relationship between pre-tax 
income and functional limitations among low income working age individuals. The 
outcome variable is having the specified functional limitation, so a negative 
coefficient signifies that increases in income reduce the probability that the individual 
reports the limitation and thus that higher income is associated with better health. For 
seven of the eight functional limitations and for the aggregated functional limitations 
variable, higher income is associated with lower rates of the limitation. This is true 
both using pre-tax (Panel A) and post-tax (Panel B) income. The one exception was 
having difficulty using a telephone, where the effect was reversed and higher income 
was associated with higher prevalence of the functional limitation.  
To gain insight into the direction of these effects within the low income 
population, the same IV approach used previously is used here to re-estimates the 
effect of higher incomes on functional limitations. As was done when measuring 
morbidity using self-reported health, the effects are estimated using both pre-tax and 
post-tax income and with and without controls for employment status. The results 
using pre-tax income are provided in Panel A of Table 3.8 and those using post-tax  
  
1
3
1
 
  
Table 3.6: Frequency of self-reported functional limitations by decile of pre-tax size-adjusted family income 
Income 
Decile 
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
getting  
out of bed 
or a chair 
performing 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
1 6.30 3.85 13.04 15.13 15.04 1.58 4.48 5.21 24.65 
2 4.54 3.08 8.46 10.37 10.37 1.26 3.04 3.79 18.11 
3 3.00 2.46 5.76 7.01 7.24 0.74 2.10 2.29 13.29 
4 2.34 2.60 4.54 5.61 5.48 0.65 1.48 1.64 11.25 
5 1.93 2.13 3.56 4.60 4.65 0.45 1.17 1.30 9.49 
6 1.70 2.28 3.22 3.94 4.11 0.51 1.11 1.14 9.07 
7 1.37 1.97 2.70 3.49 3.52 0.39 0.90 0.97 7.96 
8 1.06 1.63 2.29 3.12 2.98 0.27 0.76 0.91 6.67 
9 1.21 1.90 2.05 2.30 2.51 0.21 0.57 0.68 6.52 
10 0.96 1.51 1.47 2.02 2.04 0.34 0.57 0.48 5.24 
All 2.44 2.34 4.71 5.76 5.79 0.64 1.62 1.84 11.22 
 Source: Author‘s calculations based on the SIPP (1992-2005) data files  
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3
2
 
  
Table 3.7: Ordered Probit results regressing functional limitations on size-adjusted family income and demographic 
controls for low income working age individuals  
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
Getting out 
of bed or a 
chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Pre-tax income  ($1000s) -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.027*** 0.020** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
 
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
Getting out 
of bed or a 
chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Pre-tax income  ($1000s) -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.037*** 0.020** -0.043*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
Additional covariates in all regressions include gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, education, year, state of residence, 
residence in an MSA, number of children in the family, marital status, and health insurance status. 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on the SIPP (1992-2005) data files 
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Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable results regressing self-reported health on size-adjusted family income and demographic 
controls for low income working age individuals 
Panel A: Regression results using Pre-Tax Income 
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
getting  
out of 
bed/chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Pre-tax income  ($1000s) -1.328*** -2.687*** -0.308 -0.380 -0.434 0.381 -0.633 -0.229 -0.697*** 
 
(0.488) (0.550) (0.354) (0.343) (0.337) (1.036) (0.585) (0.560) (0.261) 
          Employment Controls No No No No No No No No No 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
First-stage F-statistic 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 
 
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
getting  
out of 
bed/chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Pre-tax income  ($1000s) -1.421** -3.235*** -0.027 -0.066 -0.112 0.919 -0.353 0.250 -0.579* 
 
(0.600) (0.674) (0.439) (0.427) (0.420) (1.278) (0.723) (0.693) (0.323) 
          Employment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
First-stage F-statistic 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 4.43 
 
  
1
3
4
 
 
 
Table 3.8 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression results using Post-Tax Income 
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
getting  
out of 
bed/chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Post-tax income  ($1000s) -0.185*** -0.375*** -0.043 -0.053 -0.060 0.053 -0.088 -0.032 -0.097*** 
 
(0.068) (0.077) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.144) (0.082) (0.078) (0.036) 
          Employment Controls No No No No No No No No No 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
First-stage F-statistic 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 412.93 
 
  
reading 
newsprint 
hearing 
conversation 
lifting 10 
pounds 
climbing 
10 stairs 
walking 
1/4 mile 
using a 
telephone 
getting  
out of 
bed/chair 
performing 
light 
housework 
any  
functional 
limitation 
Post-tax income  ($1000s) -0.167** -0.380*** -0.003 -0.008 -0.013 0.108 -0.042 0.029 -0.068* 
 
(0.070) (0.079) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.150) (0.085) (0.081) (0.038) 
          Employment Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Observations 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 58943 
First-stage F-statistic 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 433.18 
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level 
Additional covariates in all regressions include gender, age, age-squared, race, ethnicity, education, year state of residence, 
residence in an MSA, number of children in the family, marital status, and health insurance status. 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on the SIPP (1992-2005) data files 
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income are provided in Panel B of Table 3.8. 
Similar to the results found when measuring morbidity using self-reported 
health, in general higher income from increased EITC benefit generosity had no 
statistically significant effects on the prevalence of functional limitations. This was 
true for six of the eight functional limitations using both pre-tax and post-tax income. 
The two exceptions are whether the individual has difficulty reading newspaper print 
even when wearing glasses or contact lenses and whether the individual has difficulty 
hearing even when wearing a hearing aid. For each of these functional limitations, the 
increase in either pre-tax or post-tax income resulted in a significant reduction in the 
prevalence of the limitation. Additionally, the effect that higher income has on 
reducing these limitations is substantial enough that increases in income also 
significantly reduce the probability of reporting at least one of the eight limitations.  
One possible explanation for the more significant effect of increases in income on 
these particular limitations is the availability and relatively low cost of glasses, contact 
lenses, and hearing aids which are referenced in the questions and can easily mitigate 
the limitation. The vast majority of individuals with these limitations do not report 
being blind or completely deaf, but rather have limited vision or hearing. Thus, it is 
possible that their functional limitations are the result of having no glasses or hearing 
aids or an outdated prescription. But because each of these limitations can be easily 
corrected in the short run with the purchase of glasses or a hearing aid, the limitations 
can be corrected in the short-run more easily than the other functional limitations 
inquired about. Thus, these findings may be reflective of the direct health spending in 
the short-run that result from increases in income. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Numerous researchers have previously documented the positive relationship that exists 
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between income and morbidity. Similarly, this paper observes this relationship over 13 
years of data from the SIPP and March CPS even when controlling for the gender, age, 
race, ethnicity, and education of individuals. Using shifts in the generosity of state and 
federal EITC benefits to instrument for the income of low income individuals, it 
considers whether the relationship is derived from changes in income influencing 
morbidity rates. When doing so, there is only limited evidence that changes in income 
influence morbidity status. 
Using both pre-tax and post-tax income, shifts in income among the low 
income population have only a statistically insignificant effect on self-reported health 
in the SIPP. Similarly, when measuring morbidity using functional limitations in the 
SIPP, changes in income resulting from EITC generosity have no significant effect on 
the prevalence of 6 of the 8 functional limitations. However, increases in income do 
appear to reduce the probability that an individual is unable to read newspaper print 
even when wearing glasses or contact lenses or hear normal conversation even when 
wearing a hearing aid. The positive significant effect of increases in income on these 
particular limitations would be consistent with individuals using additional income 
from their EITC benefits to remedy health ailments that are easily observable and 
relatively inexpensive to correct. 
While the SIPP data finds no significant effect of shifts in income on self-
reported health, a similar analysis in the March CPS provides limited support for a 
positive income effect. Using the March CPS data, the point estimates for the impact 
of higher pre-tax or post-tax income from increased EITC benefits are larger than 
those from the SIPP and are significantly positive when no employment controls are 
included. However, once employment controls are included the effect of higher 
income is no longer statistically significant so even in the March CPS the evidence for 
positive health effects from income are weak.  
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While the evidence in this study generally does not support the theory that 
higher incomes reduce morbidity rates in the short run, it is important to recognize that 
this does not rule out the possibility of long-term effects on health of an individual‘s 
income. Because both the SIPP and CPS follow individuals only for a relatively short 
period of time, it is not possible to observe the effects of higher income over several 
years or decades. Thus, over an extended period there may be long-term health effects 
from a permanent shift in income that exceed those observed just a year after the 
income shock occurs.  
Despite this limitation, it is useful to understand the short-term impacts on 
health of from shifts in income. Many of the pathways through which one might 
envision income influencing health, including improved medical compliance, health-
related behavioral changes, or reduced stress, would be expected to have an impact in 
the relatively short term even if these effects grow over time. However, it would 
nevertheless be valuable to further explore the long-run effects of income shocks and 
understand how these long-term effects compare to the short-run effects observed in 
this study.  
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